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ABSTRACT
Background
India is currently taking steps to provide Universal Health Coverage (UHC) as envisaged
in its National Health Policy 2017. Financial protection is considered the backbone of
UHC. In India, OOP expenses accounts for about 62.6% of total health expenditure - one
of the highest in the world. Out of 1.324 billion people in India, around 12.4% of the
population is below the poverty line. Lack of health insurance coverage and inadequate
coverage are important reasons for high OOP health expenditures. High OOP health
expenditures push many households into poverty. The objective of this research is to
examine the effect of Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor on hospitalizations
and inpatient OOP health expenditures, and to investigate the effect of OOP heath care
payments on catastrophic health expenditures (CHE).
Methods
Data from the recent national survey by the National Sample Survey Organization, Social
Consumption in Health 2014 were used. A propensity score matching was used to match
the people enrolled and not enrolled in health insurance programs. Binary logistic
regression model, Tobit model, and a two-part model were used to study the effects of
enrolment under Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor on the incidence of
hospitalizations, duration of hospitalization, and OOP payments for inpatient care
respectively. Three different analytical approaches were used to investigate CHE: (i)
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incidence and intensity of CHE, (ii) socioeconomic inequality in CHE, and (iii) factors
affecting CHE.
Results
Health insurance programs for the poor increase the incidence of hospitalization but has no
effect on the duration of hospitalizations and inpatient OOP health expenditures. Presence
of chronic illness, belonging to older age groups, women in the reproductive age group,
and belonging to a small household have higher hospitalization. People who have higher
duration of hospital stay, admitted to a private hospital, using allopathic treatment, having
chronic illnesses, having higher level of education and belonging to the middle age group
experienced higher OOP inpatient health expenditures. Presence of health insurance
coverage reduced both the incidence and intensity of CHE. CHE incidence was 10.94%
and the mean positive overshoot was 35.94%. Households with members at extremes of
age, female member, utilized a private hospital, and small households have higher
incidence of CHE. Households belonging to the poor socioeconomic status, and with
members having higher duration of hospital stay, and chronic illness experienced both
higher incidence and intensity of CHE.
Conclusions
By identifying the groups most affected, this research aids the designers of the national
insurance programs to design better benefit packages for those population groups. This
investigation will serve as a basis for assessing India’s policy options to reduce financial
burden due to OOP health expenditure
Keywords: financial protection, out-of-pocket health expenditure, catastrophic health
expenditures
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
Background
United Nations’ Sustainable Development agenda incorporates one goal (Goal 3)
that is related to health and well-being of the population and one of the specific targets of
the goal is to improve financial risk protection through universal health coverage (UHC).
UHC includes securing access to quality healthcare and safe, affordable medicines and
vaccines for everyone (Chapman, 2016). Resolution 58.33 of the World Health Assembly
recommends that all WHO member states should provide universal health coverage to their
entire population and protect households from catastrophic health expenditures (Obermann
et al., 2018). Catastrophic health expenditures are defined as out-of-pocket (OOP) health
spending that exceed a certain proportion of a household financial capability (Xu et al.,
2003). More than 100 countries in the world have either started their reforms towards UHC
or have already achieved it (Obama, 2008; Summers, 2015). Even though most countries
are striving to enable their citizens to obtain the healthcare they need without financial
barriers, 150 million people still experience catastrophic health expenditure each year
(Kastor & Mohanty, 2018). The amount of financial protection rendered to population
groups will depend on their degree of dependence on out-of-pocket expenditures for
financing health care (Xu et al., 2003).
Out of the 1.324 billion people in India (2016), around 21.9% of the population is
below the poverty line using the revised World Bank Poverty line of USD 1.90 (World
1

Bank 2019). In India, 35.1% (NHA 2017) of total health expenditure is due to
hospital inpatient services and therefore, protecting households from OOP expense in
hospital expenditures should significantly improve financial equity in health service
delivery. Moreover, access to health care can be improved significantly if the health system
can protect the poor households from significant out-of-pocket expenses. In order to
improve access to health care by the poor, India initiated a national health insurance
program for the poor in 2008. Although the insurance program is national in scope,
majority of the health insurance programs for the poor cover only hospital expenses
(Shahrawat & Rao 2012). It is not known to what extent the insurance program for the poor
has effectively reduced OOP cost of inpatient services for the poor individuals. The
objective of this research is to examine the effect of Public Health Insurance Programs for
the Poor on hospitalizations and inpatient OOP health expenditures. The program should
reduce the OOP expenses as well as should improve access to hospital services. A related
objective of the study is to identify the characteristics of households, specific health
conditions of individuals, and health delivery system issues that make people prone to
catastrophic health expenditures. In particular, the study will examine the association of
households’ demographic characteristics, social structure, and healthcare utilization
features that appear to be associated with relatively high level of expenditure and also
quantify the burden of OOP health expenditures and impoverishment due to OOP health
expenditures.
This research seeks to inform policy makers and health financing practitioners
about the characteristics of beneficiaries and types of services to be considered for reducing
likelihood of catastrophic expenditure in a system that intends to provide universal health
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care coverage. Around 35% of the total national health expenditure is for inpatient care,
and 31.96% of the total OOP health expenditures cost is spent for getting inpatient health
services (NHA 2017). Studies have shown that hospitalizations caused 25% catastrophic
health expenditures in different parts of India (Pandey et al., 2018). Previous studies used
different datasets or the same dataset for previous years or conducted cross-sectional
studies in different states to study the effect of public health insurance programs for the
poor. This study aims to improve on existing studies by investigating the effect of Public
Health Insurance Programs for the Poor using the specific dataset and the determinants of
catastrophic health expenditures at the household level including the incidence and
intensity of catastrophic health expenditures (CHE) in India. To this end, it is vital to begin
by understanding the demographic and health system characteristics of India.
1.2 INDIAN HEALTH SYSTEM
India’s Health System and Socioeconomic Snapshot
India is a lower middle-income country with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per
capita $7055.66 in terms of Purchasing Power Parity dollars and a population of 1.24
billion (World Bank 2018). The second most populous country in the world, India is home
to over 17 percent of the world’s population and experiences an annual population growth
rate of 1.1% (James, 2011). The annual growth rate of the urban population is 3.18%
(James, 2011). The populations of different states and union territories in India vary widely,
from 120 million in Uttar Pradesh to 64,473 in Lakshadweep (James, 2011). More than
two-thirds of Indian population live in rural areas. In terms of age, 41.1% of the population
of India is under the age of 18, and 49.8% is between the ages of 19 and 64 (James, 2011).
The largest employment sector in the country is agriculture, constituting 56.6% of
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employment share. As of 2018, around 81% of the total workforce was employed in the
informal sector including agriculture (ILO 2018). The literacy rate in India is 68.91% in
rural areas and 84.98% in urban areas and varies widely by state, with Kerala’s literacy
rate at 94% and Bihar’s at only 62% (GOI 2011). Though it represents the third largest
national economy in the world (after the U.S. and China), India’s public health expenditure
constitutes approximately about 17% of total health expenditure (Harris, 2005). Health
indicators in India have improved significantly since its independence from the British in
1947, but it still lags behind many developing countries. Life expectancy at birth in India
is 68 years and varies widely based on region; for instance, life expectancy in the state of
Kerala is 77 years yet only 61.50 years in the state of Madhya Pradesh (Singh et al., 2017).
One-fifth of all maternal deaths and one-fourth of all child deaths of the world occur in
India (UNICEF 2009). The maternal mortality ratio has seen an annual decline of 4.7%,
and the availability of skilled birth attendants in India has increased annually by 3.5% since
1990 (WHO 2012). The infant mortality rate in India is 34 per 1000 live births, with a wide
variation of 8 in the state of Goa to 47 in Madhya Pradesh (Narwal & Gram, 2013). India
failed to achieve many of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and targets (Nath,
2011).
Important indicators, such as infant mortality rate (IMR) and having an
institutional delivery, highlight wide disparities between the rich and the poor. Among the
poorest wealth quintile in India, the IMR is near 82 per 1,000 live births, whereas in the
richest quintile it is only 34 per 1,000 live births (Balarajan et al., 2011). There are
significant differences in access to healthcare in India based on socioeconomic factors.
Pregnant women in the richest quintile are six times more likely to give birth in an
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institution than poor women, and only 40% of Indian women have institutional deliveries
(Balarajan et al., 2011; Sen et al., 2002). Only 44% of children in India are immunized,
and coverage is 64% for children whose mothers have greater than 5 years of education;
only 26% of children with mothers with no formal schooling receive vaccinations
(Balarajan et al., 2011). The health information system is in its rudimentary stages in India,
and currently there is no national health system architecture covering all states (Pandey et
al., 2010).
The burden of disease in India is very high, accounting for 18% of the total deaths
occurring worldwide and 20% of global disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). India is
undergoing a period of epidemiological transition with 53% of deaths and 44% of DALYs
lost attributable to non-communicable diseases, and 36% of deaths and 42% of DALYs
lost due to communicable diseases, nutritional deficiencies, and maternal and child health
diseases (Srinath Reddy et al., 2005).
Service Delivery
Health service delivery in India is characterized by a three-tier system, which is
comprised of the central government, state governments, and private providers (Chokshi et
al., 2016). The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW) is the principal ministry
for health in India, and there are state ministries of health that look after the delivery of
health services in the states. The health functions are divided between the central
government and the states (Chokshi et al., 2016). Public health delivery is the responsibility
of the state governments, whereas both the state and the central governments have the
authority on actions related to health insurance (Lakshminarayanan, 2011).
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The public health sector system of India is composed of primary health centers,
sub-centers, hospitals/health centers, community health centers, rural hospitals, district
hospitals, and teaching hospitals (Nair, 2015). In India, services in the public health sector
hospitals are offered free of cost for almost all services; a small service fee is charged for
advanced procedures (Prinja et al. 2017). The private sector consists of the private
hospitals, general practitioners, specialists, and clinics. The principal source of revenue of
private hospitals is the out-of-pocket payments (Nair, 2015). In the private sector, patients
are free to consult the general practitioners or the specialists of their choice. Private
insurance companies are run as “for-profit” businesses. Central government agencies, such
as defense and railways, have their own hospitals, and the central government health
scheme provides free service only to their employees (Prinja et al. 2017).
Health Workforce
India’s health human resources are scare, with a national average of 0.59 doctors
per thousand population compared to global norm of 2.25. The Indian health sector
comprises only 1% of the total general workforce, approximately 2.5% of the service
sector, and about 6.5% of the total segment of the workforce devoted to community, social,
and personal services (Hazarika, 2013). The National Sample Survey of India indicated
that all practitioners (approximately 2 million), across all areas of medicine and all types
of medical establishments, are working in 1.3 million enterprises excluding the public
sector (Government) (Karan et al., 2019). Primary Health Centers (PHCs) have an 8%
deficit of doctors, and Community Health Centers (CHCs) have a 65% shortfall of
specialists. Although the rural population comprises around 70% of the total Indian
population, most of the infrastructure and health services are located in urban areas, which
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contain almost two-thirds of India’s doctors (Yadav et al., 2009). Only 24% of rural areas
have a health facility, as compared to 88% of towns (Karan et al., 2019). Notably, sole
practitioners run 90% of the healthcare facilities in rural areas (Karan et al., 2019).
Public-Private Sector Divide
The private sector provides 58% of India’s hospitals and 81% of doctors in India
(Thadani, 2014). Even though 29% of the available hospital beds in India reside in the
private sector, it only has an occupancy rate of 44%; in the public sector, the occupancy
rate is 62%. Nearly 78% of the rural and 81% of the urban population is provided medical
treatment by private healthcare players. In terms of outpatient department (OPD) cases in
the private sector, 77% occur in rural areas and 80% take place in urban areas (Katyal et
al., 2015). Healthcare services in India are trending toward more high cost and high-tech
procedures, especially in the private sector (Thadani, 2014). Since the private sector
currently dominates the healthcare system, India needs to achieve an effective publicprivate mix and better regulate the private sector in order to provide safe, comprehensive
primary health care to everyone.
Financing Health Care
Evidence from the recent National Health Accounts of India shows that among the
total health expenditure in India, only 29% is from government health expenditure, 5.7%
is from Social Security Expenditure on health, 3.7% is from Private health insurance
expenditure and the rest 62.6% is OOP health expenditure. Out of the 62.6% of OOP health
expenditures, 59.1% are for outpatient and preventive health care, 31.96% for inpatient
health care, 2.46% for medicines (not covered under inpatient and outpatient care), 6.24%
for transportation, and 0.09% for laboratory and imaging services. India spends only 1%
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of its GDP on publicly funded healthcare and 0.1% on medicines for its people (NHA
2017). By 2020, the Government of India intends to increase public spending on healthcare
to 3% of its GDP (Hooda, 2013). This level of public health expenditure is extremely
unfavorable, because the lower and middle-income countries spent, an average, 2.8% of
their GDP on healthcare, and even impoverished sub-Saharan countries spent 1.7% of their
GDP on public health (WHO 2019). The World Development Indicators (health systems)
of the World Bank show that India spent 4.7% of its GDP on health care in 2014. Out of
this only 29% was publicly funded, which means that the other 71% was funded from nongovernmental sources consisting of both formal and informal care providers (World Bank
2014). Secondary and tertiary hospitals accounted for nearly three-fourths of the total
formal curative care spending; these hospitals are mostly located in urban areas whereas
70% of the total Indian population is in rural areas (GOI 2011). The composition of health
expenditures is such that a major chunk is spent to meet the recurrent costs of the public
healthcare delivery system, with about 70% of the total health budget devoted to salaries
and wages alone (NHA 2017). Figure 1.1 below highlights India’s various sources of
healthcare funds (NHA 2017).
Among the total health expenditure various components of health expenditures by
function shown in Figure 1.2. Only 6.8% of India’s spending goes toward preventative and
promotive healthcare (NHA 2017); in China and Sri Lanka, this proportion is as high as
two-thirds (Basu et al., 2012). States fully finance hospital services; on average, out of the
total governmental healthcare spending, the states’ share of primary healthcare costs is
found to be above 85%, but the budgetary allocations at the state level are deplorably low
with glaring interstate differentials (Purohit, 2004).
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Figure 1.1 Current Health Expenditures (2014-15) by Financing Schemes (National Health
Accounts, 2017)

Figure 1.2 Current Health Expenditure (2014-15) by Healthcare Functions
9

1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
1.3.1 OOP Health Expenditures in India
According to the World Health Organization’s list of “countries with highest out of
pocket (OOP) expenditure on health,” India ranks third in the region of Southeast Asia. In
India, OOP expenses accounts for about 71.1% of total health expenditure - one of the
highest in the world (Balarajan et al., 2011; Hooda, 2017). Evidence shows that high OOP
health expenditures push many households into poverty (Hooda, 2017). There has been a
significant increase in out-of-pocket and catastrophic health expenditures in India because
of declining importance of GOI funding in overall health expenditure (Hooda, 2013), a
strong private healthcare system and weakening of the public healthcare system (Peters et
al., 2002), the user fee in the public sector tertiary hospitals (Thakur et al., 2009), the
liberalization of the pharmaceutical industry (Kumar, 2004), and the creation of the Drug
Price Control Order, which led to an increase in drug prices (Hooda, 2017).
Nearly 39 million people in India become impoverished every year due to
catastrophic health expenditures (Balarajan et al., 2011). Indeed, evidence shows that such
expenditures can increase the incidence and depth of poverty; additionally, poverty has a
negative impact on health (Braveman & Gruskin 2003; McHenga et al., 2017). Expected
OOP spending acts as an important barrier to the utilization of health care services. Due to
the lack of financial protection, approximately 20-28% of the people in India do not use
healthcare and hence their illnesses remain untreated (Barik & Thorat 2015).
Since those with the greatest need often have the least access to health care, the
unmet need for healthcare in India is very high (Gaudin & Yazbeck 2006; Sen et al., 2002;
Singh & Ladusingh 2009). Nearly 12.4% of the population lives Below Poverty Line
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(BPL), and expanding insurance coverage in the country has been a challenge because only
about 7% of the workforce is employed in the organized sector (Chen & Ravallion 2010).
A mere 11% of India’s population is protected by any form of health insurance, because
the health insurance system is rudimentary and only available to a few privileged
individuals (Akash & Ranson, 2005; Ellis, 2000; Gupta & Mayur, 2006; Ranson et al.,
2006). When health insurance is provided in a country, it has been associated with an
increase in healthcare coverage and financial protection, which improves the health status
of the population (Gaudin & Yazbeck 2006). In India, the Government Health Insurance
Scheme consists of the Employees State Insurance and the Central Government Health
Scheme, which are run by the agency of the government at a subsidized rate for the welfare
of public sector employees.
1.3.2 Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditures for Inpatient Healthcare
Evidence shows that around 31.96% of OOP health spending in India goes toward
inpatient care (Kumar et al., 2011). A study by Berman et al. showed that hospitalizations
were the primary reason for catastrophic health expenditures in India (Berman et al., 2010).
Evidence from National Health Account 2017 shows that OOP health expenditures for
inpatient care constitutes around 31.96% of the total OOP health expenditures, even after
coverage by various health insurance programs. Inadequate insurance coverage is
considered to be the primary reason for high health expenditures and for pushing people
into poverty (Shahrawat & Rao, 2012). A WHO study in 51 countries that aimed to estimate
the occurrence of catastrophic health expenditures due to OOP health expenditures and to
quantify the proportion of OOP health expenditures due to outpatient, inpatient, and
medicine expenditures at the country level showed that around 2.2% of the population

11

experiences catastrophic health expenditures due to inpatient care every year (Saksena et
al., 2010).
There are many Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor offered by the
Government of India and the individual states that cover the cost of hospitalization and
inpatient care. Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY), started in 2008, is a central PFHI
program offered by the GOI in all states that do not have their own state-sponsored health
insurance program. Some of the states, like Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu,
have their own state health programs, such as Aarogyasri, Yashaswini, and Kalaignar
health insurance schemes, which offer various levels of coverage of inpatient services for
the below poverty line (BPL) population (Hooda, 2017). The range of financial coverage
for the inpatient service costs varies from INR 30,000 under RSBY to INR 200,000 under
Vajpayee Aarogyasri Scheme in Karnataka (Hooda, 2017). All the government-sponsored
health insurance programs cover the cost of inpatient care for people below the poverty
line, while people above the poverty line are excluded from the service coverage (Hooda,
2017). Despite the availability of health insurance programs for the poor under the national
and state insurance programs for the poor, government employees under the Central
Government Health Scheme and state government programs, all small business employees
under the Employee’s State Insurance Program and other workers in private sector under
the Employment based insurance that cover inpatient health services, the OOP health
expenditure due to inpatient healthcare is still about one-fourth of the total OOP health
expenditure, suggesting that there are gaps in the coverage for inpatient services (Kumar
et al., 2011). A study done in the Chhattisgarh state of India showed that 35.5% of people
experienced catastrophic health expenditures when one member of their family was
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hospitalized (Nandi et al., 2017). Another study showed that people who were enrolled in
the Government health insurance programs including RSBY experienced a median OOP
expenditure of INR 3550 compared to INR 5100 for individuals who were not covered
(Sundararaman et al., 2016). Many studies show that people incur high OOP health
expenditures despite being covered by the national health insurance program RSBY and
the other state health insurance programs (Devadasan et al., 2013; Rent & Ghosh, 2015;
Rao et al., 2014; Rajasekhar et al., 2011; Selvaraj & Karan, 2012). The Government of
India is aware of the problem and trying to increase governmental expenditure on health
care (GOI, 2017).
Evidence from literature has shown that increased health insurance coverage leads
to increase in utilization of health services, but the effect of health insurance coverage on
financial risk protection is less clear, especially for poor beneficiaries (Escobar et al.,
2010). The health insurance for the poor people in India covers only inpatient services.
This creates an incentive for the patients to visit hospitals and get hospitalized, instead of
using basic primary health care services which usually cover only outpatient health
services. Studies on hospitalization trends in India showed that an annual hospitalization
rate increased from 16.6 per 1000 to 37.0 per 1000 from 1995 to 2014 (Pandey et al., 2017).
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
India is currently taking measures to provide universal health coverage to its
population. Providing financial protection is considered the backbone of UHC. A quarter
of OOP expenditures are due to household payments for hospitalization and inpatient
services. Although Health Insurance Programs for the Poor such as the RSBY and other
state insurance programs do not cover OOP for outpatient treatments or the cost of drugs,
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these programs do cover the cost of inpatient health services. Despite this, the burden of
inpatient OOP health expenditure has been increasing raising questions about the
effectiveness of the programs in providing financial protection for inpatient health
expenditures. With the government currently planning to expand the health insurance for
the poor (by a new National Health Insurance Program) in terms of coverage limits and
services covered, it is vital to study the effect of currently available Public Health Insurance
Programs for the Poor on hospitalizations and inpatient OOP health expenditures to help
policy makers to address the gaps and design better health insurance programs. Also,
identifying and quantifying the degree of catastrophic health expenditures experienced by
the people and their effect on poverty is vital for framing adequate policies to address them.
1.5 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study uses nationally representative dataset to understand the effects of Public
Health Insurance Programs for the Poor. A number of studies have been published in Iran,
China, Nepal, Turkey, Tanzania, Brazil, Thailand, Georgia, Vietnam, Portugal, Botswana,
Lesotho, and South Korea analyzing the determinants of catastrophic health expenditures
(Nandi et al., 2017; Fazaeli et al., 2015; Van Minh et al., 2013; Shi et al., 2011; Saito et al.,
2014; Kronenberg & Barros, 2014; Yardim et al., 2010; Brinda et al., 2014; Akinkugbe et
al., 2012; Barros et al., 2011; Choi et al., 2014). This study intends to do the same for India.
The following research questions will be addressed in this research:
What is the effect of Public Health Insurance Programs for the poor on the utilization
of hospital services as well as out-of-pocket health expenditures for inpatient care in
India?
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More specific research questions would be:
1. How do hospitalizations differ between the people enrolled and not-enrolled under
Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor?
2. How does OOP health expenditure for inpatient care differ among people enrolled
and not-enrolled under Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor?
Hypothesis
1. The incidence of hospitalization is higher among members enrolled under Public
Health Insurance Programs for the Poor compared to non-enrolled members
2. The length of stay of hospitalization is higher among members enrolled under
Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor compared to non-enrolled
members
3. Poor people enrolled under Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor have
lower OOP health expenditures for inpatient care compared to non-enrolled
members
Increase in OOP health expenditure over a certain threshold of the household consumption
expenditure makes it catastrophic. High OOP health expenditures and Catastrophic health
expenditures have the potential to push households into poverty and push already poor
households further deep into poverty. The Poor People’s Health Insurance Program already
has several problems and limitations on enrolment and coverage. If more people are pushed
into poverty because of OOP and catastrophic health expenditures, it becomes difficult for
the Poor People’s Health Insurance Program to provide coverage to the newly poor
households who are enrolled into the program because of their change in status from nonpoor to poor.
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The second general question this research would address the burden and determinants
of catastrophic health expenditures.
Research Questions
1. What is the incidence of catastrophic healthcare payments among the people in
India?
2. What is the intensity of catastrophic healthcare payments among the people in
India?
3. What is the degree of inequality among households in terms of incidence and
intensity of catastrophic health expenditures?
4. What are the factors affecting the incidence of catastrophic health payments in
India?
5. What are the factors affecting the intensity of catastrophic health payments in
India?
The structure of this research study is as follows: Chapter 1 provides the background
information and research questions for the study; Chapter 2 is a review of relevant research
on the topic; Chapter 3 provides the methodology for the study; Chapter 4 provides the
results and discussions on the effect of public health insurance programs for the poor on
hospitalizations and out-of-pocket inpatient care cost ; Chapter 5 provides the results and
analysis of incidence, intensity, determinants of CHE and socioeconomic inequality in
experiencing CHE in India; and Chapter 6 provides a conclusion of the two transcripts.

16

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Out of the 1.324 billion people in India (2016), around 21.9% of the population is
below the poverty line using the revised World Bank Poverty line of USD 1.90 (World
Bank 2019). Majority of the health insurance programs in India cover only the hospital
expenses (Shahrawat & Rao, 2012). Inadequate health insurance coverage is considered to
be the primary reason for high OOP health expenditures and also for pushing people into
poverty (Shahrawat & Rao, 2012). Although part of the hospitalization expenses for poor
people are covered by the health insurance programs in India, there are significant gaps in
the depth and breadth of coverage provided by the currently available health insurance
programs. The various health insurance programs and mechanisms that provide protection
from financial burden to the poor in India are discussed below.
2.1 PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM FOR THE POOR IN INDIA
RSBY is a health insurance program started by the Ministry of Labor and
Employment of the Government of India in April 2008 that provides a wide range of
hospital-based healthcare services for BPL families (Kumar at al., 2011). There are a
number of state public health insurance programs for the poor in three of the southern states
in India which provide higher coverage compared to RSBY and are exempted from the
national program. The programs are the Chief Minister’s Comprehensive Health Insurance
Scheme in Tamil Nadu State, Rajiv Aarogyasri Community Health Insurance (RACHI) in
Andhra Pradesh State, and Vajpayee Aarogyasri Scheme (VAS) in Karnataka State.
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Table 4 summarizes the important features of the RSBY program and the state health
insurance programs for the poor in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu.
Table 2.1: Key Parameters under RSBY and State Health Insurance Programs
Parameter

Benefits covered

Rashtriya Swasthiya Bima Yojana (RSBY)

Description
Cost of hospitalization
for 725+ procedures at
empaneled hospitals
up to INR 30,000 per
annum per household;
INR 100 per visit up to
INR 1,000 per year for
transport cost

Additional Caveats
Pre-existing
conditions
are
covered;
minimal
exclusions;
day
surgeries
covered;
outpatient
expenditure is not
covered

Eligibility criteria

Must be on the official All enrolled members
state BPL list; Limited must be present to be
to five members of the enrolled;
household including
household
head,
spouse, and three
dependents

Premium and fees

INR 30 registration fee
per household per
annum
paid
by
household.

Financing

75%/ 25%
Government of India/
State Government

Insurer

Both public and private
insurance companies
can bid to work in a
district or more than a
district recommended
by state governments

The ratio is 90% /10%
in Northeast states
and
Jammu
&
Kashmir
In one district only
one
insurance
company is finally
selected
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State health insurance
programs for the poor
(Andhra Pradesh,
Tamil Nadu and
Karnataka)
Description
Andhra
Pradesh
Families are provided
coverage
for
INR
200,000 per family per
year, and there are no
restrictions on the
number
of
family
members enrolled
Karnataka
INR150,000 per year
for 5 persons in a family
Tamil
Nadu
–
INR100,000 per family
per year
Must be on the official
BPL list of the specific
state. No restrictions on
the number of family
members enrolled in
Andhra Pradesh, and
Tamil Nadu. Covers
five members of family
in Karnataka.
No specific enrolment
fee in the three states of
Andhra
Pradesh,
Karnataka, and Tamil
Nadu
Completely funded by
the respective states

Both public and private
insurance
companies
can bid to work at the
state level

Service provider

Both public and private
sector
service
providers can apply to
join the network of
providers empaneled
under the scheme

Minimum eligibility
criteria on quality of
services
to
be
provided have been
laid down by the MoL
&E

Both public and private
sector service providers
in the specific state can
join the network of
providers empaneled in
the program. Minimum
eligibility criteria laid
down by the respective
State Health Ministries

Source: Ministry of Labor and Employment (MoL & E) and State Health Departments
Enrolment under Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor
Around 41 million families are enrolled in RSBY, covering around 150 million
poor people as of September 2016 (Karan et al., 2017). The enrolment under the program
is increasing from just 55 districts in 2008-2009. Nationally, around 460 districts
participate in the program, with 57% of the eligible households are currently enrolled
(Karan et al., 2017). There is significant inter-district and inter-state variation in the
percentage of eligible households enrolled in RSBY. Across states, the enrolment ratio
varies from a low of 24% in Arunachal Pradesh and 36% in Haryana to more than 75% in
Kerala. The degree of enrollment of households in each district varies significantly among
the various districts across the country, with a low rate of enrollment of 3% in Kannauj
district and 6% in Kanpur district in the Uttar Pradesh state to a high enrollment rate of
90% of the households in most of districts in the Chhattisgarh and Kerala states of India
(Karan et al., 2017). Enrolment is not complete in many states, even a decade after the start
of the program (Karan et al., 2017). Also, as of September 2016, the state of Rajasthan was
still in its early stages for enrollment of households for RSBY (Karan et al., 2017). This
shows that enrollment in the RSBY program has been slow in some parts of India. Not all
states in India participate in RSBY.
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The state of Andhra Pradesh has not adopted RSBY as it already has a substantially
more generous state level health insurance program than RSBY which pre-dates RSBY
and also has higher population coverage, covering nearly 80% of its population (Fan et al.,
2012). Even the state of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka have their own health insurance
programs with higher levels of coverage than RSBY. The three states, Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are running their state level health insurance programs. In
Karnataka, Vajpayee Aarogyasri Scheme (VAS) program was started in February 2010 in
the Gulbarga division covering 1.439 million BPL households, and then expanded to the
Belgaum division by August 2010 covering 1.691 million BPL households. By June 2012
it had been extended to the Bangalore and Mysore divisions, thus covering the whole state
of Karnataka (Sood et al., 2014). There are some problems associated with the RSBY
program. Studies show that access is not available to around 50% of the people eligible for
the RSBY program because they are currently not enrolled in RSBY due to the lack of
availability of full lists of the eligible participants, and high migration rates (Karan et al.,
2017). Beneficiary knowledge about the covered services under RSBY is also limited
(Taneja & Taneja, 2016). There is no awareness creation component of the program. There
also has been denial of treatment to smart card holders because of disputes between the
hospital and the insurer, for which there are no proper mechanisms to resolve (Taneja &
Taneja, 2016). RSBY leads to misuse of services, since both the physician and the patient
have the incentive to convert an outpatient case into an inpatient admission, leading to
unwanted increased utilization (Taneja & Taneja, 2016).
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Health Insurance Coverage, Hospitalization and OOP health expenditures
The increase in health insurance coverage may lead to increase in health care
utilization because of the change in behavior both by the insured and the provider. A study
by Anderson et al. (2012) on the effect of health insurance coverage on the utilization of
medical services in the US showed that there was a 61% reduction in inpatient hospital
admissions and 40% reduction in emergency department visits among the uninsured
population (Anderson et al., 2012). Evidence from literature has shown that increased
health insurance coverage leads to increase in utilization of health services, but the effect
of health insurance coverage on financial risk protection is less clear, especially for poor
beneficiaries (Escobar et al., 2010). The health insurance for the poor people in India covers
only inpatient services. This creates an incentive for the patients to visit hospitals and get
hospitalized, instead of using basic primary health care services which usually cover only
outpatient health services. Studies on hospitalization trends in India showed that an annual
hospitalization rate increased from 16.6 per 37.0 per 1000 from 1995 to 2014 (Pandey et
al., 2017). Under the Public Health Insurance Programs for the poor only the
hospitalization services and expenses are covered. It is expected that these health insurance
for the poor will increase utilization of hospitals by the households below poverty line who
would usually be forced to postpone their non-urgent procedures for a later time because
they cannot afford it. But there may be OOP payments for drugs, tests and post-treatment
care which are not covered by the health insurance that may increase the OOP payments
for total inpatient care. Hence the direction of association of the Poor People Health
Insurance Programs on total inpatient OOP health expenditure is unclear. With health
insurance coverage, it is expected that although there may be some increase in inpatient
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health expenditures and healthcare utilization, but the number of individuals experiencing
OOP health expenditures for inpatient care should decrease.
Globally studies on the effect of health insurance on hospitalization and OOP health
expenditures show mixed evidence. A study by Aggarwal (2010) on Yeshasvini
community-based health insurance program in Karnataka among 4109 households
employed propensity score matching to identify suitable control households showed that
the community-based health insurance program led to increase in utilization of health
services and also a reduction in OOP healthcare spending with improved health outcomes
(Aggarwal, 2010). Devadasan et al. (2010) evaluated the Community Based Health
Insurance scheme, the ACCORD-AMSASHWINI scheme among 297 insured and
matched them with 248 uninsured individuals and found that insured individuals had higher
hospital admission rates compared to uninsured individuals (Devadasan et al., 2009). A
study by Fan et al. (2012) to evaluate the impact of Arogyashri health insurance program
of Andhra Pradesh found that the state health insurance program significantly reduced the
OOP health expenditures for hospitalizations but did not have effect on reducing outpatient
OOP health expenditures (Fan et al., 2012). Another study in Andhra Pradesh state by Rao
et al. (2014) which used the NSSO data for 2004 and 2008, found that the RACHI program
led to significant decreases in OOP health expenditures for inpatient care (Rao et al., 2014).
In the neighboring state of Karnataka, a study by Sood et al. (2014) on another state health
insurance program, Vajpayee Arogyashree (VAS) on hospital utilization and OOP health
expenditures using primary data collected from 572 villages showed that the households
under the program experienced reduced OOP health expenditures for hospitalizations
(Sood at al., 2014).
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Smaller cross-sectional studies were done in various states in India. A crosssectional study conducted in two districts of Andhra Pradesh by Mitchell et al. (2011)
showed that households with insurance had higher OOP health expenditures compared to
households with no health insurance coverage (Mitchell et al., 2011). A cross sectional
study conducted in Tamil Nadu state by Philip et al. (2012) showed that utilization of
healthcare was significantly higher among the insured compared to the uninsured
population and the mean OOP expenditure among the insured households was significantly
higher than the uninsured households (Philip et al., 2016). Another primary cross-sectional
survey conducted in Maharashtra by Ghosh (2014) showed that utilization of healthcare
was higher among the insured compared to the uninsured families (Ghosh, 2014). Katyal
et al. (2015) used a quasi-experimental design (Pre and post design with a DID based
analysis) with a primary survey undertaken in the two states of Andhra Pradesh and
Maharashtra and the results were compared with findings of NSSO data from 2004-05
round and the results of the study showed that the utilization of private hospitals increased
in Andhra Pradesh, but decreased in Maharashtra, while the utilization of public hospitals
decreased in both the states, and OOP increased in both the states with greater increase in
Maharashtra compared to Andhra Pradesh (Katyal et al., 2015).
At the national level, Selvaraj and Karan (2012) used NSSO data to evaluate the
impact of RSBY using the NSSO data for the pre and post intervention periods (2004-05
and 2009-10). They did not find any beneficial effects of the program (Selvaraj & Karan,
2012). Another study by Karan et al. (2017) on the impact evaluation of RSBY used the
NSSO data for (1999, 2004 and 2011) and employed the ‘difference-in-differences’
methods to estimate the effects of RSBY on OOP health expenditures and found that the
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likelihood of incurring OOP health expenditures increased by 30% due to RSBY program
and the results showed that RSBY has not been effective in reducing the burden of OOP
health expenditures for poor households (Karan et al., 2017).
2.2 CATASTROPHIC HEALTHCARE EXPENDITURES
Defining Catastrophic Healthcare Expenditures
Catastrophic health expenditure (CHE) occurs when the OOP health expenditures
exceed a specific threshold value of the household expenditures. Different studies have
used different methods to choose this threshold value. CHE has been used as a measure of
financial protection in several studies in different countries (Saksena et al., 2010; WHO
2015; Xu et al., 2003). Numerous methodologies have been used to estimate whether OOP
health expenditure is catastrophic. The most common method is to calculate the OOP
healthcare expenditures are percent of the income (Xu et al., 2003; Berki, 1986; Skarbinski
et al., 2002; Wyszewianski, 1986). A study by Forthofer et al. used five different definitions
of CHE namely greater than USD 1,000, USD 2,500, USD 5,000, expenditure greater than
15% of the total family income, and expenditures greater than 50% of the per-capita income
(Forthofer et al., 1982). The next approach is the WHO’s methodology called the ‘capacity
to pay approach’, in which health expenditure is said to be catastrophic if the OOP is more
than 40% of a household’s ability to pay (income remaining after non-discretionary
expenditure) (Xu et al., 2003).
The next approach is the ‘budget share approach’, wherein a household OOP health
expenditure of more than 25% of the total household expenditure is defined as catastrophic
(WHO 2015). The other approach is the ‘food expenditure approach’, in which an
expenditure is defined as catastrophic if the household OOP health expenditures are more
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than 40% of the household’s non-food expenses (WHO 2015). A study by Wagstaff and
Doorslaer used two different approaches for measuring CHE (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer,
2003). They applied their methodologies to the OOP health expenditure data from Vietnam
for 1993 to 1998. In the first approach, the OOP health expenditures is not expected to be
higher than a pre-specified proportion of the income. The second approach is based on the
principle that OOP health care payments should not force the households into poverty.
Wagstaff and Doorslaer developed the indices for the measurement of intensity and
incidence of CHE and the degree of CHE occurring across the income groups. They also
developed the measures for the measurement of poverty-impact incidence and intensity.
Under the National Health Policy (NHP) of the Government of India, Catastrophic
household healthcare expenditure is defined as health expenditure exceeding 10% of its
total monthly consumption expenditure or 40% of its monthly non-food consumption
expenditure (Rajpal & Joe, 2018; GOI, 2017). In this study, to examine the effects of CHE
on the welfare of the households in India, two different methodologies will be used. The
first one will the measurement of incidence and intensity of CHE in the households and the
next one is the measurement of the effect of OOP healthcare payments on poverty
headcount and poverty gap measures. The two approaches measure different aspects of
financial risk protection. The first approach measures the CHE, the degree to which the
OOP payments exceed the different thresholds of household income and the number of
people affected by it. The second approach measures the incidence and the depth of poverty
that is caused by the healthcare payments (Bredenkamp et al., 2011).
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Measuring Catastrophic Health Expenditures
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer defined OOP health expenditures as catastrophic if
they exceed some fraction of household income or total expenditure in a given period. The
reason provided they provided was that, if the household spends a higher proportion of its
budget on healthcare; they will be forced to forgo expenditures on other goods and services
that is essential for the well-being for the household (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003).
Defining the threshold amount is important for calculating the incidence of CHE.
Household consumption expenditures will be used as a proxy for income of the household.
Households are expected not to spend more than a pre-identified portion of their household
expenditures/income (Z) during a specified period for the procuring the health services. If
the health expenditures of the household are higher than Z, then it is termed as catastrophic.
The idea is that the households will need at least (1-Z) of their household
income/expenditures for other necessities of the household such as food, clothing, housing,
education, etc. Thus, if the households spend more than the catastrophic level, it may affect
the standards of living of the household.
India’s National Health Policy 2017 and Catastrophic Health Expenditures
Affordability is a key principle under the National Health Policy 2017 (NHP) of
India. The National Health Policy states that “As costs of care increases, affordability, as
distinct from equity, requires emphasis”. In the National Health Policy, Catastrophic
household healthcare expenditure is defined as health expenditure exceeding 10% of its
total monthly consumption expenditure or 40% of its monthly non-food consumption
expenditure, are unacceptable (Rajpal & Joe, 2018; GOI, 2017). The recent National Health
Policy (NHP), 2017 aims to increase the government health funding from the current level
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of 1.15% to 2.5% of GDP by 2025. The policy report envisages “to attain the highest
possible level of health and well-being for all at all ages and to provide affordable and
universal access to good quality health care services without anyone facing financial
catastrophe”. Further, the NHP report specifically mentions that the proportion of
households incurring CHE should be reduced by 25% from the current level by 2025 (GOI,
2017). Catastrophic health expenditures affect the economy of the households and leading
to poverty or push people further into poverty (Garg & Karan, 2009; Selvaraj & Karan,
2009). The current policy debate is about “health for all with financial protection” from the
concept of “health for all” which was more common in the last decade (Hooda, 2015).
Determinants of Catastrophic Health Expenditures
A number of determinants affect OOP and catastrophic health expenditures. These
determinants vary depending on the developed or developing nature of a country. Public
sector health spending is higher in developed countries compared to that of developing
countries due to various reasons, such as the stability of the governments, efficiency of the
health system, and maintenance of quality (Liang & Mirelman, 2014). The literature on the
determinants of OOP health expenditures from OECD countries may not be completely
applicable to developing countries. Since the country of focus of this study is India, the
focus of literature review will be primarily from India. Previous research on out-of-pocket
health care expenditures and catastrophic health expenditures provide the framework for
this research. The review of previous work helps in exploring the variables of interest for
the analytical framework.
A study by Bhojan et al. (2012) examining the OOP health expenditures for chronic
conditions in Bangalore city, Karnataka State of India among 9299 households showed that
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small household size, low income households, and the use of referral hospitals as the place
of consultation were associated with a greater likelihood for catastrophic health
expenditures. The OOP payments increased as the place of consultation moved from
primary health centers (primary level) to referral hospitals (secondary level) and superspecialty referral hospitals (tertiary level). Households borrowed money and sold or
mortgaged assets in order to finance their OOP healthcare spending. OOP payments for
chronic conditions, even if the care is only for outpatient care, push people into poverty.
Additionally, OOP payments for the treatment of chronic conditions show that using
private healthcare facilities led to higher OOP expenditures compared to public sector
hospitals. The study also demonstrates that the OOP payments for health services were
higher in the private sector, but the collective OOP payments for other items such as travel,
food, and informal payments were greater when the government sector was the site of
consultation. This may be due to the remote location of the government health facilities in
many parts of the country and the rampant corruption in them. The study also showed that
an increase in the number of female members in a household was associated with a decrease
in the health expenditures of the household (Bhojani et al., 2012).
Mohanty et al. (2014) used the Consumption Expenditure Data, National Sample
Survey 2009-2010 to study the OOP health expenditures among the elderly and non-elderly
in India and found that households with elderly members had significantly higher OOP
health expenditures compared to households with non-elderly members. The health
expenditures increased with the economic status of the household and the age and
educational attainment of the household head. The health expenditures are more likely to
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become catastrophic for households with elderly members, poorer households, and
households with casual laborers (Mohanty et al., 2014).
Also in India, Leone et al. (2012) studied maternal healthcare expenditures using
the 2004 National Sample Survey Organization data, which showed that rural households
had higher healthcare expenditures for maternal and neonatal care, irrespective of the
socioeconomic status of the households or the state in which the household was located.
Furthermore, the cost of maternal healthcare services in India was two to four times higher
in private healthcare facilities compared to that of government facilities (Leone et al.,
2013).
Drawing from 1000 participants, a study performed in Vellore, Tamil Nadu State
of India examined the determinants of OOP health expenditures among the elderly aged
above 65 years. The researchers found that male gender, lack of education, poor sanitation
and lack of access to safe water, and the presence of diseases such as diabetes, tuberculosis,
malaria, respiratory diseases, gastrointestinal diseases, dementia, depression, and disability
were associated with higher OOP health expenditures. This study determined the important
finding that elderly men have higher OOP health expenditures than elderly women (Brinda
et al., 2012).
Srivastava et al. (2009) conducted a study in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh State of India
to study the OOP health expenditures for sick children among the urban poor. Their results
revealed that the OOP health expenditures for neonatal illness were significantly lower in
government healthcare facilities compared to non-governmental facilities, and OOP health
expenditures were significantly higher for those hospitalized in private hospitals
(Srivastava et al., 2009).

29

A study by Mondal et al. (2014) in the three districts of Malda, North 24 Parganas,
and Bankura in the West Bengal State of India examined 748 urban and 2403 rural
households. Their findings showed that the households with members suffering from
chronic illness who had been hospitalized were three times more likely to experience
catastrophic health expenditures compared to households with members suffering from
chronic illnesses who had not been hospitalized. Thus, the main determinants of OOP
health expenditures identified in the study were the prevalence of chronic illnesses among
the members of the household, hospital admissions, and delivery expenses for childbirth
(Mondal et al., 2014).
Daga et al. (2015) assessed the OOP non-medical expenses for the out-patient
treatment of childhood illness in Pune district, Maharashtra State of India and discovered
that households in rural areas experienced higher OOP expenditures because they visit
private healthcare facilities instead of utilizing the government public health centers, even
though they are nearer, because of the perceived lower quality of services (Daga et al.,
2015).
Using the Consumer Expenditure Survey of India for 1999-2000, Karan and Garg
(2009) showed that increases in the poverty head count and the deepening of poverty were
higher in the poorer states of India and in the rural areas compared to the richer states and
urban areas (Garg & Karan, 2009). A report from the World Bank by Gerard and Nagpal
(2012) in India showed that hospitalizations are the major drivers of OOP health
expenditures, which is the main reason why the government is trying to provide coverage
for hospitalization expenses (La Forgia & Nagpal, 2012).
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A community-based cross-sectional study in Uttar Pradesh State of India by Patel
et al. (2014) demonstrated that there are many instances where a sick person does not seek
medical advice for the treatment of their illness, but follow the advice given by family
members, friends, and informal providers such as medical shop owners instead (Ahmad et
al., 2014). This has the potential to complicate the illness and lead to higher health
expenditures for the patient.
A study in Delhi, India by Dhar et al. (2009) on maternity care services showed that
cesarean sections led to higher health expenditures compared to normal deliveries both in
public and private sector hospitals. Also, women from higher income areas spent much
more for maternal and neonatal care compared to women from lower income areas (Dhar
et al., 2009).
Karan et al. (2014) used the three Consumer Expenditure Surveys (2000, 2005, and
2012) to assess the burden of OOP health expenditures among the social groups in India.
Their findings revealed that Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes, Muslims, and the poorest
20% of households experienced higher OOP health expenditures as a share of total
household expenditures for outpatient care compared to other groups. Muslim households
reported higher OOP health expenditures for inpatient care compared to non-Muslim
households, but the poorest 20% of the households reported lower OOP health expenditures
for inpatient care compared to the other groups, which may be due to the coverage of the
poorest groups by the cashless public health insurance programs in India (Karan et al.,
2014).
A study by Brinda et al. (2015) used the WHO’s study on global aging and adult
health to reveal that OOP health expenditures were higher among people with disabilities
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and people with lower income levels. The presence of illnesses such as diabetes, heart
disease, tuberculosis, hypertension, and chronic pulmonary disease led to higher OOP
health expenditures. Older men and individuals with chronic diseases were at a higher risk
of experiencing catastrophic health expenditures, and the coverage by health insurance
reduced the risk of catastrophic health expenditures (Brinda et al., 2015).
Dwivedi and Pradhan (2017) used the Consumer Expenditure Survey for 2009-10
to demonstrate that people residing in urban areas, people with low income levels, nonMuslims, and non-Scheduled Tribes had higher healthcare expenditures (Dwivedi &
Pradhan, 2017). Kumar et al. (2012) conducted a study in Hyderabad, Telangana State of
India to estimate the OOP health expenditures for road traffic injuries in India and
identified that admission to a private hospital and not having health insurance coverage
increased the risk of experiencing catastrophic health expenditures (Kumar et al., 2012).
The sanitation coverage nationally in India is only about 34%, with around 66% of
the population practicing open defecation. These unhygienic practices lead to high rates of
infections, mortality, and morbidity in the community (Jha, 2003). This may lead to more
physician visits and increased health expenditures. The WHO report on the costs and
benefits of water and sanitation shows that the provision of safe drinking water will lead to
a reduction in the number of diarrheal diseases and water-associated diseases and, in turn,
will reduce the associated health expenditures. The cost of treating a single case of diarrhea
including consultation expenses, medication, and other overheads such as transportation
and food, may vary between US$10 and US$23, depending on the location. The
transportation cost for a visit to a health facility is estimated to be US$0.50 per visit, and
50% of patients use transportation to reach health facilities (Hutton & Haller, 2004).
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In summation individuals make the decision to use health services in order to take
advantage of the potential benefits, and they incur health expenditures as a result. There
are many factors that affect the utilization of different types of health services and the OOP
health expenditures they experience. Various individual factors such as age, gender, marital
status, education, occupation, and religion/caste affect OOP healthcare expenditures. An
individual’s decision to use healthcare services and incur health expenditures is influenced
by a number of household characteristics such as household size and composition,
socioeconomic status, location, water and sanitation facilities, and the cooking fuel used in
the household. A number of the characteristics of the health systems, financing, and disease
status have been found to be important variables determining the degree of OOP health
expenditures incurred by patients, such as the type of provider, level of care, type of ward,
type of illness and severity, hospitalizations, presence of chronic illnesses, type of
treatment received, coverage by health insurance, and source of financing for medical
expenses.
Table 2.2: Factors affecting Out-of-Pocket and Catastrophic Health Expenditures
Factors - Groups
Individual
Characteristics

Household Level
Characteristics

Factors - Variables
Age (+/-)
Gender (+/-)
Marital Status (Married +/-)
Education (+/-)
Religion and Social Group (Minority group +/-)
Socioeconomic status of individual (+/-)
Household size (+/-)
Household head (Female +)
Composition of household (Elderly +; Children +; Female: +/)
Socioeconomic status of household (+/-)
Location of household (Rural/Urban) (+/-)
WASH facilities of household (-)
Cooking fuel of household (Clean fuel -)
Illness and type (+)
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Illness and Health Chronic illness (+)
Facility Characteristics Hospitalizations (+)
Type of provider (Private +)
Level of care (Primary +; Secondary ++; Tertiary +++)
Nature of treatment (Allopathy/AYUSH) (+/-)
Health insurance (-)

Incidence of Catastrophic Health Expenditures
In India, OOP expenses account for about 71.1% of the total health expenditures—
one of the highest levels in the world (Balarajan et al., 2011; Hooda, 2017). Nearly 39
million people in India become impoverished every year due to catastrophic health
expenditures (Balarajan et al., 2011). A study by Mohanty et al. (2018) used the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (68th round) to investigate the geographic variation and catastrophic
health spending in India. The study showed that 23.4% of the households experienced
catastrophic health spending in India in 2011-12, with the highest level in Kerala (37.2%),
followed by Andhra Pradesh (31.7%), and West Bengal (31.1%); the level was lowest in
Assam (8.9%) and Delhi (11.3%). Catastrophic health spending did not show any
association with the economic development of the state, and it was equally high in both the
economically developed and undeveloped states (Mohanty et al., 2018). Pal et al. (2012)
used the Consumer Expenditure Survey for 2004-2005 to study the incidence of
catastrophic health expenditure variation based on the rural/urban location and
socioeconomic status of the households in the different states. The results showed that the
incidence of catastrophic health expenditures was highest among the poorest quintiles in
the rural areas of Kerala (9.71%), and highest among the richest quintiles of the rural areas
of Madhya Pradesh (21.82%). Among the poorest quintiles, the rate of catastrophic health
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expenditures was highest in Rajasthan (13.34%) in urban areas and among the richest
quintiles in urban areas in Orissa (11.26%) (Pal, 2012).
Assessing catastrophic healthcare expenditures sensitive to socioeconomic status
The measures of incidence and intensity of CHE discussed in the previous section
are insensitive to the socioeconomic status of the households and thus do not identify
whether the poor or rich households exceed the threshold more. The headcount (HC) is
defined by number of households whose levels of OOP payments exceed a certain
threshold and overshoot (O) is the gap between actual payment and threshold level if the
gap is positive, irrespective of economic status of households, i.e., whether household is
poor or rich (O’Donnell et al., 2008). Many policy makers will consider it a more
significant problem if the poorer households exceed the threshold level compared to the
richer households. Wagstaff at al. recommend the method of concentration curves and the
calculation of concentration indices to identify this (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003).
Concentration curves are used to detect the presence of socioeconomic inequality in any
health sector variable and whether it is more marked in one group than another. However,
a concentration curve will not measure the magnitude of inequality. The concentration
index which is related to the concentration curve can be used to measure the degree of
socioeconomic related inequality in a health variable (Kakwani, 1977; Kakwani, 1980;
Kakwani et al., 1997; Wagstaff et al., 1989). In literature, concentration indices have been
used to estimate the socio-economic inequality for several health public health issues
namely child mortality (Wagstaff, 2000), child immunization (Gwatkin et al., 2003), child
malnutrition (Wagstaff et al., 2003), adult health (van Doorslaer et al., 1997), health
subsidies (O’Donnell et al., 2007), and health care utilization (van Doorslaer et al., 2006).
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The method of computation of concentration indices for the catastrophic payment
headcount and catastrophic overshoot in this study is described in detail in the methods
section.
Impoverishment and Catastrophic Health Expenditures
The incidence of CHS as discussed above does not demonstrate the degree to which
CHS truly cause financial hardship. Some households may spend a higher proportion of
their income on health and still not cross the poverty line, but other households may spend
only a small proportion of their income on healthcare but still become impoverished. The
idea of impoverishment goes further than incidence of CHS and the concept is that nobody
should be pushed into poverty or further push already poor deeper into poverty because of
healthcare expenditures (Wagstaff, 2008). Impoverishment can be measured by some of
the methods suggested in literature. According to studies done by Wagstaff and van
Doorslaer (2003) and van Doorslaer et al (2007), the impoverishing effects of OOP
payments can be identified by calculating the difference between poverty estimations
derived from household resources gross and net of OOP payments for healthcare (van
Doorslaer et al., 2007; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003). Another study by Xu (2005)
showed that a non-poor household is impoverished by health expenditures when it becomes
poor after paying for obtaining the healthcare services, based on a defined poverty line in
the country (Xu 2005).
2.3 GAPS IN RESEARCH
Current studies on Poor People’s Health Insurance Programs such as RSBY deal
with issues in program enrolment (Shahi & Singh, 2015), barriers in implementation of the
program (Rajasekhar et al., 2011), effect of information campaign (Das & Leino, 2011),
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hospitalization patterns (Thakur, 2016), determinants of participation in the RSBY
program (Nandi et al., 2013). There are only two district level studies on RSBY, one done
in Amaravati district in Maharashtra (Rathi et al., 2012), and another in Gujarat (Devadasan
et al., 2013) showed that RSBY increased hospitalizations and higher OOP health
expenditures among the RSBY insured people. The study in Gujarat showed that RSBY
enrollees experienced higher OOP health expenditures because they had to pay for
medicines and diagnostics during the hospital admission (Aggarwal, 2010). Another state
level study done for the state health insurance program Aarogyasri found different results
with insurance significantly reducing the OOP health expenditures for hospitalizations
(Fan et al., 2012). Most of the other studies that studied the impact of health insurance on
hospitalizations and OOP health expenditures were community-based health insurance
programs in different parts of the country (Aggarwal, 2010; Devadasan et al., 2009;
Devadasan et al., 2007; Ranson, 2002) and thus their implications for nation-wide policy
interest is limited.
The current study will present a considerable improvement on the available studies
on Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor in India on two important counts: i) the
study uses nationally representative dataset which helps in estimating pan-India effects of
Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor which will have important policy
implications ii) the study evaluates the effect of Public Health Insurance Programs for the
Poor by using poor people who are enrolled and not enrolled under the program which may
highlight the need for program scale up and the importance of expanding the insurance
program for the poor who are eligible for the program. Many of the current available studies
are based on RSBY enrollees alone and do not have controls, thus making it difficult to
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identify the effects of the Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor, but this study
will use control population.
The previous section discussed the various determinants of catastrophic health
expenditures from the literature available in India. Many studies have studied the health
expenditures on specific diseases such as diabetes, tuberculosis, cancer, injuries etc., but
the problem was that most of these studies were done in small geographical areas of the
country and their representativeness for the whole nation was limited (Binnendijk et al.,
2012; Yesudian et al., 2014; Rao et al., 2011; Prinja et al., 2015; Muniyandi et al., 2005;
Ramachandran et al., 2007). Some studies have examined the determinants of out-ofpocket health expenditures for outpatient care in a few districts of India for certain age
groups (Brinda et al., 2012; Gupta et al., 2016). Also, other studies have used different
NSSO datasets and other nationally available data like National Family Health Survey
(NFHS) etc. to study disease specific OOP health expenditures for hospitalizations (Kastor
& Mohanty, 2018), OOP health expenditures due to non-communicable diseases (NCDs)
(Tripathy et al., 2016), burden of OOP payments due to medicines (Selvaraj & Farooqui,
2018), OOP health expenditure for maternal care (Mohanty & Kastor, 2017), OOP health
expenditure for accidental injury (Pradhan et al., 2017), but they did not address the specific
research questions of catastrophic health expenditures, impoverishment and factors causing
them that are addressed by this study.
The main reason for the Government of India and the various states in India seeking
to establish different health insurance programs is to reduce the OOP health expenditures
for inpatient services. The high burden of OOP health expenditures for hospitalizations and
the occurrence of catastrophic health expenditures demonstrates that there are gaps in the
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functioning of the current health insurance programs. This raises important questions: 1)
Are the insurance programs for the poor effective in reducing OOP expenditures for
inpatient care? 2) Are there other determinants which make people incur catastrophic
health expenditures? 3) What is the incidence and intensity of catastrophic health
expenditures experienced by the people? 4) How much does catastrophic health
expenditures contribute to poverty in the households?
Evidence shows that high OOP health expenditures leading to catastrophic health
expenditures are not essentially caused by a single event or by the use of costly medical
procedures (Xu et al., 2003). Small payments that occur frequently also lead to higher OOP
health expenditures. A study showed that the primary conditions that are necessary for the
occurrence of high OOP health expenditures which are catastrophic are the availability and
utilization of health care, poor capacity of households to pay for healthcare, and lack of
any risk pooling and prepayment mechanisms (Xu et al., 2007). Thus, identifying the
various determinants that cause individuals to have high OOP health expenditures is an
important literature gap that this study will address. As discussed in the previous section,
high OOP health expenditures have the potential to be catastrophic to the households.
Catastrophic health expenditures may push the households into poverty and may push the
households that are already poor further deep into poverty. The different states in India
vary greatly in health outcomes, public health infrastructure, and health insurance
coverage. The financial coverage, people covered, and number of people enrolled in the
health insurance programs vary by states. It is vital to quantify the burden of catastrophic
health expenditures in India to address and improve the financial coverage and provide
financial protection to the people. No study has explored the various aspects of occurrence,
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intensity, factors affecting catastrophic health expenditures and the impoverishing effect
of catastrophic health expenditures using nationally representative dataset; this is another
literature gap that this study aims to address.
Evidence obtained by addressing these two knowledge gaps will be vital for policy
makers in India, both in the central government and in the different state governments,
especially in the current scenario as the country transitions to UHC and the government is
making massive investments to improve the financial coverage and address the underlying
determinants. The present study can help decision-makers by identifying the effect of
Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor, quantifying catastrophic health
expenditures and discussing the mechanisms driving them, thereby highlighting the need
for developing options for addressing these determinants and developing stronger financial
protection mechanisms. By identifying the incidence, intensity, socioeconomic inequalities
in catastrophic health expenditures and the impoverishing effects of catastrophic health
expenditures, this study helps the central government provide appropriate higher budgetary
allocations for the groups that have higher OOP health expenditures and aids the designers
of the national and state health insurance programs to design better benefit packages for
those population groups. This investigation will serve as a basis for assessing India’s policy
options to reduce financial catastrophe due to health expenditures.
2.4 THEORETICAL MODEL
Andersen’s Behavioral Model of Healthcare Utilization will be used to guide this
research (Andersen, 1995). The Andersen model examines the predisposing, enabling,
need and healthcare utilization characteristics. In using the Andersen model, this study
classifies individual and household characteristics as predisposing or enabling factors
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associated with the use of health care services. Central government and state government
health insurance schemes in India enroll population at the household level. This study
focuses on the demographic characteristics such as age, gender, marital status, education,
occupation, religion and social groups; household characteristics such as socioeconomic
status, household size and composition, location of the household, WASH facilities, source
of energy for household cooking; health system and utilization characteristics such as type
of provider, level of care, type and severity of illness, nature of treatment, health insurance
coverage and source of financing. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between household’s
characters and its relationship to the OOP health expenditures.
Predisposing Characteristics
Predisposing characteristics of health services utilization are the demographic
characteristics such as age, and gender composition of the household, which highlight the
biological need for healthcare services (Andersen, 1995). Social structure denoted the
household’s ability to solve its problems (Andersen, 1995). Social structure consists of
literacy and employment status of the household head, geographic location of the
household which can either delay or facilitate access to health services, and social networks
of the household which will be influential during the time of need. Beliefs are the norms,
knowledge, values, and attitudes of the household about health and health services, which
play an important role on the opinion of the household about need and utilization of health
services (Andersen, 1995). Education is one of the important components which affects the
beliefs of the household.
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Enabling Characteristics
Enabling characteristics of health services utilization are financing and
organization. Financing represents access to financial resources to pay for health care
which can be income, assets, savings, coverage for health expenses through health
insurance, and social safety nets. Organization refers to how the healthcare resources are
distributed in the household’s surroundings, which includes number and type of health
facilities, access to transportation, time required to reach a health facility, and the waiting
time to get the care.
Need
Need characteristics of health service utilization consist of both perceived needs
and evaluated needs. Perceived needs indicate when an individual feels sick, the person
decides to have a health consultation. The evaluated need denotes the objective and
professional decisions made by the healthcare professionals regarding the illness of the
individual. Thus, the evaluated need decides the type and duration of care that is prescribed
to the patient. The diagnosis of the patient in a hospital usually highlights the evaluated
need for healthcare and this usually determines the duration of hospitalization and medical
services received by the patient.
Healthcare utilization characteristics
Healthcare utilization characteristics highlight the purpose of visiting the health
facility (primary care for preventing an illness from starting, secondary care for providing
treatment and retuning the patient to the normal healthy stage, and tertiary care for treating
severe and chronic illnesses), type of care wanted, level of care wanted, and the type of
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healthcare provider visited. The literatures on the effect of these different variables are
discussed in the previous section.

Demographic
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Figure 2.1 Determinants of Household’s OOP Health Expenditures using Anderson’s
Behavioral Model of Healthcare Utilization
43

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the methodology to be followed by the research study
including the data set to be used. Some basic information about the data set will also be
discussed. Empirical methodology for each of the principal aims of the paper will be
presented.
3.1 DATA
Source of Data
The data from the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) of the
Government of India will be used for the study. NSSO is a national organization under the
Ministry of Statistics and Implementation which was established in 1950 to regularly
conduct surveys and provide useful statistics in the field of socio-economic status of
households, demography, health, industries, agriculture, consumer expenditure etc. The
specific data from NSSO that will be used in this study is the Social Consumption (Health),
NSS 71st Round for 2014, which is latest nationwide data available in India. The survey
covered whole of the Indian Union. The survey used the interview method of data
collection from a sample of 65,932 randomly selected households (36,480 in rural India
and 29,452 in urban India) and 335,499 individuals, covering the members of the
household in all the 36 states (including union territories). The data for the survey were
collected over a period of six months, from January to June 2014. The NSSO Social
Consumption (Health) collected data on demographic characters, employment, health
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conditions, source of payments, health insurance coverage, type of coverage, costs of
various inpatient services, level of care, type of care and a number of other variables. The
survey also collected information on medical care received at inpatient and outpatient
facilities of medical institutions including health expenditures for various episodes of
illness. This is the first NSSO health survey that collected data on utilization of alternative
medicines. The details of hospitalization for all current and former members of the
household were collected for the last 365 days (hospitalization occurred from January 2013
to June 2014) and the details of outpatient services were collected for the last 15 days.
Outline of the Survey Design
The Social Consumption and Health Survey Interviews are conducted with a
representative sample of households randomly selected through a stratified multi-stage
survey design covering India. A rural/urban stratification is created within clusters called
state-regions, which comprises of a continuous group of districts within a State or Union
Territory. Within each district of a State/Union Territory, two strata were formed: the rural
stratum comprising of all rural areas in the district, and the urban stratum comprising of all
urban areas in the district. The First Stage Units (FSU) were the census villages in the rural
sector and Urban Frame Survey (UFS) blocks in the urban sector. In case of large FSUs,
one intermediate stage of sampling was done by the selection of two hamlet-groups/subblocks from each rural/urban FSU. The households constitute the Ultimate Stage Units
(USU) in both the rural and urban sectors. A total of 4577 villages and 3720 urban blocks
were surveyed, from which 36,480 rural and 29,452 urban households were sampled. In
total, 335,499 individuals from 65,932 households were interviewed. The complete
information of the survey design can be found in the survey report (NSSO 2014).
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Weighted Analysis
Weighted analysis using the appropriate national weights based on stratification
and clustering of the survey design was employed to derive nationally representative
numbers or parameters. The NSSO has calculated the sampling weights and the weights
are included in the data set for each of the observations. “Svy” commands in STATA
version 14.0 was used for applying weights.
Limitations of the Data
Data were not collected from the floating population (people without any normal
residence), but households residing in open spaces, roadside shelters and people who reside
in the same place were listed. People residing in the protected residential areas of military,
para-military, police areas and people in orphanages, rescue homes, etc., were not covered.
The NSSO health survey data does not collect detailed consumption expenditure and the
consumption expenditure in the NSSO survey does not differentiate between food and nonfood expenditure. One approach of estimating catastrophic health expenditure requires data
on non-food expenditure. It should also be noted that all information is reported by the
surveyed individuals and households and some information required quite long recall time.
Therefore, the data is prone to strategic, recall and other types of biases.
Ethical Approval
The dataset is available in the public domain after removing all individual level
identification variables. It is not possible to identify the residence of any of the households
as well. Therefore, ethical approval is not needed for the study. Permission has been
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obtained from the Ministry of Statistics and Implementation of the Government of India
for this research and potential future publications using the data set.
3.2 EFFECT OF HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM FOR THE POOR ON OUT-OF-

POCKET INPATIENT HEALTH CARE COST IN INDIA
Hospitalization
Hospitalization in the NSSO data is defined as “an overnight stay in the hospital
anytime in 365 days prior to the survey” (NSSO, 2014). Admission in inpatient facility of
a medical institution for treatment of illness or injury, or for childbirth, will be called
hospitalization. The birth of a baby in a hospital will not be taken as a case of
hospitalization of the baby. If, however, a baby who has never left the hospital after birth
or contracts an illness for which it has to stay in hospital, it will be regarded as a case of
hospitalization. Surgeries undergone in temporary camps set up for treatment of ailments
(ex. eye ailments) was considered as hospitalization by the survey. The recall period for
the inpatient hospitalizations as well as hospital expenditures was 365 days. A total of
42,869 hospitalization cases were reported in the 2014 survey and all these cases will be
included in the analysis.
Poverty Line
The state-wise poverty lines of India for the urban and rural areas for the year 20112012 were calculated by the Planning Commission of India using Tendulkar Methodology
of calculating poverty line. Details of the methodology can be found in the Planning
Commission of India report (Planning Commission, 2014). This study will use the poverty
lines to identify the individuals who are poor in the data set. The households with
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consumption expenditure below the respective poverty line for the state and area are
defined as “poor”.
3.2.1 Empirical Methodology
The main objective of this study is to estimate the effect of Public Health Insurance
Programs for the Poor on hospitalizations and OOP inpatient care costs. The effects of the
program will be estimated by comparing the probability of hospitalizations and OOP
inpatient healthcare costs between the groups who are eligible (poor) and covered by the
insurance programs and who are eligible (poor) but not covered. In theory, the best
approach of estimating the impact of a program would be to adopt a Difference-indifference (DID) framework. DID is a quasi-experimental research design that is used to
study the casual relationships where randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are infeasible or
unethical (Wing et al., 2018). DID is typically used to estimate the effect of a specific
intervention or treatment (such as a passage of law, policy, or large-scale program
implementation) by comparing the changes in outcomes over time between a population
that is enrolled in or affected by a program (the treatment group) and a population that is
not (the control group). The framework requires data on these two groups in the preintervention period and then in the post-intervention period (Abadie 2008). DID estimators
compare the change in mean outcomes before and after the intervention among individuals
who acquire coverage (treated) and those remaining not exposed.
To estimate the causal effect using DID, the assumptions of DID must be satisfied.
The main assumptions are that the treatment and control groups have parallel trends in
outcome, the composition of the treatment and control groups are stable for repeated crosssectional design, the allocation of treatment is unrelated to the outcome at baseline, and
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there are no spillover effects. The most important assumption for DID is the ‘parallel trend
assumption’. This means that in the absence of the intervention/treatment, the average
difference in the outcome between the treatment and control groups would remain constant
in post-intervention time period as in pre-intervention period. The violation of this
assumption will imply that the DID approach will not be able to obtain unbiased estimates
of the program impacts. The DID model cannot be used if composition of the preintervention and post-intervention groups are not stable, if the comparison group has a
different outcome trend, and if the allocation of the treatment/intervention is determined
by the baseline outcome (Abadie 2008).

Figure 3.1 Intervention Effect using Difference-in-Difference Method

However, the treated and untreated may differ in the distribution of both observable
and unobservable characteristics. Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) highlighted that
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unobservable variables may play a bigger (or smaller) role in influencing the withtreatment outcome than the without-treatment outcome (Heckman & Vytlacil 2007).
Inability to control for them is likely to provide under (over) estimation of the effects of
the programs. Since the main assumption of DID is parallel trend assumption and checking
for the constant difference in outcome over time is necessary for deriving impact of a
program or intervention using DID approach.
For the purpose of this study, a number of simplifying assumptions must be made
as the data set is cross-sectional in nature and we only observe the outcomes in the year the
data were collected. Therefore, the data set does not provide any information on the
individuals who were enrolled in the insurance program in the previous period and those
who were not enrolled. The insurance program is designed for the poor households and
since belonging to the poverty group is a dynamic event, a household in poverty in preinsurance period may not be in poverty in the post-intervention period. Moreover,
household in poverty in the current year (the year of data collection) may not have been in
poverty in the previous period. Almost all programs also show some degree of mistargeting
implying that some poor people may not be offered the insurance while some non-poors
were offered the insurance benefit. These potential deviations from expected enrollment
may affect the estimate of outcomes when a post-intervention year’s data are used.
In the DID model, the intervention effect will be the difference between the
observed outcome in intervention group and the unobserved counterfactual outcome for
intervention group as shown in Figure 1. It is possible to model the unobserved
counterfactual outcome for intervention group in the post-intervention period in absence
of the intervention if data on pre-intervention period are available. In the cross-sectional
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data of the study, we do not have information on the intervention and control groups in preintervention period and if intervention and control groups differed in terms of outcomes of
interests, we have no way of correcting for this. The only alternative approach we can take
is to select the comparison groups from the cross-sectional data in such a way that the
likelihood of pre-intervention variability would be minimized.
Rather than identifying the economic status of individuals who were actually
covered by insurance in the previous period, the implicit assumption we are using is
complete absence of mistargeting or simply not allowing the mistargeted individuals in the
analysis. It is also assumed the social mobility of poor households in India is relatively low
and so the households belonging to poverty category in the current year (the year of the
survey) were also poor in the previous few years. Since the sample size is large enough,
most of the observed and unobserved characteristics of the poor who are in the program
and who are not in the program are likely to be similar. Therefore, the factors other than
insurance coverage that may cause differences between the intervention group and control
group in terms of utilization of hospital services or out-of-pocket costs will be negligible.
If the intervention and control groups are matched in the current year using a list of
observable characteristics will further reduce the possibility of biased estimate or unequal
starting point for the two groups in terms of outcome variables. Thus, using the crosssectional post-intervention data, the intervention effect will be the difference between the
observed outcome in the intervention group and the observed outcome in the control group
as shown in Figure 2.
Two important assumptions are made in the impact evaluation process when using
this cross-sectional data. The assumptions are, at the starting point in the pre-intervention
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period, the unobservable differences between the intervention and control group are small,
if any, and that both the intervention group and the matched control group would show
similar trend in terms of outcomes in absence of the intervention.

Figure 3.2 Intervention Effect using Cross-sectional data

Treatment Group and Control Group
The treatment group will consist of all the people currently enrolled under the
Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor namely the RSBY and other state health
insurance programs for the poor. The control group will consist of all people who are poor
but not enrolled in the Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor in the survey year
2014.

52

TREATMENT GROUP
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Individuals who are Poor
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Enrolled in the Public Health
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Not Enrolled in the Public Health
Insurance Programs for the Poor

Figure 3.3 Treatment and Control Groups

3.2.2. Propensity Score Matching
In order to make both the groups comparable and to avoid selection bias, a
propensity score matching will be used to match the treatment and control groups. A
propensity score is the conditional probability that a subject receives “treatment” given the
subject’s observed covariates. A propensity score matched regression analysis
incorporating survey weights can better account for selection bias based on observed
variables than an unmatched regression (Dugoff et al., 2014; Ridgeway et al., 2015). The
main goal of propensity score is to balance the observed covariates from the individuals in
the treatment and control groups in order to imitate a randomized study (Faries et al., 2010).
To control for selection bias, samples who are poor and covered by Poor People Health
Insurance Program with those who are poor and not covered by the Poor People Health
Insurance Program will be matched by education, socioeconomic status, location of
household (urban/rural), household size, and age of the individual, using a user-written
command psmatch2 in STATA. After matching, a regression analysis will be performed.
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3.2.3 Incidence of Hospitalization and Public Health Insurance for the Poor
Hospitalization is determined by several factors. To study the effects of enrolment
under Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor on the incidence of hospitalizations
after controlling for other factors, a binary logistic regression model will be used. The
logistic regression model is preferred since the dependent variable is dichotomous.
The Logit model will be estimated as:

Pr(E)
In (
) = βo + β1 X1 + β2 X2 + ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ + βk Xk + μ
1 − Pr(E)
“Whether the individual was hospitalized during the last 365 days?” will be used as the
dependent variable. A dichotomous variable for hospitalization will be created with 0 for
‘not hospitalized during the last 365 days’ and 1 for ‘hospitalized during the last 365 days’.
Thus, this dichotomous variable created for hospitalization will serve as the dependent
variable for the logistic regression model. The independent variables include enrollment
under the Poor People Health Insurance Program and other covariates as shown in Table
2. The model will estimate the log odds of incidence of hospitalization adjusted for a set of
explanatory variables. Individual is the unit of analysis. The results for the logistic
regression will be presented with the help of regression coefficients, odds ratio and 95%
confidence intervals.
3.2.4 Length of stay in hospital and Public Health Insurance for the Poor
Tobit Regression Model will be used to study the association between Public Health
Insurance Programs for the Poor and the duration of hospitalization. The Tobit model is
54

usually used when the dependent variable has a number of values clustered, usually at zero.
For the duration of hospitalization, the dependent variable is either zero or higher than 0
(Wooldridge, 2003). The dependent variable duration of hospitalization is truncated below
zero and thus the Tobit model is used.
The Tobit model will be estimated as:

Y*i = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + ……………………………………. + βkXk + µ
Yi = Y*i

if Y*i > 0

Yi = 0

if Y*i <= 0

where Y*i is the latent dependent variable, and Yi is the observed dependent variable.
3.2.5 Out-of-Pocket Inpatient Care Cost and Public Health Insurance for the Poor
Tobit Regression Model will be used to study the association between Public Health
Insurance Programs for the Poor and the OOP cost for inpatient care. The Tobit model is
usually used when the dependent variable has a number of values clustered, usually at zero.
For the OOP inpatient healthcare cost, the dependent variable is either zero or higher than
0 (Wooldridge, 2003). The dependent variable duration of hospitalization is truncated
below zero and thus the Tobit model is used.
The Tobit model will be estimated as:

Y*i = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + ……………………………………. + βkXk + µ
Yi = Y*i

if Y*i > 0

Yi = 0

if Y*i <= 0
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where Y*i is the latent dependent variable, and Yi is the observed dependent variable.
Dependent variable
‘Total Out-of-Pocket health expenditures for inpatient care’ is defined as the total
health expenditure for inpatient care net of reimbursement by health insurance. It is a
continuous variable calculated in Indian Rupees (INR). The hospitalization expenses are
included under two heads namely medical (direct) and direct non-medical (indirect) costs.
Direct medical expenditure consists of package component and non-package component
(doctor fee, medicines, diagnostic tests, bed charges, other medical expenses) and direct
non-medical expenditure consists of transport for patient, transport for others, lodging
charges of escort, food expenses, and other expenses and the details are provided in
Annexure 1.
Total inpatient healthcare expenditure = (Medical expenditure, X) + (Direct Non-Medical
Expenditure, Y)
Total out-of-pocket inpatient health expenditure = (Total inpatient healthcare expenditure)
–
(Amount reimbursed by the health
insurance, Z)
T = (X + Y) – Z
State Fixed Effects
State fixed effect model will be used to see the average effect of health insurance
coverage dollars to the outcome variable (Inpatient OOP Health Expenditure) and we also
allow for state-specific effect of the same variable to the outcome
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Covariates
All the independent variables including the main independent variable of health
insurance and other covariates that will be analyzed at the individual level as shown below:

Table 3.1: List of Covariates with Definition and Measurement
Unit of Analysis - Individual
Variable Name
Definition
Measurement
Health Insurance for the Categorical variable
= 0 if not enrolled
Poor
= 1 if enrolled
Age
Continuous variable for the age of the individual
Sex

Binary variable for sex of the = 1 if male
individual
= 2 if female

Marital Status

Education level

Disease diagnosed

Chronic illness
Location
household

of

Categorical variable for the = 1 if never married
marital status of the individual
= 2 if currently married
= 3 if widowed /divorced/
separated
Categorical variable created for = 1 if illiterate
education of the individual
= 2 if primary/middle school
educated
= 3 if secondary school
educated
= 4 if higher secondary school
educated
= 5 if
diploma/graduate/postgraduate
educated
Categorical variable created for = 1 if infections
disease diagnosed in the = 2 if cancers, blood diseases,
individual
endocrine, metabolic, eye & ear
diseases
= 3 if cardiovascular &
respiratory diseases
= 4 if gastro-intestinal diseases
=5 if skin, musculoskeletal,
psychiatric & neurological
diseases
= 6 if genitourinary, obstetric &
childbirth
= 7 if injuries
Binary variable for the presence = 1 if Yes
of chronic illness
= 2 if No
the Binary variable for location of = 1 if rural
household of individual
= 2 if urban
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Type of household

Household size

Source of drinking water
Household cooking fuel

Type of drainage

Type of latrine

Socioeconomic status

Religion

Social group

Level of care

Type of ward

Categorical variable for the type = 1 if self-employed
of household of the individual
= 2 if regular wage/salary
earning
= 3 if casual labor
= 9 if others
Categorical
variable
for = 1 if household size 1 to 4
household size will be created
(small household)
= 2 if household size 5 to 8
(medium household)
= 3 if household size 9 & more
(large household)
Categorical variable created for = 1 if safe water
the source of drinking water
= 2 if unsafe water
Categorical variable created for = 1 if clean cooking fuel
the cooking fuel in household of = 2 if unclean cooking fuel
individual
= 3 if no cooking arrangement
Categorical variable for the type = 1 if open (kutcha and pucca)
of drainage in household of = 2 if covered (pucca and
individual
underground)
= 3 if no drainage
Categorical variable for the type = 1 if service and pit latrine
of latrine in household of = 2 if septic tank/ flush system’
individual
= 3 if no latrine
Individual consumption expenditure per capita per year (INR)
obtained from the household consumption expenditure by using the
Adult Equivalent Unit
Categorical variable for the = 1 if Hinduism
religion of individual
= 2 if Islam
= 3 if Christianity
= 4 if Other religions
Categorical variable for the social = 1 if Scheduled tribes
group of the individual
= 2 if Scheduled castes
= 3 if Other backward classes
= 9 if Others
Categorical variable for level of = 1 if HSC/PHC//CHC/mobile
care received by the individual
medical unit
= 2 if Public hospital
= 3 if Private hospital
Categorical variable for type of = 1 if Free
ward used by the individual
= 2 if Paying general
= 3 if Paying special
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3.3 CATASTROPHIC HEALTH EXPENDITURES IN INDIA
Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditures for Inpatient Care (T) is already discussed in
the previous section. Payments made by all the individuals in a household for inpatient care
and outpatient care will be summed at the household level.
Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditures for Outpatient Care (A)
Total OOP healthcare expenditure for outpatient care (A) is the total health
expenditure that is experienced by the patients after deducting the amount of money
reimbursed or expected to be reimbursed by the health insurance. The total OOP health
expenditure for outpatient care is calculated as follows:
Total outpatient healthcare expenditure = (Medical expenditure, B) + (Direct Non-medical
Expenditure,
C)
Total OOP outpatient health expenditure = (Total outpatient health expenditure) - (Amount
reimbursed by the health insurance, S)
A= (B + C) – S
Total Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditures (M)
Total OOP health expenditure (M) is calculated by adding the OOP health
expenditure for inpatient care (T), and the OOP health expenditure for outpatient care (A).
M = (T + A)
Household Consumption Expenditure (X)
Total household consumption expenditure is defined as comprising of both
monetary and in-kind payment on all goods and services and the money value of the
consumption of homemade products (199). The 71st round of NSS data provides a single
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variable on consumption expenditure. There is no separate variable or information on nonsubsistence consumption. The household’s usual consumption expenditure in a month is
provided in Indian Rupees (INR).
Reference Period
The reference period of institutional expenditure is 365 days, 1 month for household
consumption expenditure. The amount of money reimbursed by the medical insurance
company for inpatient healthcare is for the last 365 days. For outpatient care including the
services and expenditure, the reference period was 15 days.
Table 3.2: Reference Period for various categories
Categories
Household consumption expenditure
Medical treatment received as inpatient of a medical
institution and expenses incurred
Expenses incurred for outpatient care
Spells of ailments of household members during the
last 15 days (including hospitalization)

Reference Period (days)
30 days
365 days
15 days
15 days

All the reference period will be converted into a common scale for analysis. Thus, in this
study all the reference periods will be adjusted for 30 days. Expenses for outpatient OOP
health expenditure will be multiplied by 2 to get the monthly estimates. Expenses for
inpatient OOP health expenditure will be divided by 12 to get the monthly estimates.
3.3.1 Measuring Incidence of Catastrophic Health Expenditures
The method of calculation of incidence and intensity of CHE has been adopted from
the article by Wagstaff et al. (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003). Incidence of catastrophic
health expenditures is the fraction of households whose health payments as a proportion of
household consumption expenditure exceed a particular threshold of overall household
expenditure or household nonfood expenditure. Catastrophic payment headcount informs
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the proportion/number of households affected by CHE i.e. the number of households who
are experiencing an OOP healthcare expenditure above 10% of the total household
consumption expenditure. Household consumption expenditures will be used as the proxy
for income of the household.
Catastrophic payment headcount is given by the formula:
𝑁

1
𝐻𝐶 = ∑ 𝐸
𝑁
𝑖=1

HC is the Catastrophic payment headcount. The indicator E=1 is defined when Ti/Xi >Z
and zero otherwise. Here Z is 0.10. T is the household OOP health expenditure; X is the
total household consumption expenditure and N is the sample size. The minimum and
maximum value of catastrophic payment headcount are 0% and 100% respectively. The
catastrophic payment headcount does not consider the intensity of the CHE, but only
considers whether the household has experienced CHE. Since it is insensitive to the degree
to which the CHE exceed the threshold value, it is vital to study the intensity of the CHE,
to identify the households who are highly affected.
3.3.2 Measuring Intensity of Catastrophic Health Expenditures
The intensity of the CHE is calculated by the catastrophic payment gap (or excess).
It is the average degree when the household OOP health expenditures as a proportion of
the household consumption expenditure exceeds the pre-specified thresholds (10%).
Oi is the excess or overshoot and it is calculated by the formula, Oi=Ei [(Ti/xi)-Z]. Ti is the
OOP health payment of household. Xi is the household consumption expenditure. Z is the
threshold budget share. The minimum and maximum value of catastrophic payment gap is
0% and 90% respectively when the threshold value is fixed at 0.10.
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Similar to community level incidence rate of CHE, we can also define community level
CHE gap or intensity. At the community level, CHE gap is defined as

𝑂=

1
𝑁∗

∑𝑁∗
𝑖=1 𝑂 𝑖

Figure 3.4 Catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditure as share of per-capita/household
expenditure, by cumulative % of population, ranked by decreasing payment

3.3.3 Measuring Socioeconomic Inequalities of Catastrophic Health Expenditures
Concentration index is calculated to separate the association of CHE with socioeconomic status (Erreygers, 2009). To identify the proportion of households that are
exceeding the threshold vary across the various income distribution, the computation of
concentration index for Ei defined as CE is necessary. Similarly, in order to identify the
intensity of the CHE across the different socioeconomic groups, the concentration index
for Oi needs to be computed which is defined as CO. For CE, the concentration curve will
graph the cumulative share of the sample, ranked by household consumption expenditure
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on the x-axis against the cumulative share of the households who exceed the pre-specified
threshold on the y-axis. Similarly, for CO, the concentration curve will graph the standard
of living variable on the x-axis against the cumulative share excessed on the y-axis. The
socioeconomic rank of the household will be assigned such that the most well-off
households ranked first and the least well-off ranked last. The ‘Convenient covariance’
approach will be used for the calculation of concentration index (Jenkins, 1988). According
to this, the concentration index equals the covariance between the variable and the person’s
rank in the income distribution, multiplied by two and dividing them by the mean of the
variable (Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1989). The complete calculation of this formula is
presented in Appendix 2.
Concentration index is calculated using the following formula (10):

C = 2 cov (yi, Ri)/ µ
In the case of CE, variable yi = Ei, Ri is the ith individual’s fractional rank in the per capita
and µ is the mean of Ei. Cov is the covariance between yi and Ri. Similarly, for Co, variable
yi = Oi, Ri is the ith individual’s fractional rank in the per capita and µ is the mean of Oi.
Cov is the covariance between yi and Ri.
When the curve lies above the line of equality, the concentration index takes a
negative value, and this indicates a disproportionate concentration of CHE among the poor
households, and when the curve lies below the line of equality, the concentration index
takes a positive value indicating a higher concentration of CHE among the rich households.
The concentration index is zero when there is no inequality. The value of the concentration
index ranges from -1 to +1. For this research, positive value of CE indicates that richer
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households are more likely to exceed the threshold and a positive value of CO indicates that
there is greater tendency of overshoots among the richer households.

Figure 3.5 Inequality Curve

3.3.4 Factors affecting Incidence of Catastrophic Health Expenditure
To study the effects of various factors on the incidence of catastrophic OOP
healthcare payments, the logistic regression model will be used. The logistic regression
model is preferred since the dependent variable is dichotomous.
The Logit model will be estimated as:

Pr(E)
In (
) = βo + β1 X1 + β2 X2 + ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ + βk Xk + μ
1 − Pr(E)
“Whether a household is incurring catastrophic health expenditure?” will be used as the
dependent variable. A dichotomous variable for CHE will be created with 0 for not
incurring catastrophic health expenditures and 1 for incurring catastrophic health
expenditures.
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CHE variable: A CHE variable takes up the value of 1 when Ti/xi > z and 0 otherwise. The
value of z will be set at 0.10 or 10%.
Thus, the dichotomous variable created for CHE will serve as the dependent variable for
the logistic regression model. The independent variables include the various characteristics
of the individuals, households and health facility as shown in Table 3. The model will
estimate the log odds of incurring CHS adjusted for a set of explanatory variables.
Household is the unit of analysis. The results for the logistic regression will be presented
with the help of regression coefficients, odds ratio and 95% confidence intervals.
3.3.5 Factors affecting Intensity of Catastrophic Health Expenditure
To study the effects of various factors on the intensity of catastrophic OOP
healthcare payments, the multiple regression model will be used.
The multiple regression model will be estimated as:

Yi =β0 + β1X1 + β2X2+…………………………….+ βkXk + µ
Where Yi is the observed dependent variable, Xs are the independent variables and βs are
the coefficient of Xs. Catastrophic payment gaps were computed at threshold levels of 10%.
The dependent variable will be the catastrophic payment gap (Oi), where Oi = Ei ((Ti/xi) –
z). The independent variables for the model will include the various characteristics of the
individuals, households and health facility as shown in Table 3.
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Table 3.3: List of independent variables with their definition and measurement

Variable Name

Unit of Analysis - Household
Definition
Measurement

Age groups

Dummy variable
Dummy variable

Female

Continuous variable

Divorced,
Dummy variable
widowed, separated
Education of female Dummy variable
members in the
household
Location of the
household
Household size
Source of drinking
water
Household cooking
fuel

Dummy variable for
location of the household
Continuous variable
Dummy variable

Type of drainage

Dummy variable for
type of drainage
household
Dummy variable for
type
of
latrine
household

Type of latrine

Dummy variable for the
cooking fuel will be
created
the
in
the
in

Socioeconomic
status

Categorical variable

Religion

Dummy variable for the
religion of members of the
household
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Presence of at least of one children (aged 5
years and less) in the household
Presence of at least one elderly person (aged
above 60 years) in the household
Proportion of female members in each
household
Presence of someone divorced in the
household
= 1 if no educated female member in the
household
= 2 if at least one secondary educated female
member in household
= 1 if rural
= 2 if urban
Number of members in the household
= 1 if safe water
= 2 if unsafe water
= 1 if clean cooking fuel
= 2 if unclean cooking fuel
= 3 if others
= 4 if no cooking arrangement
= 1 if open (kutcha and pucca)
= 2 if covered (pucca and underground)
= 3 if no drainage
= 1 if service and pit latrine
= 2 if septic tank/ flush system’
= 3 if no latrine
= 9 if others
Quintiles will be created from household
consumption expenditure per month (INR)
= 1 if lowest income quintile
= 2 if second lowest income quintile
= 3 if third income quintile
= 4 if fourth income quintile
= 5 if highest fifth income quintile
= 1 if Hinduism
= 2 if Islam
= 3 if Christianity
= 4 if Sikhism
= 5 if Jainism
= 6 if Buddhism
= 7 if Zoroastrianism
= 9 if Others

Social group

Dummy variable for the = 1 if Scheduled tribes
social group of the = 2 if Scheduled castes
household
= 3 if Other backward classes
= 9 if Others
Chronic illness
Continuous variable
Proportion of household members suffering
from chronic illnesses in the household
Hospitalization
Continuous variable
Proportion of members hospitalized in the
household
Level of care
Dummy variable for level = 1 if Public Hospital
of care
= 2 if Private Hospital
Number of days of Continuous variable
Total days of illness among all the members
illness
in a household summed together
Duration of stay in Continuous variable
Total number of days admitted in hospital
hospital
among household members summed
together
Health insurance
Dummy variable for = 1 if covered by any health insurance
health insurance of the program
household
= 2 if not covered by any health insurance
program
State
of Dummy variable for the place of hospitalization for all the 36 states and
hospitalization
union territories
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CHAPTER 4: MANUSCRIPT I
4.1 EFFECT OF HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM FOR THE POOR ON OUT-OFPOCKET INPATIENT CARE COST IN INDIA
Introduction
Achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC) is the main goal for almost every
nation in the world (WHO 2010). Financial risk protection is an important dimension of
UHC. One of the specific targets of the recent Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is
to provide financial risk protection (Saksena et al. 2014). The amount of financial
protection rendered to population groups will depend on their degree of dependence on
out-of-pocket expenditures (OOP) for financing health care (Xu et al. 2003). The primary
conditions that are necessary for the occurrence of high OOP health expenditures are the
availability and utilization of health care, poor capacity of households to pay for healthcare,
and lack of any risk pooling and prepayment mechanisms (Xu et al., 2007). Evidence from
National Health Account 2017 shows that OOP health expenditures for inpatient care
constitutes around 31.96% of the total OOP health expenditures, even after coverage by
various health insurance programs (NHA 2017). Lack of health insurance coverage and
inadequate coverage are considered important for high OOP health expenditures (Sahrawat
et al. 2011). Protecting households from hospital OOP expenses should significantly
improve financial equity in health service delivery. Moreover, access to health care can be
improved if the health system can protect the poor households from significant OOP

68

expenses. In order to improve access to health care by the poor, India initiated a
number of health insurance programs for the poor since 2008 (Sahrawat et al. 2011). This
paper advances our knowledge about financial risk protection and effect of health insurance
programs for the poor in India.
The increase in health insurance coverage may lead to increase in health care
utilization because of the change in behavior of the insured as well as the health care
provider. A study by Anderson et al. (2012) on the effect of health insurance coverage on
the utilization of medical services in the US showed that there was a 61% reduction in
inpatient hospital admissions and 40% reduction in emergency department visits among
the uninsured population (Anderson et al. 2012). Evidence from literature has shown that
increased health insurance coverage leads to increase in utilization of health services, but
the effect of health insurance coverage on financial risk protection is less clear, especially
for poor beneficiaries (Escobar et al. 2010). The health insurance for the poor in India
covers only inpatient services. This creates an incentive for the patients to visit hospitals
and get hospitalized, instead of using basic primary health care services. Studies on
hospitalization trends in India showed that an annual hospitalization rate increased from
16.6 per 1000 population to 37.0 per 1000 from 1995 to 2014 (Pandey et al. 2017).
There are many Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor offered by the
Government of India (GOI) and individual states cover the cost of hospitalization and
inpatient care (Hooda 2017). RSBY is a health insurance program started by the Ministry
of Labor and Employment of the Government of India in April 2008 and it provides a wide
range of hospital-based healthcare services to Below Poverty Line (BPL) families (Kumar
2011). There are a number of state-run public health insurance programs for the poor in
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three of the southern states in India which provide higher coverage than RSBY and are
exempted from the national program. The programs are the Chief Minister’s
Comprehensive Health Insurance Scheme in Tamil Nadu State, Rajiv Aarogyasri
Community Health Insurance (RACHI) in Andhra Pradesh State, and Vajpayee Aarogyasri
Scheme (VAS) in Karnataka State (Hooda 2017). Table 1 summarizes the important
features of the RSBY program and the state health insurance programs for the poor in
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu.
Table 4.1 Key Parameters under Health Insurance Programs in India
Parameter

Benefits covered

Rashtriya Swasthiya Bima Yojana (RSBY)

Description
Cost of hospitalization
for 725+ procedures at
empaneled hospitals
up to INR 30,000 per
annum per household;
INR 100 per visit up to
INR 1,000 per year for
transport cost

Additional Caveats
Pre-existing
conditions
are
covered;
minimal
exclusions;
day
surgeries
covered;
outpatient
expenditure is not
covered

Eligibility criteria

Must be on the official All enrolled members
state BPL list; Limited must be present to be
to five members of the enrolled;
household including
household
head,
spouse, and three
dependents

Premium and fees

INR 30 registration fee
per household per
annum
paid
by
household.
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State health insurance
programs for the poor
(Andhra Pradesh,
Tamil Nadu and
Karnataka)
Description
Andhra
Pradesh
Families are provided
coverage
for
INR
200,000 per family per
year, and there are no
restrictions on the
number
of
family
members enrolled
Karnataka
INR150,000 per year
for 5 persons in a family
Tamil
Nadu
–
INR100,000 per family
per year
Must be on the official
BPL list of the specific
state. No restrictions on
the number of family
members enrolled in
Andhra Pradesh, and
Tamil Nadu. Covers
five members of family
in Karnataka.
No specific enrolment
fee in the three states of
Andhra
Pradesh,

Financing

75%/ 25%
Government of India/
State Government

Insurer

Both public and private
insurance companies
can bid to work in a
district or more than a
district recommended
by state governments
Both public and private
sector
service
providers can apply to
join the network of
providers empaneled
under the scheme

Service provider

Karnataka, and Tamil
Nadu
The ratio is 90% /10% Completely funded by
in Northeast states the respective states
and
Jammu
&
Kashmir
In one district only Both public and private
one
insurance insurance
companies
company is finally can bid to work at the
selected
state level

Minimum eligibility
criteria on quality of
services
to
be
provided have been
laid down by the MoL
&E

Both public and private
sector service providers
in the specific state can
join the network of
providers empaneled in
the program. Minimum
eligibility criteria laid
down by the respective
State Health Ministries

Source: Ministry of Labor and Employment (MoL & E) and State Health Departments
Around 41 million families are enrolled in RSBY, covering around 150 million
poor people as of September 2016. The enrolment under the program has been increasing
starting from only 55 districts in 2008-2009. Nationally, around 460 districts participate in
the program, with 57% of the eligible households are currently enrolled (Karan et al. 2017).
There is significant inter-district and inter-state variation in the percentage of eligible
households enrolled in RSBY. Across states, the degree of enrolment of households varies
from a low of 24% in Arunachal Pradesh and 36% in Haryana to more than 75% in Kerala.
The degree of enrollment of households by district varies significantly across the country,
with a low rate of enrollment of 3% in Kannauj district and 6% in Kanpur district in the
Uttar Pradesh state to a high enrollment rate of 90% of households in most of districts in
the Chhattisgarh and Kerala states of India. Enrolment is not complete in many states, even
a decade after the start of the program. Also, as of September 2016, the state of Rajasthan
was still in its early stage for enrolling households in RSBY (Karan et al. 2017). This shows
71

that enrollment in the RSBY program has been slow in some parts of India. Not all states
in India participate in RSBY. The state of Andhra Pradesh has not adopted RSBY as it
already has a substantially more generous state level health insurance program than RSBY
which pre-dates RSBY with relatively high population coverage, covering nearly 80% of
its population (Fan et al. 2012). Studies show that access is not available to around 50% of
the people eligible for RSBY program because they are currently not enrolled in RSBY
due to lack of availability of full lists of eligible participants, and high migration rates
(Karan et al., 2017).
Under the Public Health Insurance Programs for the poor only the hospitalization
services and expenses are covered. It is expected that these health insurance for the poor
will increase utilization of hospitals by the BPL households who would usually be forced
to postpone their non-urgent procedures for a later time because of cost. Even with
insurance, there may be OOP payments for drugs, tests and post-treatment care which are
not covered by the health insurance that may increase the OOP payments for inpatient and
inpatient-related care. Hence the direction of effect of the Poor People Health Insurance
Programs on total inpatient OOP health expenditure is unclear. Also, RSBY leads to misuse
of services, since both the physician and the patient have the incentive to convert an
outpatient case into an inpatient admission, leading to unnecessary utilization (Taneja and
Taneja 2016). The objective of this research is to examine the effect of Public Health
Insurance Programs for the Poor on hospitalizations and inpatient OOP health
expenditures.
Many studies show that people incur high OOP health expenditures despite being
covered by the national health insurance program RSBY or other state health insurance
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programs (Devadasan et al. 2013; Rao et al. 2014; Selvaraj and Karan 2012; Rajasekhar et
al. 2011; Rent and Ghosh 2015; Mitchell et al. 2011).). However, studies on state health
insurance programs in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh showed that OOP health
expenditures significantly declined with health insurance coverage (Aggarwal 2010; Fan
et al. 2012; Sood et al. 2014). Cross-sectional studies done in Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra
show that the utilization of healthcare was significantly higher among the insured
compared to the uninsured population (Philip et al. 2012; Ghosh 2014).
Current studies on Poor People’s Health Insurance Programs such as RSBY deal
with issues in program enrolment (Shahi & Singh, 2015), barriers in implementation of the
program (Rajasekhar et al. 2011), effect of information campaign (Das and Leino; 2011),
hospitalization patterns (Thakur, 2016), and determinants of participation in the RSBY
program (Nandi et al. 2013). There are only two district level studies on RSBY, one done
in Amaravati district in Maharashtra (Rathi et al. 2012) and the other in Gujarat (Devadasan
et al. 2013) showed that RSBY increased hospitalizations and higher OOP health
expenditures among the RSBY insured people. The study in Gujarat showed that RSBY
enrollees experienced higher OOP health expenditures because they had to pay for
medicines and diagnostics during the hospital admission (Aggarwal 2010). Another state
level study done for the state health insurance program Aarogyasri found different results
with insurance significantly reducing the OOP health expenditures for hospitalizations
(Fan et al. 2012). Most of other studies that studied the effect of health insurance on
hospitalizations and OOP health expenditures were community-based health insurance
programs in different parts of the country (Aggarwal 2010; Devadasan et al. 2010;
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Devadasan et al. 2007; Ranson 2002) and thus their implications for nation-wide policy
interest is limited.
This study is a considerable improvement over other studies on Public Health
Insurance Programs for the Poor in India on two important counts: i) the study uses
nationally representative dataset which helps in estimating pan-India effects of Public
Health Insurance Programs for the Poor ii) the study evaluates the effect of Public Health
Insurance Programs for the Poor by comparing outcomes between poor people enrolled
and not-enrolled in the insurance program. Many studies are based on RSBY enrollees
alone and do not have any controls making it difficult to identify the effects of the Public
Health Insurance Programs for the Poor. This study identified comparable control
population from among those who are poor but were not enrollment in insurance. The
specific research questions that will be addressed in this research are: (i) How do
hospitalizations differ between the enrolled and not-enrolled groups under Public Health
Insurance Programs for the Poor? and (ii) How does OOP health expenditure for inpatient
care differ among people enrolled and not-enrolled under Public Health Insurance
Programs for the Poor?

Methods
Data source
The data from the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) of the
Government of India were used for the study (NSSO 2014). NSSO is a national
organization under the Ministry of Statistics and Implementation which was established in
1950 to regularly conduct surveys and provide useful statistics in the field of socioeconomic status of households, demography, health, industries, agriculture, consumer
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expenditure etc. The specific data set from NSSO that was used in this study is the Social
Consumption (Health), NSS 71st Round for 2014, which is the latest nationwide data
available in India. The survey covered whole of the Indian Union. The survey used the
interview method of data collection from a sample of 65,932 randomly selected households
(36,480 in rural India and 29,452 in urban India) and 335,499 individuals, covering the
members of the household in all the 36 states (including union territories). The data for the
survey were collected over a period of six months, from January to June 2014. The NSSO
Social Consumption (Health) collected data on demographic characters, employment,
health conditions, source of payments, health insurance coverage, type of coverage, costs
of various inpatient services, level of care, type of care and a number of other variables.
The survey also collected information on medical care received at inpatient and outpatient
facilities of medical institutions including health expenditures for various episodes of
illness. This is the first NSSO health survey that collected data on utilization of alternative
medicines. The details of hospitalization for all current and former members of the
household were collected for the last 365 days (hospitalization occurred from January 2013
to June 2014) and the details of outpatient services were collected for the last 15 days.
Empirical Methodology
The main objective of this study is to estimate the effect of Public Health Insurance
Programs for the Poor on hospitalizations and OOP inpatient care costs. The effects of the
program were estimated by comparing the probability of hospitalizations and OOP
inpatient healthcare costs between the groups who are eligible (poor) and covered by the
insurance programs and who are eligible (poor) but not covered. In theory, the best
approach of estimating the impact of a program is to adopt a Difference-in-difference
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(DID) framework with randomized allocation of eligible individuals in the program group
and the no-program group. The framework requires data on the two groups in the preintervention period and then in the post-intervention period (Abadie 2008). DID estimators
compare the change in mean outcomes before and after the intervention among individuals
who acquire coverage (treated) and those remaining not exposed.
To estimate the causal effect using DID, the assumptions of DID must be satisfied.
The main assumptions are that the treatment and control groups have parallel trends in
outcome, the composition of the treatment and control groups are stable for repeated crosssectional design, the allocation of treatment is unrelated to the outcome at baseline, and
there are no spillover effects. The most important assumption for DID is the ‘parallel trend
assumption’. This means that in the absence of the intervention/treatment, the average
difference in the outcome between the treatment and control groups would have remained
constant in post-intervention time period as in pre-intervention period. The violation of this
assumption will imply that the DID approach will not be able to obtain unbiased estimates
of program impacts. The DID model cannot be used if composition of the pre-intervention
and post-intervention groups are not stable, if the comparison group has a different
outcome trend, and if the allocation of the treatment/intervention is determined by the
baseline outcome (Abadie 2008).
However, the treated and untreated may differ in the distribution of both observable
and unobservable characteristics. Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) highlighted that
unobservable variables may play a bigger (or smaller) role in influencing the withtreatment outcome than the without-treatment outcome (Heckman and Vytlacil 2007).
Inability to control for them is likely to provide under (over) estimation of the effects of
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the programs. Since the main assumption of DID is parallel trend assumption and checking
for the constant difference in outcome over time is necessary for deriving impact of a
program or intervention using DID approach.

Figure 4.1 Intervention Effect using Difference-in-Difference Method

For the purpose of this study, a number of simplifying assumptions must be made
as the data set is cross-sectional in nature and we only observe the outcomes in the year the
data were collected. Therefore, the data set does not provide any information on the
individuals who were enrolled in the insurance program in the previous period and those
who were not enrolled. The insurance program is designed for the poor households and
since belonging to the poverty group is a dynamic event, a household in poverty in preinsurance period may not necessarily be in poverty in the post-intervention period.
Moreover, household in poverty in the current year (the year of data collection) may not
have been in poverty in the previous period. Almost all programs also show some degree
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of mistargeting implying that some poor people may not be offered the insurance while
some non-poors are offered the insurance benefit. These potential deviations from expected
enrollment may affect the estimate of outcomes when a post-intervention year’s data are
used.
In the DID model, the intervention effect will be the difference between the
observed outcome in intervention group and the unobserved counterfactual outcome for
intervention group as shown in Figure 1. It is possible to model the unobserved
counterfactual outcome for intervention group in the post-intervention period in absence
of the intervention if data on pre-intervention period are available. In the cross-sectional
data of the study, we do not have information on the intervention and control groups in preintervention period and if intervention and control groups differed in terms of outcomes of
interests, we have no way of correcting for this. The only alternative approach we can take
is to select the comparison groups from the cross-sectional data in such a way that the
likelihood of pre-intervention variability would be minimized.
Rather than identifying the economic status of individuals who were actually
covered by insurance in the previous period, the implicit assumption we are using is
complete absence of mistargeting or simply not allowing the mistargeted individuals in the
analysis. It is also assumed the social mobility of poor households in India is relatively low
and so the households belonging to poverty category in the current year (the year of the
survey) were also poor in the previous few years. Since the sample size is large enough,
most of the observed and unobserved characteristics of the poor who are in the program
and who are not in the program are likely to be similar. Therefore, the factors other than
insurance coverage that may cause differences between the intervention group and control
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group in terms of utilization of hospital services or out-of-pocket costs should be
negligible. If the intervention and control groups are matched in the current year using a
list of observable characteristics will further reduce the possibility of biased estimate or
unequal starting point for the two groups in terms of outcome variables. Thus, using the
cross-sectional post-intervention data, the intervention effect will be the difference between
the observed outcome in the intervention group and the observed outcome in the control
group as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 4.2 Intervention Effect using Cross-sectional data

Two important assumptions are made in the impact evaluation process when using this
cross-sectional data. The assumptions are, at the starting point in the pre-intervention
period, the unobservable differences between the intervention and control group are small,
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if any, and that both the intervention group and the matched control group would show
similar trend in terms of outcomes in absence of the intervention.
Treatment Group, Control Group and Propensity Score Matching
The treatment group consist of all the people currently enrolled under the Public
Health Insurance Programs for the Poor namely the RSBY and other state health insurance
programs for the poor. The control group will consist of all people who are poor but not
enrolled in the Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor. In order to make both the
groups comparable and to avoid selection bias, a propensity score matching was used to
match the treatment and control groups. A propensity score is the conditional probability
that a subject receives “treatment” given the subject’s observed covariates. A propensity
score matched regression analysis incorporating survey weights can better account for
selection bias based on observed variables than an unmatched regression (DuGoff et al.
2014 and Ridgeway et al. 2015). The main goal of propensity score is to balance the
observed covariates from the individuals in the treatment and control groups in order to
imitate a randomized study (Faries 2010). The variables used to get the propensity scores
were education, socioeconomic status, location of household (urban/rural), household size,
and age of the individual, using a user-written command psmatch2 in STATA. After
matching, a regression analysis was performed.
Data Analysis
Incidence of hospitalization and duration of hospital stay
Hospitalization is determined by several factors. To study the effects of enrolment
under Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor on the incidence of hospitalizations
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after controlling for other factors, a binary logistic regression model was used. The logistic
regression model is preferred since the dependent variable is dichotomous. “Whether the
individual was hospitalized during the last 365 days?” was used as the dependent variable.
A dichotomous variable for hospitalization was created with 0 for ‘not hospitalized during
the last 365 days’ and 1 for ‘hospitalized during the last 365 days’. The independent
variables include enrollment under the Poor People Health Insurance Program and other
covariates. The model estimated the log odds of incidence of hospitalization adjusted for a
set of explanatory variables. Individual is the unit of analysis. The results for the logistic
regression have been presented with the help of regression coefficients, odds ratio and 95%
confidence intervals. Tobit Regression Model was used to study the association between
the Public Health Insurance Programs for the Poor and the duration of hospitalization. The
Tobit model is usually estimated when the dependent variable has a large number of
observations clustered, usually at zero. For the duration of hospitalization, the dependent
variable is either zero or higher than 0 (Wooldridge 2003). The dependent variable duration
of hospitalization is truncated below zero and thus the Tobit model is used.
OOP inpatient healthcare cost
Tobit Regression Model will be used to study the association between Public Health
Insurance Programs for the Poor and the OOP cost for inpatient care. The Tobit model is
usually used when the dependent variable has a number of values clustered, usually at zero.
For the OOP inpatient healthcare cost, the dependent variable is either zero or higher than
0 (Wooldridge, 2003). The dependent variable duration of hospitalization is truncated
below zero and thus the Tobit model is used.
The Tobit model will be estimated as:
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Y*i = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + ……………………………………. + βkXk + µ
Yi = Y*i

if Y*i > 0

Yi = 0

if Y*i <= 0

where Y*i is the latent dependent variable, and Yi is the observed dependent variable.

Results
Descriptive Statistics
The total sample consisted of 336,470 individuals. In the total sample, 42,121
individuals were covered by the government sponsored health insurance programs such as
Employee’s State Insurance Scheme (ESIS), Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS),
and the poor people’s health insurance programs such as RSBY and other state health
insurance programs. Poverty is a dynamic event where people move in and out of poverty.
We used the poverty line for 2014 to find out the individuals who were poor in 2014. Since
the data had only one variable for the individuals covered by the government sponsored
health insurance programs which included both the poor people health insurance programs
and other government health insurance programs for the non-poor, we considered that the
people who were below the poverty line and enrolled under the government sponsored
health insurance programs to be enrolled under the public health insurance programs for
the poor such as RSBY, RACHI etc and the people who were below poverty line and not
enrolled as the people who were eligible for the poor people’s health insurance program
but not enrolled. Only the poor people below the poverty line as of 2014 is used for this
study. Descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 are at the individual level, consisting of
only poor individuals. There were 64,270 observations. The mean age group of the poor
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population is 25.29 years. Only 9.55% of the poor individuals in India are enrolled in any
type of public health insurance programs for the poor. 9.41% of the poor individuals are
enrolled in RSBY all over India except the states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and
Karnataka. In Andhra Pradesh, 39.97% of the poor people are enrolled in RACHI, 5.69%
are enrolled in VAS in Karnataka, and only 4.45% are enrolled in CCHIS in Tamil Nadu.
Around 41.30% of the poor in the sample is illiterate; 80.57% were of Hindu religion;
85.13% belong to the disadvantaged classes; 64.20% of the individuals were from medium
sized households (5 to 8 members). 2.51% of the poor individuals were suffering from
chronic illnesses; 3.33% were hospitalized in the previous one year with the mean duration
of hospitalization per poor person being 0.1664 days (see below for admission statistics).
The yearly OOP health expenditure for inpatient health care for the whole poor population
was 269.26 INR.
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for the poor individuals in the 2014 survey
Variables

Categories

Hospitalization
Health Insurance for
the Poor
Sex
Marital Status

Education

Location
Religion

No
Yes
Enrolled

Frequency (%)
n = 64,270
56,755 (88.31%)
7,515 (11.69%)
5,917 (9.21%)

Weighted
Percentage
96.67%
3.33%
9.55%

Female
Never married
Currently married
Widowed/divorced/separated
Illiterate
Primary/middle school
Secondary school
Higher secondary school
Diploma/graduate/post graduate
Rural
Urban
Hinduism
Islam
Christianity
Other religions

32,152 (50.03%)
32,938 (51.25%)
28,443 (44.26%)
2,889 (4.50%)
26,063 (40.55%)
29,240 (45.50%)
4,834 (7.52%)
2,795 (4.35%)
1,337 (2.08%)
42,590 (66.27%)
21,680 (33.73%)
46,464 (72.30%)
11,836 (18.42%)
3,988 (6.21%)
1,982 (3.08%)

48.90%
51.81%
43.59%
4.60%
41.30%
47.39%
6.49%
3.46%
1.36%
80.03%
19.97%
80.57%
15.09%
2.09%
2.25%
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Social Group

Household size

Household type

Latrine type

Drainage type

Drinking water
Cooking fuel

Chronic illness
Level of care

Type of ward

Nature of ailment

Scheduled tribes
Scheduled castes
Other backward classes
Others
Small household (1 to 4
members)
Medium household (5 to 8
members)
Large household (9 and more)
Self-employed
Regular wage/salary earning
Casual labor
Others
Service and pit latrine
Septic tank/flush system
No latrine and others
Open
Covered
No drainage
Safe water
Unsafe water
Unclean fuels
Clean fuels
No cooking arrangement
Yes
Sub-center/PHC/CHC
Public hospital
Private hospital
Did not seek care
Free
Paying general
Paying special
Did not seek care
Infections
Cancers, blood, endocrine,
metabolic, eye & ear diseases
Cardiovascular, respiratory
diseases
Gastrointestinal diseases
Skin, musculoskeletal,
psychiatric & neurological
diseases
Genitourinary, obstetric &
childbirth
Injuries
Did not seek care
Continuous Variables
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12,983 (20.20%)
13,759 (21.41%)
26,105 (40.62%)
11,423 (17.77%)
8,835 (13.75%)

16.65%
25.51%
42.97%
14.86%
18.07%

39,009 (60.70%)

64.20%

16,426 (25.56%)
33,211 (51.67%
7,794 (12.13%)
21,617 (33.63%)
1,648 (2.56%)
13,594 (21.15%)
16,931 (26.34%)
33,745 (52.51%)
30,535 (47.51%)
8,543 (13.29%)
25,192 (39.20%)
61,807 (96.17%)
2,463 (3.83%)
50,913 (79.22%)
12,802 (19.92%)
555 (0.86%)
1,911 (2.97%)
890 (1.38%)
4,005 (6.23%)
2,620 (4.08%)
56,755(88.31%)
4,532 (7.05%)
2,672 (4.16%)
311 (0.48%)
56,755 (88.31%)
1,518 (2.36%)
486 (0.76%)

17.73%
49.44%
9.27%
38.49%
2.80%
14.65%
19.36%
65.99%
44.05%
10.66%
45.29%
98.36%
1.64%
84.91%
13.69%
1.40%
2.51%
0.42%
1.72%
1.18%
96.67%
2.00%
1.20%
0.13%
96.67%
0.53%
0.19%

542 (0.84%)

0.22%

553 (0.86%)
576 (0.90%)

0.22%
0.21%

3,204 (4.99%)

1.73%

636 (0.99%)
56,755 (88.31%)

0.23%
96.67%

Variables

Mean

Standard Error

95%
Confidence
Interval
24.95 –
25.63

Age

25.29

0.1719

Age Groups
0 – 18 years

9.21

0.0685

9.08 – 9.35

19 – 40 years

29.41

0.1003

41 – 60 years

50.06

0.1431

29.21 –
29.60
49.78 –
50.34

61 – 80 years

67.71

0.2262

67.27 –
68.16

80+ years

86.62

0.5686

85.50 –
87.74

Duration of
hospitalization

0.1664

0.0067

0.1532 –
0.1796

Yearly inpatient OOP
health expenditure

269.26

12.13

245.47 –
293.04

Monthly inpatient OOP
health expenditure

22.43

1.01

20.45 –
24.42

Yearly individual
consumption
expenditure

8305.62

18.5608

8269.24 –
8342.00

Monthly individual
consumption
expenditure

692.13

1.5467

689.10 –
695.16

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the poor individuals who were hospitalized. The
mean age of hospitalized individuals is 30.92 years; mean yearly individual consumption
expenditure is 8449.03 INR; mean duration of hospitalization is 5.009 days; yearly inpatient
OOP health expenditure is 8149.41 INR.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables when Hospitalization =1
Variable

Mean
5.009
8149.415

Standard
Error
0.1605
317.9662

95% Confidence
Interval
4.686 – 5.315
7526.11 – 8772.71

Duration of hospitalization
Yearly Inpatient OOP health
expenditure
Age
Yearly individual consumption
expenditure
Monthly individual consumption
expenditure

30.927
8449.035

0.3844
46.2932

30.174 – 31.681
8358.287 – 8539.782

704.086

3.8577

696.523 – 711.648

Propensity score matching was done using the variables such as education, socioeconomic
status, location of household (urban/rural), household size, and age of the individual, using
a user-written command psmatch2 as shown in Table 3. 5,917 samples in the intervention
group were matched with 5,917 samples in the control group. Thus, the total matched
sample consisted of 11,834 observations. After matching, different types of regression
analysis were performed using the total matched sample.
Table 4.4: One-One Propensity Score Matching

Total sample
Average Treatment on
Treated (ATT)

Age
Individual
Consumption
Expenditure
Household size
Location
Education

Treated
5917
0.1407

Control
5917
0.1191

Difference

T statistics

S. E

0.0216

2.89

0.0074

Propensity Score Testing of Two Groups
Treated
Control
% Bias
T statistics
(Mean)
(Mean)
26.821
26.426
2.0
1.10
8588.9
8595.4
-0.3
-0.17

2.0255
1.2505
1.7828

2.014
1.2525
1.7725

1.9
-0.4
1.2
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1.04
-0.25
0.67

Probability(t)
0.269
0.866

0.299
0.799
0.503

Multivariate analysis
The logistic regression model results for the effects of poor people health insurance
program on incidence of hospitalization are shown in Table 4. People enrolled in poor
people health insurance program have 1.21 higher odds of incidence of hospitalization
compared to poor people not having health insurance coverage. Chronic illness, household
size, and age of the individual had significant effects on incidence of hospitalization. The
presence of chronic illness increased the probability of hospitalization, and the different
age groups categories for individuals 19 years and above had higher probability of
hospitalization compared to less than 18 years’ age group. However, individuals belonging
to the medium and large households had lower probability of incidence of hospitalization
compared to individuals from small households. Social group, religion, urban/rural
location, household type, marital status, education, number of hospital beds in the state had
insignificant effects on the incidence of hospitalization. Average marginal effects of each
of the independent variables on the probability of the incidence of hospitalization are
presented in Table 4. Fixed effects for state of residence of the individual was used in the
model. No significant effects for the state of residence were found.
Table 4.5: Logistic Regression Results for the Effect of Poor People Health
Insurance Program on the Incidence of Hospitalization
Incidence of Hospitalization
Public Health Insurance for the Poor
Not enrolled (Reference)
Enrolled
Social Group
Other Backward Classes (Reference)
Scheduled tribes
Scheduled castes
Others
Chronic Illness
No Chronic illness (Reference)
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Odds Ratio

95% Confidence
Interval

P value

1.23

1.06 – 1.44

0.007

1.01
1.01
1.17

0.85 – 1.19
0.86 – 1.19
0.96 – 1.42

0.878
0.859
0.103

Chronic Illness
Age Groups
0 to 18 years (Reference)
19 to 40 years
41 to 60 years
61 to 80 years
Older than 80 years
Interaction Age Group* Sex
Female and Age Group (19 to 40 years)
Female and Age Group (41 to 60 years)
Female and Age Group (61 to 80 years)
Female and Older than 80 years
Household Size
Small household (Reference)
Medium household (5 to 8 members)
Large household (9 & more members)
Hospital beds per 1000 population
More than 1 bed per 1000 (Reference)
0.5 to 1 per 1000 population
Less than 0.5 per 1000 population
Constant

3.55

2.87 – 4.45

0.000

1.06
2.44
2.99
4.85

0.82 – 1.36
1.89 – 3.15
2.14 – 4.17
1.71 – 13.69

0.635
0.000
0.000
0.003

6.81
0.91
0.82
0.76

4.95 – 9.36
0.63 – 1.30
0.51 – 1.30
0.19 – 3.04

0.000
0.617
0.411
0.703

0.77
0.47

0.66 – 0.89
0.39 – 0.58

0.000
0.000

1.59
1.16
0.15

0.34 – 7.40
0.26 – 5.05
0.03 – 0.68

0.551
0.843
0.013

Table 5 includes Tobit model results on the effect of poor people health insurance program
on the duration of hospitalization. Being enrolled in health insurance for the poor had no
significant effect on duration of hospitalization. People who did not have chronic illnesses
had significantly lower duration of hospitalization compared to people with chronic
illnesses. People belonging to the other backward classes social group category had
significantly higher duration of hospitalization compared to the reference group (scheduled
tribes). Other covariates such as household type, religion, age, urban/rural location,
household type, household size, marital status, education, and number of hospital beds had
no significant effect on the duration of hospitalization. Fixed effects for state of residence
of the individual was used. Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Gujarat were the only three state
showing significant results. Average marginal effects of each of the independent variables
on the duration of hospitalization are presented in Table 5.
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Table 4.6: Tobit Regression Results for the Effect of Poor People Health Insurance
Program on the Duration of Hospitalization
Duration of Hospitalization
Public Health Insurance for the Poor
Not enrolled (Reference)
Enrolled
Social Group
Other Backward Classes (Reference)
Scheduled Tribes
Scheduled Castes
Others
Chronic Illness
No Chronic illness (Reference)
Chronic Illness
Household Type
Self-employed (Reference)
Regular wage/Salary earning
Casual labor
Others
Age Groups
0 to 18 years (Reference)
19 to 40 years
41 to 60 years
61 to 80 years
Older than 80 years
Household Size
Small household (Reference)
Medium household (5 to 8 members)
Large household (9 & more members)
Number of Hospital Beds in States
Less than 10,000 beds (Reference)
10,000 to 20,000 beds
Greater than 20,000 beds
Constant

Coefficient

95% Confidence
Interval

P value

0.44

-0.47 - 1.35

0.346

-1.20
-0.08
-0.56

-2.21 – 0.20
-1.07 – 0.90
-1.72 – 0.60

0.019
0.870
0.344

3.15

1.96 – 4.33

0.000

0.38
0.45
-0.03

-0.72 - 1.48
-0.34 - 1.26
-2.02 - 1.92

0.497
0.263
0.970

-0.90
1.08
0.36
0.44

-1.87 - 0.05
-0.09 - 2.25
-1.14 - 1.88
-3.45 - 4.33

0.065
0.072
0.631
0.825

-0.15
-0.98

-0.99 - 0.68
-2.22 - 0.26

0.723
0.124

0.38
4.28
3.35

-7.86 - 8.64
-3.69 - 12.26
-4.47 - 11.18

0.927
0.292
0.401

Results of the two-part regression model on the effects of poor people health insurance
program on inpatient out-of-pocket health expenditures are shown in Table 6. Enrollment
under the poor people health insurance program did not have any effect on inpatient OOP
health expenditures. Duration of stay in hospital, graduate level education, age groups of
19 to 60 years, using a private hospital for treatment, admission in paying ward (general
and special), and having ailments such as cancers, blood, endocrine, metabolic, eye, ear
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diseases, cardiovascular, respiratory diseases, skin, musculoskeletal, psychiatric,
neurological diseases, and injuries had significant positive effect on the amount of OOP
health expenditures experienced by the individual. Utilization of AYUSH type of treatment
had significant negative effect of OOP health expenditures compared to individuals using
allopathic treatment. Factors such as location, social group, household type, household
size, and number of hospital beds in states had no significant effect on OOP health
expenditures. Gujarat, and Kerala were the only two states showing significant results in
the state fixed effects model.
Table 4.7: Tobit Regression Results for the Effect of Poor People Health Insurance
Program on Inpatient Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditures
Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditures
Public Health Insurance for the Poor
Not enrolled (Reference)
Enrolled
Duration of Stay in Hospital
Social Group
Other Backward Classes (Reference)
Scheduled Tribes
Scheduled Castes
Others
Education
Illiterate (Reference)
Primary/middle school educated
Secondary school educated
Higher secondary school educated
Diploma/graduate/post graduate
educated
Household Type
Self-employed (Reference)
Regular wage/Salary earning
Casual labor
Others
Age Groups
0 – 18 years (Reference)
19 to 40 years
41 to 60 years
61 to 80 years
Older than 80 years

Coefficient 95% Confidence
Interval

P value

-950.36
521.40

-2501.48 – 600.75
435.30 – 607.50

0.230
0.000

-1073.94
-664.54
-273.32

-2818.92 – 671.04
-2328.89 – 999.81
-2251.07 – 1704.43

0.228
0.434
0.786

1104.02
285.39
-1972.92
7634.86

-232.77 - 2440.81
-2359.45 - 2930.25
-5096.84 - 1150.99
2798.47 - 12471.25

0.105
0.832
0.216
0.002

1034.10
-1275.76
140.24

-903.67 - 2971.88
-2654.16 - 102.62
-3201.46 - 3481.95

0.295
0.070
0.934

1857.13
2231.96
87.75
-1018.33

-68.31 - 3782.58
234.30 - 4229.63
-2479.51 - 2655.01
-7587.77 - 5551.11

0.059
0.029
0.947
0.761
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Household Size
Small household (Reference)
Medium household (5 to 8 members)
Large household (9 & more members)
Number of Hospital Beds in States
Less than 10,000 beds (Reference)
10,000 to 20,000 beds
Greater than 20,000 beds
Nature of Treatment
Allopathic treatment (Reference)
AYUSH
Level of Care Inpatient
Sub-center/PHC/CHC (Reference)
Public Hospital
Private Hospital
Type of Ward
Free (Reference)
Paying General
Paying Special
Sector
Rural (Reference)
Urban
Nature of Ailment
Infections (Reference)
Cancers, blood, endocrine,
metabolic, eye, ear diseases
Cardiovascular, respiratory diseases
Gastrointestinal disease
Skin, musculoskeletal, psychiatric &
neurological diseases
Genitourinary, obstetric & childbirth
Injuries
Constant

352.09
2008.08

-1064.15 - 1768.33
-79.56 - 4095.74

0.626
0.059

5850.75
7440.12

-7936.70 - 19638.20
-5846.08 - 20726.34

0.405
0.272

-9020.48

-16223.98 - -1816.99

0.014

949.24
3772.82

-958.03 - 2856.53
1004.01 - 6541.63

0.329
0.008

9095.49
13642.31

6978.86 - 11212.12
9856.36 - 17428.27

0.000
0.000

-309.89

-1754.49 - 1134.70

0.674

3012.40

538.72 - 5486.08

0.017

3741.79
-1184.58

1137.12 - 6346.47
-3789.95 -1420.78

0.005
0.373

2798.06
21.09
4338.32
-5660.85

381.21 - 5214.90
-1858.70 - 1900.90
1727.14 - 6949.50
-18905.18 - 7583.47

0.023
0.982
0.001
0.402

Discussion and conclusions
Our study showed that poor people enrolled in the health insurance programs for
the poor have higher incidence of hospitalization, but the health insurance enrolment had
no effect on the duration of hospitalization. The increase in health insurance coverage may
lead to increase in health care utilization because of higher access to care and due to
changes in utilization behavior both by the insured and the provider. The results of our
study are consistent with findings from other cross-sectional studies in Tamil Nadu (Philip
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et al. 2012) and Maharashtra (Ghosh 2014) which showed that utilization of healthcare was
significantly higher among the insured compared to the uninsured. Globally, evidence from
the US showed that there was a 61% reduction in inpatient hospital admissions and 40%
reduction in emergency department visits among the uninsured population (Anderson et al.
2012). Lack of health insurance coverage usually forces people to delay or postpone
medical care even when the medical care needed is of emergency type. However, with
health insurance coverage, people can utilize healthcare with potentially lower financial
risk. Currently, the health insurance for the poor people in India covers only inpatient
services. This creates an incentive for the patients to visit hospitals and get hospitalized,
instead of using basic primary health care services. Also, it creates a financial incentive for
the provider to admit poor patients in the hospitals. Studies on hospitalization trends in
India showed that annual hospitalization rate increased from 16.6 to 37.0 per 1000
population from 1995 to 2014 (Pandey et al. 2017). Although evidence from literature has
shown that increased health insurance coverage leads to increase in utilization of health
services, but the effect of health insurance coverage on financial risk protection is less
clear, especially for poor beneficiaries (Escobar et al. 2010; Acharya et al. 2012; Giedion
et al. 2013).
Our study shows that chronic illnesses increase both the probability and duration of
hospitalizations. The findings are consistent with other results in the literature which show
chronic diseases are important determinants of hospitalizations (Dantas et al. 2016). Since
the health insurance programs for the poor do not cover outpatient services, people do not
get preventive services or outpatient treatment for their illnesses during the initial stages of
disease to prevent disease progression and development of chronic diseases. Although,
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public primary health care facilities provide free outpatient and preventive healthcare
services, there may still be significant access barriers. In India, only 37% of the population
in the rural areas have access to health care services within 5-kilometer radius and only
68% of the population have access to basic out-patient health facility (Kasthuri 2018).
Further, India is facing demographic transition with increasing old population and
epidemiological transition with increasing burden of non-communicable and chronic
diseases (Patel et al. 2011). Incidence of hospitalization among poor people is also found
to increase with age in our study. Elderly people over 80 years of age have the highest
incidence of hospitalization. These findings are consistent with another study in India
which showed that age is an important predictor for hospitalization (Kastor & Mohanty
2018). Hospital readmissions (Berry et al. 2018) and increase in the number of
comorbidities in an individual also increase with age (McPhail 2016). Women in the age
group of 19 to 40 years have higher incidence of hospitalization. This is consistent with
other studies which show that women in the reproductive age group have higher rates of
hospitalizations and incur higher health expenditures (Brinda et al. 2014; Getachew &
Liabsuetrakul, 2019).
Our results show that medium and larger households have lower probability of
hospitalization compared to smaller households. The odds of hospitalization for medium
households is 0.77 and for the large households is 0.48. One of the probable reasons may
be that larger households can arrange someone within the family to act as a caregiver in
the case of illness or disability. This family caregiving may prevent hospitalization for
many common conditions. Evidence from US have shown that home health provision has
reduced both the number of visits and duration of stay in the hospital (O'Connor et al.
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2015). The other reason may be due to problems in the design of the health insurance
programs for the poor in India which causes difficulties in health care utilization
(hospitalization) for households with large number of members. Poor people health
insurance programs in India cover hospitalization costs only for limited number of
household members. For example, health insurance programs such as RSBY and VAS in
Karnataka are limited to maximum of five members in the household, but some of the state
health insurance programs in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu cover the whole family
irrespective of the number of the members (Hooda 2017; Karan et al. 2017; Fan et al. 2012).
The RSBY program has a threshold ceiling of INR 30,000 and some of the state health
insurance programs have much higher coverage limits of up to INR 200,000 in Andhra
Pradesh (Hooda 2017). These enrolment restrictions and limited coverage threshold in the
current health insurance programs will adversely affect the households with higher number
of members by reducing their healthcare utilization and hospitalization, which may be one
of the reasons for lower probability of hospitalizations among members from larger
households.
People belonging to the scheduled tribe social group category had significantly
lower duration of hospitalization compared to the other backward classes (reference
group). Scheduled tribes have poor access to healthcare facilities since they live far away
from the nearest health facility (Barik and Thorat 2015). This may one of the reasons for
individuals belonging to the scheduled tribes to have lower duration of hospitalizations.
People belonging to the other disadvantaged groups including the backward classes and
scheduled classes live in the cities and villages and do not live in the inaccessible tribal
areas like the scheduled tribal people. Thus, the access to the healthcare facilities and
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coverage by health insurance programs will be much better for the other disadvantaged
groups thus increasing their healthcare utilization and duration of hospitalizations.
Our study showed that coverage under the public health insurance programs for the
poor had no significant effect on OOP health expenditures for inpatient care. This is
contradictory to the studies done in Andhra Pradesh (Fan et al. 2012; Rao et al. 2014),
Karnataka (Sood et al. 2014) which showed that coverage under health insurance programs
reduced OOP health expenditures for hospitalizations. However, other studies in Tamil
Nadu (Philip et al. 2012) and Andhra Pradesh (Mitchell et al. 2011) showed that households
with health insurance coverage had higher OOP health expenditures. At the national level,
another study by Karan et al. (2017) showed that the likelihood of incurring OOP health
expenditures increased by 30% due to RSBY program and that RSBY has not been
effective in reducing the burden of OOP health expenditures for poor households (Karan
et al. 2017). However, the wellbeing of the poor increased due to the program, despite
higher OOP health expenditure. Even the evidence found internationally on the effect of
health insurance on OOP health expenditures is also mixed with studies from Indonesia,
and Laos showing that health insurance programs reduced OOP health expenditures (Aji
et al. 2013; Alkenbrack and Lindelow 2015), but evidence from Vietnam showed that the
health insurance program had no effect on OOP health expenditures (Ekman 2007). OOP
health expenditures are found to be increasing with increasing duration of stay in the
hospital. A report from the World Bank in India (La Forgia and Nagpal 2017) and study of
low and middle income countries (McIntyre et al. 2006) showed that hospitalizations are
significantly associated with higher OOP health expenditures.
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India has a pluralistic system of medical culture with a number of different types of
alternative medical systems (apart from the allopathic systems of medicine) that are
practiced widely all over the country (Rudra et al., 2017). The AYUSH training programs
are officially regulated by the government of India, but there are many healers all over the
country who practice these traditional systems of medicine without any formal
qualifications in the field. In our study people who are using the alternate systems of
medicine (AYUSH) for their treatment incur lower OOP health expenditures compared to
people using the western (allopathic) systems of medicine. The findings of our study
contrast with other studies done in Tanzania (Brinda et al. 2014) and Sri Lanka
(Weerasinghe and Fernando 2009) which show that utilization of traditional systems of
medicine were associated with higher OOP health expenditures. The reason may be that in
India, the people who use alternate systems of medicine usually use them for minor
ailments and people with complex conditions usually use the allopathic systems of
medicine.
Our results showed that people who were admitted to a private tertiary hospital
incurred higher OOP health expenditures compared people admitted to a primary
healthcare facility such as a primary health center or community health center. A
systematic review assessing OOP health expenditures across a number of countries found
that the use of private healthcare facilities and inpatient admissions in private sector
hospitals were both associated with higher OOP health expenditures (Alam and Mahal
2014). Also, evidence from Thailand support our finding of higher OOP health
expenditures in private hospitals (Somkotra and Lagrada 2009). Even the use of the private
sector hospitals for specific health services such as maternal health (Leone et al. 2013;

96

Bonu et al. 2009), chronic disease treatment (Bhojani et al. 2012) were associated higher
OOP health expenditures. Apart from private ownership incurring higher OOP costs, the
level of care in hospitals (i.e., primary, secondary, and tertiary care) increased OOP costs
with higher likelihood of referral (tertiary) hospital expenditures being catastrophic
(Bhojani et al. 2012). People who are getting admitted to a paying ward incur higher OOP
expenses compared to getting admitted to a free ward. Most of the public health facilities
in India provide inpatient admission free or at a very subsidized cost, but with basic
facilities. Poor people who are getting admitted in the paying wards incur higher OOP costs
because their ability to pay will be lesser and also the coverage by the poor people health
insurance program is limited. Also, India also has a wide network of unregulated private
sector hospitals with around 49% of total available hospitals being in the private sector
(Thadani 2014).
In our study, ailments such as cancers, blood, endocrine, metabolic, eye, ear
diseases, cardiovascular, respiratory diseases, skin, musculoskeletal, psychiatric,
neurological diseases, and injuries incur OOP inpatient health expenditures compared to
infections. India is facing an epidemiological transition from infectious diseases to chronic
and non-communicable diseases (Yadav and Arokiasamy). The higher incidence and
duration of hospitalizations for chronic diseases may be associated with higher OOP costs.
Our results are consistent with other studies from India and other countries have shown
that households with members with disabilities, injuries due to road traffic accidents, and
chronic illnesses were positively associated with high OOP health expenditures, due to the
severity of the illness and long treatment duration (Li et al. 2012; Kronenberg and Barros
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2014; Saksena et al. 2010; Somkotra and Lagrada 2009; Molla et al. 2017; You and
Kobayashi 2011; Mondal et al. 2014).
Poor people with a diploma/graduate/post graduate level of education were having
higher OOP health expenditures compared to poor people who were illiterate. The results
of our study are consistent with the evidence from China which showed that better
educated had higher OOP health expenditures for healthcare (You and Kobayashi 2011).
Also, education had an effect on OOP costs for specific services. Studies in India
(Mohanty and Srivastava 2013), and in Brazil (Silva et al. 2015) show that educated
mothers reported higher OOP health expenditures. Our study showed that people who
were between 41 to 60 years had higher OOP health expenditures compared to the less
than 18 years’ age group. The odds of experiencing chronic diseases increase with age and
chronic diseases are also important determinants of hospitalizations which also increase
OOP costs. A number of studies from Bangladesh and China showed that healthcare
expenditures were significantly associated with age, and the effect of age on health
expenditures was highest among the elderly (Sarker et al. 2014; Li et al. 2012; Jiang et al.
2012; Shi et al. 2011; Alemayehu and Warner 2004). This is particularly important for
India, since it does not have any specific health insurance programs or social security
programs providing health coverage for older people who are more susceptible to chronic
diseases, hospitalizations, and also higher burden of high OOP health expenditures.
The first set of analysis examined the differences in hospital utilization by health
insurance status of the poor individuals. There are two aspects of hospital utilization –
incidence of hospitalization and duration of hospitalization. The incidence indicates need
and/or willingness to get admitted into a hospital. Decision to become hospitalized is often
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not made by the patients; in most cases, individuals follow the instructions of physicians
and other health care providers. Recommendation by health care providers is the triggering
factor for being admitted in hospitals but some individuals may decide not to seek care
from hospitals due to other barriers even though the hospitalization may be considered
medically necessary. Once the patients decide to get admitted in the hospital, the length of
stay is most likely determined by the health care providers and hospital managers.
The empirical results imply that the poor individuals enrolled in health insurance
program are more likely to get admitted in a hospital than those who are not covered by
health insurance. Incidence of hospitalization is a reflection of access to inpatient hospital
services and it is not surprising to find that having insurance increases the likelihood of
hospitalization. Even though the regression models, strictly speaking, do not show causal
relationship, in this case it probably indicates causal pathway. Enrollment in insurance
happens before utilization of hospital services and there exists no mechanism of obtaining
insurance because of need for hospitalization. Therefore, only reasonable implication of
the result would be that having insurance for inpatient services increases the incidence of
hospitalization among poor individuals in India.
The second aspect of hospital service use is the intensity of service utilization after
the patients are admitted. The empirical model indicates that insurance status had no
relationship on the level of utilization of hospital services, measured by the length of stay.
Again, most logical explanation would be that if insurance status has any relationship with
duration of stay, the causal relationship should be from insurance status to duration, not the
other way round. Since insurance status had no effect on duration of hospital stay, health
care providers did not discriminate between insured and uninsured once they are admitted
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in the hospitals. Again, this is not surprising for a number of reasons. The coverage limits
in the health insurance programs for the poor is low and this low coverage limits did not
create any incentive for increasing the duration of hospitalizations by the physician. The
other reason may be that physicians are driven by the intrinsic motivation to provide better
care for the patients, irrespective of their health insurance coverage or their capacity to pay.
There is always the possibility that the clinicians are unaware of the insurance status of the
patient, which are usually handled by the administrative divisions of the hospitals, and thus
their clinical decisions are independent of any health insurance enrolment status.
Apart from the insurance status of individuals, a number of other factors affect
hospitalization and hospital duration. Chronic illnesses increase both the incidence and
duration of hospitalization. Early detection by preventive screenings and early treatment
initiation will help in decreasing disease progression, and thus reduce preventable
hospitalizations to a large extent. This early detection and treatment initiation could be
delivered through the PHC system in India. India has a wide network of PHCs and the
PHCs should be upgraded adequately with diagnostic and treatment facilities to detect and
treat chronic diseases which will help in reducing hospital rates, the duration of
hospitalizations, and the associated higher OOP healthcare costs for inpatient care. Many
chronic diseases can be treated effectively in the ambulatory setting. Thus, better
approaches to manage the chronic diseases in the outpatient settings must be implemented
nationally to reduce hospitalizations for conditions that could be treated in the outpatient
setting.
Lower incidence of hospitalization is seen among the larger households. The
insurance for the poor may not cover all individuals in the household. In some states of
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India, enrollment is limited to five members of household and the five members must be
selected at enrollment. Therefore, for large households, many members may not be covered
by the program even though the household is enrolled in the insurance plan. Lack of
insurance coverage of some members may prevent access and service usage by those noncovered members. Since the non-covered members cannot utilize the healthcare delivery
system for their health needs, they may end up showing lower rates of hospitalizations.
This barrier in using the hospitals may adversely affect the health status of patients and
overall health status of members in larger households may suffer. Thus, removing these
enrolment restrictions will be helpful in improving hospital utilizations especially for the
members of the larger households.
Our study shows that the Scheduled tribes in India have lower duration of
hospitalization. Scheduled tribes have been traditionally neglected in the country who have
lower capacity to pay because of their limited employment opportunities in the formal
sector, lack of access to cash, and their area of residence which is mostly located in the
hilly and remote tribal areas of India. They also have poor access to healthcare facilities
since they live far away from the nearest health facility (Barik and Thorat 2015). In addition
to this, the enrolment of tribal people in the health insurance programs for the poor is also
quite low, both because of the presence of access barriers to reach them and enroll them
under insurance programs, and of the problem of acceptability with some of the tribal
groups who actively try to avoid participation in any governmental programs. Access
barriers should be reduced for the Scheduled tribes and their enrolment in health insurance
programs needs to be improved. Government should initiate outreach program to reach this
hard-to-reach group so that their enrollment in insurance program can be expanded.
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Both men and women who are 40 years or older have higher incidence of
hospitalizations. This is expected since there is a declining stock of health capital with age
and the severity of illness may also increase with age requiring higher number of
hospitalizations. However, only women in the age groups of 19 to 40 years have higher
incidence of hospitalizations, while men in the same group do not have higher incidence
of hospitalizations. The main reason for this may be that women in the reproductive age
group of 19 to 40 years have higher hospital admissions related to childbirth in healthcare
institutions. In order to have safe deliveries, the Government of India promotes institutional
deliveries through the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) conditional cash transfer scheme,
which may explain higher hospitalizations among women in the reproductive age group.
Utilization of private hospitals have higher OOP health expenditures. Utilization of
private hospitals is not a problem if the richer households are using the private hospitals to
get access to better quality services, but when the poor households obtain care from private
hospitals, out-of-pocket expenses may become too high for the poor households to afford.
The poor households need to be protected from the high OOP health expenditures when
they are forced to use private hospitals. If the poor households needing hospital services
do not have access to governmental facilities, they may decide to seek care from private
hospitals.
The private healthcare system in India is highly unregulated. Regulation of private
sector can be done by fixing prices for different diagnosis groups so that households would
become fully aware of the total hospital bill for the medical condition at the time of
utilization of services. Making the charges of hospitals more transparent will be another
way of protecting households from uncertainty related to hospital service expenses. The
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government sector hospitals act as an important source of healthcare delivery in India,
especially for the poor people. Many poor people do not use the government healthcare
facilities because of their perceived low quality, poor infrastructure, absences of health care
providers and significant travel distances. Strengthening of government health facilities
with better infrastructure and facilities is needed. Reducing access barriers to help the poor
to reach the public health facilities should be done in order to protect the poor households
from making high OOP health expenditures at private sector hospitals.
Increased duration of hospital stay leads to experiencing higher OOP health
expenditures. Duration of hospital stay can be reduced either by reducing the severity of
illness, so that people do not have to stay longer in the hospitals or by reducing the cost of
services, so that they do not incur higher health expenditures. Increasing health insurance
coverage limits and a defined benefit package for different types of medical conditions will
also help in reducing the higher OOP health expenditures due to increased hospital stay.
This research finds that specific diseases such as cancers, cardiovascular,
endocrine, respiratory, neurological, obstetric and childbirth, and injuries have higher OOP
inpatient health expenditures. Specific national health programs can be established to
include people affected by these diseases, and also provide them with disease-specific
healthcare services. India is currently establishing a national health program for noncommunicable diseases which is being piloted in some districts. Faster nation-wide
implementation of this program will help the poor individuals suffering from these diseases
to get specific health service package. Also, the health insurance coverage limits may be
increased for the poor individuals who are suffering from these specific diseases.
Increasing coverage limits may also encourage “up coding” of health conditions and
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without a rigorous monitoring system, disease-specific limits may encourage reporting of
high revenue earning health conditions at a higher rate.
Health insurance programs for the poor increase the incidence of hospitalization
but has no effect on the duration of hospitalizations and inpatient OOP health expenditures.
Presence of chronic illness, belonging to older age groups, women in the reproductive age
group, and belonging to a small household have higher hospitalization. People who have
higher duration of hospital stay, admitted to a private hospital, using allopathic treatment,
having chronic illnesses, having higher level of education and belonging to the middle age
group experienced higher OOP inpatient health expenditures. By identifying the groups
most affected, this research aids the designers of the national insurance programs to design
better benefit packages for those population groups. This investigation will serve as a basis
for assessing India’s policy options to reduce financial burden due to OOP health
expenditures.

Limitations
The main limitations of this study arise from the use of secondary data. Any study
that uses secondary data suffers from this limitation, i.e., the study becomes limited by the
data collected and survey methodology used. The contents and the questions asked in the
survey are not what an assessment of a program would have done to explore the specific
research questions of this study. One of the most important concern is the lack of
information on the coverage of public health insurance for the poor. The NSSO dataset
includes a variable that indicates insurance coverage by all public health insurance
schemes, i.e., all the people covered by the government sponsored health insurance
programs. Government sponsored health insurance schemes are many in India and includes
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insurance programs like Employee’s State Insurance Scheme (ESIS), Central Government
Health Scheme (CGHS), and the poor people’s health insurance programs such as RSBY
and other state health insurance programs. Clearly, government sponsored health insurance
programs cover poor as well as non-poor households. Employees of the central and state
governments are covered by government insurance and none of them likely to be below
the poverty line. It is also likely that many households covered by the insurance for the
poor are not below the poverty line at any specific point in time. Since the enrollment into
the insurance for the poor happens infrequently, economic status of households may change
from enrollment date to the date of the survey.
This research needed to identify the individuals and households who are covered
by the government sponsored insurance for the poor. Since many of those covered by
public or government health insurance schemes are not poor by design, using all
households/ individuals covered by public insurance will not provide the “target group”
the study would like to examine. To identify the group covered by public insurance for the
poor, a number of implicit assumptions were made: first, it is assumed that no insurance
schemes of the government, other than the insurance program designed for the poor, covers
the households or individuals below the poverty lines defined by the states. This conjecture
is likely to be valid because governmental salary structure is such that almost no one
covered by government employee health insurance program should be below the poverty
line, irrespective of the size of the household. Second assumption is that the people who
are below the poverty line and enrolled in a government sponsored health insurance
program, they must be enrolled in the public health insurance programs for the poor such
as RSBY, RACHI etc.
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These assumptions do not identify all the households and individuals covered under
the government insurance schemes for the poor but identifies only those who are covered
by the insurance scheme and are below the poverty line. The households that are below
poverty line and not enrolled in the government sponsored health insurance programs are
assumed to be the control group, i.e., the households that are eligible for participation in
the poor people’s health insurance program but were not enrolled. Poverty is a dynamic
event where people move in and out of poverty and it is almost impossible for any program
to be as dynamic as the underlying dynamics of social mobility and poverty dynamics. The
households who were covered by the insurance for the poor at the time of the survey but
were not below the poverty line at the time can happen for two very different reasons. The
first reason could be simple mis-targeting, i.e., the household should not be in the program
based on the economic status of the household but were enrolled in the program. The
second reason could be that the household belonged to the poverty category when the
household got enrolled but the household graduated from poverty to above the poverty line
during the intervening period. Since enrollment in the program and disenrollment from the
program happens only infrequently, a certain percent of enrollees will be above the poverty
line. This group was targeted correctly but they moved up the economic ladder since
enrollment. Given the data we have, it is not possible to identify households who were
covered by the insurance for the poor even though they were not poor.
In the empirical analysis, we have used the poverty line for 2014 to identify the
individuals who were poor in 2014. Thus, our study focuses on the group who was below
the poverty line and enrolled in any government health insurance program. Since the
government health insurance scheme that covers individuals below the poverty line are the

106

insurance schemes for the poor, it is likely that all those who are poor and covered by
government health insurance are actually covered by the public health insurance for the
poor. The implication of these implicit assumptions is that the study cannot conduct an
assessment or evaluation of the insurance program for the poor. It is only assessing the
differences in utilization and out-of-pocket expenses between the poor households and
individuals covered by the public health insurance schemes for the poor and those not
covered by the scheme. Therefore, it is not an assessment of those who are covered by the
insurance schemes for the poor and those not covered but at similar socioeconomic
situations.
Also, the cross-sectional nature of the data creates an important limitation that it
allows us to study only the association of health insurance with the various outcomes, and
not the actual evaluation of the program. Cross-sectional data cannot infer causal
association mainly because temporality is not known and thus cannot assess the change in
outcomes over a period of time. Thus the availability of data over time is required to
effectively evaluate the program. Data were not collected from the floating population
(people without any normal residence), but households residing in open spaces, roadside
shelters and people who reside in the same place were listed. People residing in the
protected residential areas of military, paramilitary, police areas and people in orphanages,
rescue homes, etc., were not covered. The NSSO health survey data does not collect
detailed consumption expenditure and the consumption expenditure in the NSSO survey
does not differentiate between food and non-food expenditures. It should also be noted that
all information is reported by the surveyed individuals in the households and some
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information required quite long recall time. Therefore, the data is prone to strategic, recall
and other types of biases.

Ethical Approval
The dataset is available in the public domain after removing all individual level
identification variables. It is not possible to identify the residence of any of the households
as well. Therefore, ethical approval is not needed for the study. Permission has been
obtained from the Ministry of Statistics and Implementation of the Government of India
for this research and potential future publications using the data set.
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CHAPTER 5: MANUSCRIPT II
5.1 INCIDENCE AND INTENSITY OF CATASTROPHIC HEALTH EXPENDITURES
IN INDIA: SOCIOECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND DETERMINANTS

Introduction
United Nations’ Sustainable Development agenda incorporates one goal (Goal 3)
that is related to health and well-being of the population and one of the specific targets of
the goal is to improve financial risk protection through universal health coverage (UHC).
UHC includes securing access to quality healthcare and safe, affordable medicines and
vaccines for everyone (Saksena et al .2014). Resolution 58.33 of the World Health
Assembly recommends that all WHO member states should provide UHC to their entire
population and protect households from catastrophic health expenditures (CHE)
(Obermann et al., 2018). CHE is defined as out-of-pocket (OOP) health spending that
exceeds a certain proportion of a household financial capability (Xu et al. 2003). More than
100 countries in the world have either started their reforms towards UHC or have already
achieved it (Obama 2008; Summers 2015). Even though most countries are striving to
enable their citizens to obtain the healthcare they need without financial barriers, 150
million people still experience CHE each year (Kastor & Mohanty, 2018). More than 90%
of the people experiencing CHE live in in low-income countries (Xu et al. 2003). The
amount of financial protection rendered to population groups will depend on their degree

109

of dependence on OOP health expenditures for financing health care (Xu et al. 2003 ).
Dependence of the households on OOP payments for obtaining healthcare escalates the
financial burden of the households (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003; Xu et al. 2003;
Amaya Lara and Ruiz Gomez 2011).
According to the World Health Organization’s list of “countries with highest OOP
expenditure on health,” India ranks third in the region of Southeast Asia. In India, OOP
expenses accounts for about 62.6% of total health expenditure - one of the highest in the
world (Balarajan et al. 2011; Hooda 2017). There has been a significant increase in OOP
and CHE in India because of declining importance of Government of India (GOI) funding
in overall health expenditure (Hooda 2013), a strong private healthcare system and
weakening of the public healthcare system (Peters et al. 2002), the user fee in the public
sector tertiary hospitals (Thakur and Ghosh 2009), the liberalization of the pharmaceutical
industry (Kumar, 2004), and the creation of the Drug Price Control Order, which led to an
increase in drug prices (Hooda 2017).
India spends only 1% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on publicly funded
healthcare and by 2020, the GOI intends to increase public spending on healthcare to 3%
of its GDP (Hooda 2013). This level of public health expenditure is extremely unfavorable,
because the lower and middle-income countries spent, an average, 2.8% of their GDP on
healthcare, and even impoverished sub-Saharan countries spent 1.7% of their GDP on
public health (WHO 2019). Evidence from the recent National Health Accounts of India
shows that among the total health expenditure in India, only 29% is from government
health expenditure, 5.7% is from Social Security Expenditure on health, 3.7% is from
Private health insurance expenditure and the rest 62.6% is OOP health expenditure. Out of
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the 62.6% of OOP health expenditures, 59.1% are for outpatient and preventive health care,
31.96% for inpatient health care, 2.46% for medicines (not covered under inpatient and
outpatient care), 6.24% for transportation, and 0.09% for laboratory and imaging services
(NHA, 2017).
Evidence shows that high OOP health expenditures leading to CHE are not
essentially caused by a single event or by the use of costly medical procedures (Xu et al.
2003). Small payments that occur frequently due to a number of factors leads to higher
OOP health expenditures. A survey using data from 89 countries showed that the incidence
of CHE is around 3% of the households in low-income countries, 1.8% households in
middle-income countries, and 0.6% in high-income countries (Xu et al. 2007). Pal et al.
(2012) used the Consumer Expenditure Survey for 2004-2005 to study the incidence of
CHE variation based on the rural/urban location and socioeconomic status of the
households in different states. The results showed that the incidence of CHE was highest
among the poorest quintiles in the rural areas of Kerala (9.71%), and highest among the
richest quintiles of the rural areas of Madhya Pradesh (21.82%). Among the poorest
quintiles, the rate of CHE was highest in Rajasthan (13.34%) in urban areas and among the
richest quintiles in urban areas in Orissa (11.26%) (Pal 2012). Many studies have examined
the health expenditures on specific diseases such as diabetes, tuberculosis, cancer, injuries
etc., but the problem was that most of these studies were done in small geographical areas
of the country and their representativeness for the whole nation was limited (Binnendijk et
al. 2012; Yesudian et al. 2014; Rao et al. 2011; Prinja et al. 2015; Muniyandi et al. 2005;
Ramachandran et al. 2007). Some studies have examined the determinants of OOP health
expenditures for outpatient care in a few districts of India for certain age groups (Brinda et
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al. 2012; Gupta et al. 2016). Also, other studies have used different NSSO datasets and
other nationally available data like National Family Health Survey (NFHS) etc. to study
disease specific OOP health expenditures for hospitalizations (Kastor and Mohanty 2018),
OOP health expenditures due to non-communicable diseases (NCDs) (Tripathy et al.
2016), burden of OOP payments due to medicines (Selvaraj et al. 2018), OOP health
expenditure for maternal care (Mohanty and Kastor 2017), OOP health expenditure for
accidental injury (Pradhan et al. 2017), but they did not address the specific research
questions related to CHE in general and factors affecting incidence and depth or gap of
CHE.
A number of studies have been published in Iran, China, Nepal, Turkey, Tanzania,
Brazil, Thailand, Georgia, Vietnam, Portugal, Botswana, Lesotho, and South Korea
analyzing the determinants of CHE and the burden of CHE (Nandi et al. 2017; Fazaeli et
al. 2010; Van Minh et al. 2013; Shi et al. 2011; Saito et al. 2014; Kronenberg and Barros
2014; Yardim et al. 2010; Brinda et al. 2014; Akinkugbe et al. 2012; Barros et al. 2011;
Choi et al. 2014). This study intends to do the same for India. The main objective of the
study is to identify the characteristics of households, specific health conditions of
individuals, and health delivery system issues that make people prone to CHE. In
particular, the study will examine the association of households’ demographic
characteristics, social structure, and healthcare utilization that appear to be associated with
relatively high level of expenditure and also quantify the burden of OOP health
expenditures and CHE. In this research, we used the data from the 2014 National Sample
Survey Organization (NSSO) to assess the level of financial protection in India (NSSO
2014). To measure the effect of CHE on households, we estimate (i) incidence and intensity
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of CHE in India (ii) the degree of inequality among households in terms of incidence and
intensity of catastrophic health expenditures (iii) the factors affecting the incidence and
intensity of CHE in India.
India is currently taking measures to provide UHC to its population. Providing
financial protection is considered the backbone of UHC. This research seeks to inform
policy makers and health financing practitioners about the characteristics of beneficiaries
and types of services to be considered for reducing likelihood of CHE. By identifying the
incidence, intensity, socioeconomic inequalities in CHE, this study helps the central
government provide appropriate higher budgetary allocations for the groups that have
higher OOP health expenditures and aids the designers of the national and state health
insurance programs to design better benefit packages for those population groups. This
investigation will serve as a basis for assessing India’s policy options to reduce financial
catastrophe due to OOP health expenditures.
Study Conceptual Framework
Andersen’s Behavioral Model of Healthcare Utilization will be used to guide this
research (Andersen, 1995). The Andersen model examines the predisposing, enabling,
need and healthcare utilization characteristics. In using the Andersen model, this study
classifies individual and household characteristics as predisposing or enabling factors
associated with the use of health care services. Central government and state government
health insurance schemes in India enroll population at the household level. This study
focuses on the demographic characteristics such as age, gender, marital status, education,
occupation, religion and social groups; household characteristics such as socioeconomic
status, household size and composition, location of the household, WASH facilities, source
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of energy for household cooking; health system and utilization characteristics such as type
of provider, level of care, type and severity of illness, nature of treatment, health insurance
coverage and source of financing. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between household’s
characters and its relationship to the OOP health expenditures.
Predisposing characteristics of health services utilization are the demographic
characteristics such as age, and gender composition of the household, which highlight the
biological need for healthcare services. Social structure denoted the household’s ability to
solve its problems. Beliefs are the norms, knowledge, values, and attitudes of the household
about health and health services, which play an important role on the opinion of the
household about need and utilization of health services (Andersen, 1995). Education is one
of the important component which affects the beliefs of the household. Enabling
characteristics of health services utilization are financing and organization. Financing
represents access to financial resources to pay for health care which can be income, assets,
savings, coverage for health expenses through health insurance, and social safety nets.
Organization refers to how the healthcare resources are distributed in the household’s
surroundings, which includes number and type of health facilities, access to transportation,
time required to reach a health facility, and the waiting time to get the care.
Need characteristics of health service utilization consist of both perceived needs
and evaluated needs. Perceived needs indicate when an individual feels sick, the person
decides to have a health consultation. The evaluated need denotes the objective and
professional decisions made by the healthcare professionals regarding the illness of the
individual. Thus, the evaluated need decides the type and duration of care that is prescribed
to the patient. The diagnosis of the patient in a hospital usually highlights the evaluated
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need for healthcare and this usually determines the duration of hospitalization and medical
services received by the patient. Healthcare utilization characteristics highlight the purpose
of visiting the health facility, type of care wanted, level of care wanted, and the type of
healthcare provider visited (Andersen, 1995).

Financing

Perceived

Purpose

Organization

Evaluated

Type of
care &
provider

Enabling
characteristics

Need

Demographic
Social Structure
Beliefs

Predisposing
characteristics

Healthcare
utilization

Healthcare Costs

Direct NonMedical Costs

Direct Medical
Costs

Expenditures covered
by Health Insurance

Out of Pocket Health
Expenditures

Catastrophic Health Expenditures
Figure 5.1 Determinants of Household’s OOP Health Expenditures using Anderson’s
Behavioral Model of Healthcare Utilization
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Methods
Data sources
The data from the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) of the
Government of India were used for the study (NSSO 2014). NSSO is a national
organization under the Ministry of Statistics and Implementation which was established in
1950 to regularly conduct surveys and provide useful statistics on socio-economic status
of households, demography, health, industries, agriculture, consumer expenditure etc.
Social Consumption (Health), NSS 71st Round for 2014 of NSSO data were used for this
analysis. The survey covered whole of the Indian Union and it is the latest social
consumption (Health) data available. The survey used the interview method of data
collection from a sample of 65,932 randomly selected households (36,480 in rural India
and 29,452 in urban India) and 335,499 individuals, covering the members of the
household in all the 36 states (including union territories). The data for the survey were
collected over a period of six months, from January to June 2014. The NSSO Social
Consumption (Health) collected data on demographic characters, employment, health
conditions, source of payments, health insurance coverage, type of coverage, costs of
various inpatient services, level of care, type of care and a number of other variables. The
survey also collected information on medical care received at inpatient and outpatient
facilities of medical institutions including health expenditures for various episodes of
illness. This is the first NSSO health survey that collected data on utilization of alternative
medicines. The details of hospitalization for all current and former members of the
household were collected for the last 365 days (hospitalization occurred from January 2013
to June 2014) and the details of outpatient services were collected for the last 15 days.
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Reference period
The reference period of institutional expenditure is 365 days, 1 month for household
consumption expenditure. The amount of money reimbursed by the medical insurance
company for inpatient healthcare is for the last 365 days. For outpatient care including the
services and expenditure, the reference period was 15 days. All the reference period will
be converted into a common scale for analysis. Thus, in this study all the reference periods
will be adjusted for 30 days. Expenses for outpatient OOP health expenditure will be
multiplied by 2 to get the monthly estimates. Expenses for inpatient OOP health
expenditure will be divided by 12 to get the monthly estimates.
Measuring incidence and intensity of CHE
The incidence of CHE was calculated from the proportion of OOP healthcare
payments which exceed a certain threshold in relation to the household consumption
expenditure (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003). Two definitions are commonly used. In
the first definition OOP health expenditure is compared with the total household
consumption expenditure (Pradhan and Prescott 2002; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003;
Russell 2004) and in the second one OOP health expenditure is compared with the
household non-food consumption expenditure (Berki 1986; Xu et al. 2003, 2006). Total
OOP healthcare expenditure is the total health expenditure that is experienced by the
patients after deducting the amount of money reimbursed. Payments made by all the
individuals in a household for inpatient OOP healthcare and outpatient OOP healthcare are
summed at the household level. In the National Health Policy of India, CHE is defined as
health expenditure exceeding 10% of its total monthly consumption expenditure or 40% of
its monthly non-food consumption expenditure (GOI 2017). In this research, the OOP
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health expenditure is compared with the household consumption expenditure and it is
assumed that a household experienced CHE if health expenditure exceeds 10% threshold
level. Catastrophic payment headcount informs the proportion/number of households
affected by CHE i.e. the number of households who are experiencing an OOP healthcare
expenditure above 10% of household consumption expenditure.
Catastrophic payment headcount is given by the formula:
𝑁

1
𝐻𝐶 = ∑ 𝐸
𝑁
𝑖=1

HC is the Catastrophic payment headcount. The indicator E=1 is defined when Ti/Xi >Z
and zero otherwise. Here Z is 0.10. T is the household OOP health expenditure; X is the
total household consumption expenditure and N is the sample size. The theoretical
minimum and maximum values of catastrophic payment headcount are 0% and 100%
respectively. The CHE incidence (headcount) does not indicate the degree to which the
household’s CHE exceed the threshold value, thus the CHE intensity (overshoot) has also
been estimated. The intensity (overshoot) of the CHE is the average degree when the
household OOP health expenditures as a proportion of the household consumption
expenditure exceeds the pre-specified thresholds (10%).
Average catastrophic excess (O) measures this intensity of CHE and it is given by the
formula below:

𝑂=

𝑁
1
∑ 𝑂
𝑁
𝑖=1

Oi is the excess or overshoot and it is calculated by the formula, Oi=Ei [(Ti/xi)-Z]. Ti is the
OOP health payment of household. Xi is the household consumption expenditure. Z is the
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threshold budget share. The minimum and maximum value of catastrophic payment gap is
0% and 90% respectively when the threshold value is fixed at 0.10.
Measuring socioeconomic inequalities of CHE
The measures of incidence and intensity of CHE are insensitive to socioeconomic
status of the households and thus do not identify whether the poor or rich households
exceed the threshold more (O’Donnell et al. 2008). Many policy makers will consider it a
significant problem if the poorer households exceed the threshold level compared to the
richer households. Wagstaff et al. recommend the calculation of concentration indices to
separate the association of CHE with socio-economic status (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer
2003). Concentration indices are used to detect the presence of socioeconomic inequality
in any health sector variable and whether it is more marked in one group than another
(Kakwani 1977; Kakwani 1980; Kakwani et al. 1997; Wagstaff et al. 1989). In literature,
concentration indices have been used to estimate the socio-economic inequality for several
public health issues namely child mortality (Wagstaff 2000), child immunization (Gwatkin
et al. 2003), child malnutrition (Wagstaff et al. 2003), adult health (van Doorslaer et al.
1997), health subsidies (O’Donnell et al. 2007), and health care utilization (van Doorslaer
et al. 2006). In this research, concentration indices were estimated to show the direction
and magnitude of the intensity and incidence of CHE across the different socioeconomic
groups. In the calculation of concentration indices, households were ranked according to
the socioeconomic status (household consumption expenditure), starting with the poorest
(Kakwani et al. 1997). The value of the concentration index ranges from -1 to +1. A
positive value of concentration index indicates that richer households are more likely to
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exceed the threshold and a negative value indicates that poorer households exceed the
threshold.
Prediction model of CHE
To study the effects of various factors on the incidence of catastrophic OOP
healthcare payments, the logistic regression model is used. The logistic regression is
preferred since the dependent variable is dichotomous. A dichotomous variable for CHE is
created with 0 for not incurring catastrophic health expenditures and 1 for incurring
catastrophic health expenditures. Thus, the dichotomous variable created for CHE will
serve as the dependent variable for the logistic regression model. The independent variables
include the various characteristics of the individuals, households and health facility. The
model estimated the log odds of incurring CHS adjusted for a set of explanatory variables.
Household is the unit of analysis. The results for the logistic regression are presented with
the estimated regression coefficients, odds ratio and 95% confidence intervals. This
analysis identifies the extent to which different explanatory variables affected the
household’s probability of incurring CHE. Among the households which incurred CHE,
intensity of CHE were calculated and multiple regression model was used to identify
factors affecting intensity levels. The dependent variable is the catastrophic payment gap,
and the independent variables included various characteristics of the individuals,
households and health facility.
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Results
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 are at the household level. There were
65,932 households in the sample. 33% of the households have at least one child aged 5
years and less; 26.87% households have at least one elderly person; 667.44% households
are located in the rural areas; 30.04% of the households belong to the lowest income
quintile; 33.94% households have at least one secondary educated female member; 54.08%
of the households were small; 82.35% of the households are Hindu; 71.09% households
belonged to the disadvantaged classes. The mean proportion of members hospitalized in
each household is 0.0456. 9.98% of the households had at least one member in the
household who used a private healthcare facility for hospitalization. Mean proportion of
members suffering from chronic illness in each household is 0.0637. The mean proportion
of members enrolled in health insurance in each household is 0.1684. The mean total OOP
health expenditures of all members in each household per month is INR 403.43, and the
total consumption expenditure of all members in each household per month is INR
37,233.30.
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Categorical and Continuous Variables
Variables

Definition and Categories

Age groups
(Children)
Age groups
(Elderly)

Presence of at least one child (aged 5
years and less) in the household
Presence of at least one elderly person
(aged 60 years and above in the
household
Presence of someone divorced in the
household
Presence of at least one secondary
educated female member in the
household

Marital status
Female
education
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Frequency
(%)
n = 65,932
31,361
(47.57%)
20,234
(30.69%)

Weighted
Percentage

15,649
(23.74%)
27,723
(42.05%)

22.44%

33%
26.87%

33.94%

Location of the
household

Rural
Urban

Socioeconomic
status of
household

Lowest Expenditure Quintile
Second Lowest Expenditure Quintile
Third Expenditure Quintile
Fourth Expenditure Quintile
Highest Fifth Expenditure Quintile

Drinking water

Safe water
Unsafe water

Household
cooking fuel

Unclean fuels
Clean fuels
No cooking arrangement

Drainage type

Open (kutcha and pucca)
Covered (pucca and underground)
No drainage

Latrine type

Service and pit latrine
Septic tank/flush system
No latrine and others

Household size

Small household (1 to 4 members)
Medium household (5 to 8 members)
Large household (9 and more)

Religion of the
household

Hinduism
Islam
Christianity
Other religions
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36,480
(55.33%)
29,452
(44.67%)
13,607
(20.64%)
12,768
(19.37%)
13,825
(20.97%)
12,726
(19.30%)
13,006
(19.73%)
64,376
(97.64%)
1,556
(2.36%)
35,044
(53.15%)
30,274
(45.92%)
614
(0.93%)
27,670
(41.97%)
18,764
(28.46%)
19,498
(29.57%)
13,269
(20.13%)
31,537
(47.83%)
21,126
(32.04%)
29,055
(44.07%)
31,461
(47.72%)
5,416
(8.21%)
50,662
(76.84%)
8,987
(13.63%)
3,924
(5.95%)
2,359
(3.58%)

67.44%
32.56%
30.04%
21.77%
20.59%
15.59%
12.01%
98.75%
1.25%
5.97%
38.78%
1.51%
38.49%
26.95%
34.56%
17.16%
40.76%
42.07%
54.08%
40.94%
4.98%
82.35%
12.59%
2.34%
2.72%

Social Group of
the household

Scheduled tribes
Scheduled castes
Other backward classes
Others

Level of care of
hospitalization
Variables
Sex
Health Insurance
coverage
Chronic illness

Hospitalization

Duration of
hospitalization
Duration of
ailment
Monthly
consumption
expenditure
Monthly
inpatient OOP
health
expenditure
Monthly
outpatient OOP
health
expenditure
Total monthly
OOP health
expenditure

If at least one member in the household
used a private healthcare facility for
hospitalization
Definition
Mean
Proportion of female
members in each household
Proportion of members
enrolled in health insurance
in each household
Proportion of members
suffering from chronic
illness in each household
Proportion members
hospitalized in each
household
Total duration of
hospitalization of all
members in each household
Total duration of ailment of
all members in each
household
Total consumption
expenditure of all members
in each household per
month
Total inpatient OOP health
expenditures of all members
in each household per
month
Total outpatient OOP health
expenditures of all members
in each household per
month
Total OOP health
expenditures of all members
in each household per
month
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8,382
(12.71%)
11,058
(16.77%)
25,842
(39.19%)
20,650
(31.32%)
24,060
(36.49%)

9.14%
18.69%
43.26%
28.91%
9.98%

0.48

Standard
Error
0.0018

95% CI
0.47 - 0.48

0.16

0.0032

0.16 - 0.17

0.06

0.0014

0.06 - 0.06

0.04

0.0006

0.04 - 0.04

1.29

0.02474

1.24 - 1.34

395.25

12.6161

370.52 - 419.98

37233.30

304.3445

36636.78 37829.81

287.46

11.57392

264.78 - 310.15

115.96

8.648854

99.01 - 132.91

403.43

14.48582

375.04 - 431.82

Incidence of catastrophic health expenditures
Table 2 shows the incidence of CHE at 10% of total household consumption
expenditure. CHE incidence was 10.94% in the whole population, but higher incidence was
observed in rural (11.17%) than urban (10.45%) areas. Incidence of CHE is 64.57% among
households if at least one member in the household used a private health facility compared
to households where no member used a private health facility (4.99%). Households in the
highest fifth income quintile (13.82%) experience the highest incidence of CHE, while the
households in the lowest income quintile (9.22%) experienced the lowest incidence of
CHE. Households belonging to the other backward classes (11.28%) had higher incidence
of CHE compared to scheduled tribes (7.13%). Large households (16.15%) had higher
incidence of CHE compared to smaller households (9.14%). Households which have at
least one child aged less than 5 years (14.49%), and elderly aged more than 60 years
(15.43%) have higher incidence of CHE compared to households who did not have any
elderly member or child. Presence of secondary educated female member in the household
increase the incidence rate from 10.03% to 12.71%.
Table 5.2: Incidence of CHE by Household Characteristics
Variables

Categories

Percent of total households reporting catastrophic health
expenditures
Sector
Rural
Urban
Socioeconomic status of
Lowest Expenditure Quintile
household
Second Lowest Expenditure Quintile
Third Expenditure Quintile
Fourth Expenditure Quintile
Highest Fifth Expenditure Quintile
Household size
Small household (1 to 4 members)
Medium household (5 to 8 members)
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Incidence of
Catastrophic Health
Expenditures at 10%
threshold level
10.94%
11.17%
10.45%
9.22%
10.05%
10.71%
13.50%
13.82%
9.14%
12.68%

Religion of the household

Social Group of the
household

Private healthcare facility
for hospitalization

Child aged 5 years and
less in the household

Elderly aged 60 years and
above

Secondary educated
female in household

Divorced person in
household

Large household (9 and more)
Hinduism
Islam
Christianity
Other religions
Scheduled tribes
Scheduled castes
Other backward classes
Others
If at least one member in the household
used a private healthcare facility
No member in the household used a
private healthcare facility
At least one child aged less than 5 years
present in the household
No child less than 5 years in the
household
At least one elderly person aged 60
years and above in the household
No elderly aged 60 years and above in
the household
At least one secondary educated female
member in the household
No secondary educated female member
in the household
At least one divorced person in the
household
No divorced person in the household

16.15%
10.67%
12.36%
12.22%
11.49%
7.13%
10.52%
11.28%
11.90%
64.57%
4.99%
14.49%
9.19%
15.43%
9.29%
12.71%
10.03%
12.72%
10.42%

Intensity of catastrophic health expenditures
Table 3 shows the intensity of catastrophic health expenditures at 10% of total
consumption expenditure. Mean positive overshoot indicates that on average, the out-ofpocket health expenditures was 35.94% higher than the 10% threshold level of total
household consumption expenditure. Higher intensity (overshoot) of CHE was observed in
the socioeconomically poor households and in the rural households. Intensity of CHE was
highest in smaller households (42.76%) compared to larger households (24.74%).
Scheduled tribes (63.99%) faced higher overshoot compared to the other backward classes
(32.96%). Presence of at least one elderly person in the household increased the overshoot
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from 32.68% to 41.28%, but the presence of a child in the household decreased the
overshoot from 43.45% to 26.27%. Presence of an educated female member in the
household decreased the intensity of CHE from 39.48% to 30.50%, and the intensity of
CHE in households having a divorced person increased from 33.29% to 43.45%.

Table 5.3: Intensity of CHE by Household Characteristics
Variables

Categories

Mean Positive Overshoot
Sector
Rural
Urban
Socioeconomic Lowest Expenditure
status of
Quintile
household
Second Lowest
Expenditure Quintile
Third Expenditure Quintile
Fourth Expenditure
Quintile
Highest Fifth Expenditure
Quintile
Household size Small household (1 to 4
members)
Medium household (5 to 8
members)
Large household (9 and
more)
Religion of the Hinduism
household
Islam
Christianity
Other religions
Social Group
Scheduled tribes
of the
Scheduled castes
household
Other backward classes
Others
Private
If at least one member in
healthcare
the household used a
facility for
private healthcare facility
hospitalization No member in the
household used a private
healthcare facility

CHE
Standard
Overshoot
error
among
Households
experiencing
CHE
35.94%
1.9897
36.91%
2.7993
33.78%
1.5522
58.03%
7.6230
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95% Confidence
Interval

32.04 - 39.84
31.43 - 42.40
30.74 - 36.82
43.08 - 72.97

33.84%

1.6214

30.66 - 37.01

25.10%
24.86%

1.0343
1.4873

23.08 - 27.13
21.94 - 27.77

31.04%

2.3106

26.51 - 35.57

42.76%

4.1385

34.65 - 50.87

31.18%

1.3414

28.55 - 33.81

24.74%

1.6253

21.55 - 27.93

35.81%
34.81%
45.44%
36.50%
63.99%
36.03%
32.96%
34.80%
34.07%

2.2582
4.9103
15.4347
4.0923
27.2972
2.7315
1.4396
2.3728
0.7918

31.38 - 40.24
25.18 - 44.43
15.15 - 75.74
28.46 - 44.53
10.46 - 117.53
30.67 - 41.38
30.14 - 35.78
30.15 - 39.45
32.52 - 35.62

38.62%

4.7020

29.40 - 47.84

Child aged 5
years and less
in the
household
Elderly aged
60 years and
above

Secondary
educated
female in
household

Divorced
person in
household

At least one child aged less
than 5 years present in the
household
No child less than 5 years
in the household
At least one elderly person
aged 60 years and above in
the household
No elderly aged 60 years
and above in the household
At least one secondary
educated female member in
the household
No secondary educated
female member in the
household
At least one divorced
person in the household
No divorced person in the
household

26.27%

1.2708

23.78 - 28.76

43.45%

3.3788

36.83 -50.08

41.28%

4.7785

31.91 - 50.65

32.68%

1.3121

30.10 - 35.25

30.50%

1.0207

28.50 - 32.50

39.48%

3.2050

33.20 - 45.76

43.45%

6.6062

30.50 - 56.40

33.29%

1.3265

30.69 - 35.89

Socioeconomic inequality in catastrophic health expenditures
Households in the richest expenditure quintile have the highest incidence of CHE,
but the poorest households experience the highest intensity (overshoot) of CHE. In the rural
areas, households in the richest expenditure quintile and households in the second richest
expenditure quintile in the urban areas have the highest incidence of CHE. However, the
poorest households in both the urban and rural areas have the highest intensity of CHE.
The Mean Positive Overshoot above the 10% threshold level of household consumption
expenditure is higher in the rural areas (36.91%) compared to the urban areas (33.78%).
The positive value of concentration index for headcount indicates that the richer
households are more likely to exceed the threshold both in the urban and rural areas.
However, there is a greater tendency of overshoots among the poorer households in the
rural areas, and a higher intensity of CHE among the richer households in the urban areas.
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Table 5.4 Headcount and overshoot of CHE across expenditure quintiles
Threshold
Headcount
Poorest
Second
Third
Fourth
Richest
Total
CI
SE (CI)
Overshoot
Poorest
Second
Third
Fourth
Richest
MPO
CI
SE (CI)

Rural

Urban

Total

9.61%
10.51%
10.93%
14.24%
18.61%
11.17%
0.0910
0.0081

7.33%
8.68%
10.24%
12.66%
11.70%
10.45%
0.0904
0.0096

9.22%
10.05%
10.71%
13.50%
13.82%
10.94%
0.0848
0.0062

60.20%
31.12%
23.75%
21.76%
28.37%
36.91%
-0.1328
0.0242

43.92%
43.78%
28.21%
28.81%
32.92%
33.78%
0.0277
0.0239

58.03%
33.84%
25.10%
24.86%
31.04%
35.94%
-0.0882
0.0177

Multivariate analysis
Table 5 shows the results from the logistic regression model for predicting the effect
of various factors on the incidence of CHE. It was observed that the odds of experiencing
CHE was higher among the households with at least one child aged less than 5 years, one
elderly person, one secondary educated female member, and at least one member in the
household used a private healthcare facility for their treatment. Urban households had
lower probability of experiencing incidence of CHE, and households from all other
expenditure quintiles also had lesser odds of incurring CHE compared to households in the
poorest quintile. The likelihood of incidence of CHE increased with the increase in duration
of stay in the hospital, with the highest odds being for the households who had members
who stayed for more than 20 days in a hospital. Also, the presence of chronic illness among
members in the household increased odds of CHE. Health insurance coverage in the
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household reduced the likelihood of CHE incidence. Other factors such as religion, social
group, proportion of female members in the household, household size, and presence of
divorced members in the household did not have any significant effects on the incidence
of CHE. Fixed effects for state of residence of the household was used in the model.
Significant results were found in 23 states namely Uttaranchal, Chandigarh, Haryana,
Delhi, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Sikkim, Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Chhattisgarh,
Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Daman and Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Maharashtra, Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, Lakshadweep, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Pondicherry, and Andaman and
Nicobar Islands.
Table 5.5: Logistic regression for the factors affecting incidence of Catastrophic
Health Expenditures
Characteristics
At least one member in the household has
health insurance coverage
Presence of at least one elderly aged more
than 60 years present in the household
Presence of someone divorced in the
household
Presence of at least one child aged less than 5
years in the household
Sector
Rural (Reference)
Urban
Socioeconomic status
Poorest Expenditure Quintile (Reference)
Second Lowest Expenditure Quintile
Third Expenditure Quintile
Fourth Expenditure Quintile
Highest Fifth Expenditure Quintile
Household size
Small household (Reference)
Medium household (5 to 8)
Large household (9 & more)
Duration of hospitalization
Less than 5 days (Reference)
5 to 10 days
11 to 20 days
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Odds
Ratio
0.62

95% Confidence
Interval
0.52 - 0.75

P value

1.27

1.09 - 1.48

0.002

0.94

0.82 - 1.09

0.467

1.34

1.18 - 1.52

0.000

0.91

0.81 -1.04

0.192

0.74
0.60
0.51
0.28

0.62 - 0.88
0.50 - 0.73
0.41 - 0.65
0.21 - 0.38

0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.95
0.68

0.83 - 1.10
0.50 - 0.91

0.543
0.011

8.41
16.42

7.46 - 9.49
13.64 - 19.76

0.000
0.000

0.000

More than 20 days
At least one member in the household used a
private healthcare facility
Absence of at least one female member in the
household
At least one person in the household suffers
from chronic illness
Constant

48.92
28.21

37.93 - 63.10
24.57 - 32.38

0.000
0.000

0.54

0.32 - 0.89

0.017

3.11

2.65 - 3.64

0.000

0.07

0.05 - 0.12

0.000

Table 6 shows the results from the multiple regression model for predicting the effect of
various factors on the intensity of CHE among households who incurred CHE. Households
with at least one child aged less than 5 years, members being covered by health insurance,
and not belonging to the poorest expenditure quintile had lower intensity of CHE.
However, it was in the opposite direction among households with members having chronic
illness, and increased duration of stay in the hospital since they significantly experienced
higher intensity of CHE. Factors such as religion, social group, location, household size,
presence of elderly person, divorced person, female member, secondary educated female
member, and the utilization of private health facility by a member in the household did not
have any significant effects on the intensity of CHE. No significant effects for the state of
residence were found in the state fixed effects model for the intensity of CHE.
Table 5.6: Multiple regression for the factors affecting intensity of Catastrophic
Health Expenditures (if CHE=1)
Characteristics

Coefficient

Proportion of members having health
insurance coverage in each household
Presence of at least one child aged less than 5
years present in the household
Presence of at least one elderly aged more
than 60 years present in the household
Presence of someone divorced in the
household
Presence of at least one secondary educated
female member in the household
Sector
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P value

-1.88

95% Confidence
Interval
-3.36 - -0.40

-7.06

-11.11 - -3.01

0.001

3.74

-5.02 - 12.52

0.402

8.83

-2.96 - 20.63

0.142

3.05

-0.58 - 6.70

0.100

0.013

Rural (Reference)
Urban
Socioeconomic status
Poorest Expenditure Quintile (Reference)
Second Lowest Expenditure Quintile
Third Expenditure Quintile
Fourth Expenditure Quintile
Highest Fifth Expenditure Quintile
Household size
Small household (Reference)
Medium household (5 to 8)
Large household (9 & more)
Duration of hospitalization
Less than 5 days (Reference)
5 to 10 days
11 to 20 days
More than 20 days
At least one member in the household used a
private healthcare facility
Proportion of female members in each
household
Proportion of members with chronic illness in
each household
Constant

1.11

-3.96 - 6.18

0.668

-20.58
-28.77
-30.46
-27.78

-31.15 - -10.012
-37.15 - -20.38
-38.92 - -22.00
-37.23 - -18.34

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

-3.02
-7.55

-10.24 - 4.19
-16.95 - 1.85

0.412
0.116

6.54
25.61
64.66
1.88

3.38 - 9.71
20.96 - 30.25
51.30 - 78.03
-8.30 - 12.08

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.717

-22.31

-50.14 - 5.51

0.116

34.29

10.06 - 58.52

0.006

46.50

19.30 - 73.69

0.001

Discussion and conclusions
In this study, around 10.94% of the households experienced CHE nationally, and it
was more concentrated among the rural (11.17%) households compared to the urban
(10.45%). One of the possible reasons for that is that the public sector health programs are
better in the urban areas. Also, there is a better healthcare access to people in urban areas
because there is a higher concentration of healthcare providers and better coverage under
the urban health programs. The health infrastructure and primary health care programs in
the urban sector were strengthened after the introduction of the National Urban Health
Mission which primarily aimed to help the urban poor and strengthen the health
infrastructure in the urban areas and reduce the OOP health expenditures (Bhat et al. 2018).
The findings of our study are consistent with the results of other studies done in India
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(Ghosh 2011; Garg and Karan 2009) and globally (Fazaeli et al. 2010; Li et al. 2012; Shi
et al. 2011; Yardim et al. 2010; Akinkugbe et al. 2012; Van Minh et al. 2013; Kronenberg
and Barros 2014; Saksena et al. 2010). Among the households which experienced CHE,
the mean positive overshoot indicates that on average, the OOP health expenditures was
35.94% higher than the 10% threshold level of total household consumption expenditure.
This shows that the intensity is very high among the households experiencing CHE.
Our study showed a higher odds of incidence of CHE among the households having
at least one child aged less than 5 years, one elderly person, and at least one member in the
household utilizing a private healthcare facility for treatment. Although the incidence of
CHE was higher among the households with children, but the overshoot was lesser among
the households with children. This is not an issue, since the overshoot shows that among
the households with children the intensity is lesser when compared to other groups,
although there is higher incidence of CHE in the households with children. This was
consistent with literature which showed that households which consisted of members at
extremes of age (Mohanty et al. 2014; Silva et al. 2015), members utilization of private
health facility (Alam and Mahal 2014; Saksena et al. 2012; Kumara and Samaratunge et
al. 2016; Somkotra and Lagrada 2009) had higher OOP and CHE. The likelihood of
incidence of CHE in our study increased progressively with the increase in duration of stay
in the hospital and among the households that experienced the incidence of CHE, the
intensity of CHE also increased with increase in the duration of hospitalization. A report
from the World Bank in India showed that hospitalizations are the major drivers of OOP
health expenditures (McIntyre et al. 2006). Also, the presence of chronic illness among
members in the household increased odds of CHE incidence and also increased the
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intensity among households experiencing CHE. Similar results were found in India
(Mondal et al. 2014), Bangladesh (Molla et al. 2017), and China (You and Kobayashi 2011)
that showed that chronic illness is an important determinant for experiencing CHE. Our
study showed that the presence of health insurance coverage among members in the
household reduced the likelihood of CHE incidence and even among the households that
experienced CHE, the intensity was lesser for households that had health insurance
coverage. Other studies from India (Fan et al. 2012), Indonesia (Aji et al. 2013), Laos
(Alkenbrack and Lindelow, 2015), and Vietnam (Sepehri 2013) supported this finding of
the protective effect of health insurance from CHE. Our study shows that the incidence of
CHE is higher among households with female members. This is consistent with other
studies in literature which also show that households with female members incur higher
OOP health expenditures and most of which is catastrophic (Brinda et al. 2014).
The regression results show that the households from all other expenditure quintiles
had lesser odds of incurring CHE compared to households in the poorest quintile. Among
the households that experienced CHE, the intensity was also highest among the households
in the poorest expenditure quintile. For the poorer households, high level of intensity or
overshoot may be due to low level of absolute income. Globally there is mixed evidence
on the relationship between SES and CHE. Our study results are consistent with the
findings from studies done in Bangalore, India (Bhojani et al. 2012), Thailand, Paraguay,
and Burkina Faso (Makinen et al. 2000) which showed that low income households were
associated with a higher likelihood of CHE. Other studies in Nigeria, Namibia, Albania,
Kenya, Bangladesh, and India show that poorer households have lower absolute OOP
health expenditures compared to richer individuals and households, but the relative
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proportion of OOP health expenditures to non-food household expenditures was higher in
poor households (Chuma, and Maina 2012; Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2011; Hotchkiss et al.
2005; Karan et al. 2014; Onwujekwe et al. 2014; Rahman et al. 2013). However, studies
from 13 low-income Asian countries (O’Donnell et al. 2008), Sri Lanka, South Africa and
Guatemala (Makinen et al. 2000) showed that richer households spent more on OOP health
expenditures and also enjoyed a wide range of services.
In conclusion, coverage by health insurance programs reduces both the incidence
and intensity of CHE in India. People belonging to the lower socio-economic status have
higher incidence of CHE. It is expected that the poor people are more prone to experience
CHE, since they have lower level of income and any expenditure that incur for healthcare
will easily make it “catastrophic” since the proportion of the health expenditure will
become relatively high for them because of low total consumption expenditure (low value
of denominator). Thus, people with lower income levels are at a much higher risk of
experiencing CHE even with a relatively small adverse health event. Health insurance
benefit packages and coverage limits may be adjusted based on the income levels of poor
households with the poorest group receiving the highest level of protection. This type of
targeting is also difficult to implement in practice but it is not impossible with help from
community organizations representing the poor and extreme poor households.
Households with children less than 5 years and elderly more than 60 years have
higher CHE incidence. Children and elderly are the vulnerable age groups who are prone
to higher level of health risks. They have higher healthcare utilizations and thus experience
higher healthcare expenditures which make the expenditure levels catastrophic in many
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cases. This implies that policy makers should also consider age as one of the factors in
deciding the level of insurance coverage.
Utilization of private hospitals has higher incidence of CHE. It is not a problem if
the richer households are using private hospitals more. They will have enough resources in
terms of higher income, savings, and property to pay for the expenses in most cases. Our
data uses expenditures as a proxy for income. Although richer households seem to
experience CHE because of their higher healthcare spending, but this spending may not
actually represent “catastrophic” in reality. When a high proportion of total expenditure is
spent on health care, by definition, it creates catastrophic expenditure situation. However,
richer households may decide to use high-cost private hospitals, use more expensive
hospital services, etc. and for that year total expenditure may increase significantly due to
health care expenditure. A part of this health care expenditure may be coming from savings
and assets they own and therefore, the hospital expenditure will not create long-term
economic and social stress for them. But poorer households need to be protected from CHE
as their high medical care expenses are often funded by borrowing and selling whatever
small amount of assets they have. Therefore, the CHE among the poor creates many social
and economic problems for the poor. Increasing access to government health facilities,
which are mostly free in India, and strengthening their service delivery, and health
infrastructure will enable poor people to utilize the public healthcare facilities, thus
reducing their probability of incurring CHE. As discussed before the regulation of the
private sector with fixed prices for disease-specific diagnosis groups will also help in
reducing CHE.
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There is an increase in both the incidence and intensity of CHE with increased
duration of stay in the hospital. Higher duration of hospital stay increases the chance of
experiencing CHE. When the higher health expenditures are not covered adequately by
health insurance programs, OOP health expenditures may become catastrophic for many
households. The coverage limits provided by the current health insurance programs in India
are limited and are not adequate especially when the patients stay for longer duration in the
hospitals. Thus, the coverage limits for hospital insurance needs to be increased to protect
households from CHE.
Chronic illness increases both CHE incidence and intensity. Steps should be taken
for early diagnosis and treatment, to reduce the severity of illness, reduce the cost of
services, and implementation of better approaches to treat them in the ambulatory settings.
Lifestyle changes and changes in behavioral aspects, food consumption, etc, may also help.
Increasing coverage limits and better benefit package for chronic disease treatment may
also help in reducing CHE.
Households with female members have higher incidence of CHE. Women in the
reproductive age group have higher incidence of hospitalizations for deliveries and if they
experience higher delivery expenses, they may make the households prone for CHE.
Specific health programs in India like the JSY provide minimum funds for promoting the
institutional delivery of poor women. The coverage limits under JSY needs to be improved.
In addition, specific health programs for women’s health need to be started to provide them
free and subsidized healthcare and protect the poor households from CHE.
People in the rural areas are found to have higher CHE incidence and overshoot.
There are higher rates of poverty and lower incomes in the rural areas. Thus, the people in
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the rural areas must be provided with better health insurance benefit packages and higher
coverage limits to protect the households from experiencing CHE when they face a health
event. People in the rural areas must be provided better access to public sector hospitals
which are free. People in the rural areas have significant access barriers such as long travel
distances which prevent their healthcare utilization. A study showed that only 37% of the
population in the rural areas in India have access to health care services within 5-kilometer
radius and only 68% of the population have access to even a basic out-patient health facility
(Kasthuri 2018). The current health insurance programs for the poor in India provide the
same amount of money for travel expenses both for the urban and rural people, but the rural
people face significantly higher travel distances and associated higher travel costs.
Inclusion of higher transportation charges in health insurance for people in rural areas must
be done. Currently there are low rates of enrolment in the public health insurance programs
for the poor in India (Karan et al. 2017). Health insurance coverage to the rural people must
be increased.
Presence of health insurance coverage reduced both the incidence and intensity of
CHE. Households with members at extremes of age, female member, utilized a private
hospital, and small households have higher incidence of CHE. Households belonging to
the poor socioeconomic status, and with members having higher duration of hospital stay,
and chronic illness experienced both higher incidence and intensity of CHE. By identifying
the groups most affected, this research aids the designers of the national insurance
programs to design better benefit packages for those population groups. This investigation
will serve as a basis for assessing India’s policy options to reduce financial burden due to
OOP health expenditures.
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Limitations
The main limitations of this study arise from the use of secondary data. Any study
that uses secondary data suffers from this limitation, i.e., the study becomes limited by the
data collected and survey methodology used. The contents and the questions asked in the
survey are not what an assessment of a program would have done to explore the specific
research questions of this study. One of the most important concern is the lack of
information on the coverage of public health insurance for the poor. The NSSO dataset
includes a variable that indicates insurance coverage by all public health insurance
schemes, i.e., all the people covered by the government sponsored health insurance
programs. Government sponsored health insurance schemes are many in India and includes
insurance programs like Employee’s State Insurance Scheme (ESIS), Central Government
Health Scheme (CGHS), and the poor people’s health insurance programs such as RSBY
and other state health insurance programs. Clearly, government sponsored health insurance
programs cover poor as well as non-poor households. Employees of the central and state
governments are covered by government insurance and none of them likely to be below
the poverty line. It is also likely that many households covered by the insurance for the
poor are not below the poverty line at any specific point in time. Since the enrollment into
the insurance for the poor happens infrequently, economic status of households may change
from enrollment date to the date of the survey.
This research needed to identify the individuals and households who are covered
by the government sponsored insurance for the poor. Since many of those covered by
public or government health insurance schemes are not poor by design, using all
households/ individuals covered by public insurance will not provide the “target group”
the study would like to examine. To identify the group covered by public insurance for the
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poor, a number of implicit assumptions were made: first, it is assumed that no insurance
schemes of the government, other than the insurance program designed for the poor, covers
the households or individuals below the poverty lines defined by the states. This conjecture
is likely to be valid because governmental salary structure is such that almost no one
covered by government employee health insurance program should be below the poverty
line, irrespective of the size of the household. Second assumption is that the people who
are below the poverty line and enrolled in a government sponsored health insurance
program, they must be enrolled in the public health insurance programs for the poor such
as RSBY, RACHI etc.
These assumptions do not identify all the households and individuals covered under
the government insurance schemes for the poor but identifies only those who are covered
by the insurance scheme and are below the poverty line. The households that are below
poverty line and not enrolled in the government sponsored health insurance programs are
assumed to be the control group, i.e., the households that are eligible for participation in
the poor people’s health insurance program but were not enrolled. Poverty is a dynamic
event where people move in and out of poverty and it is almost impossible for any program
to be as dynamic as the underlying dynamics of social mobility and poverty dynamics. The
households who were covered by the insurance for the poor at the time of the survey but
were not below the poverty line at the time can happen for two very different reasons. The
first reason could be simple mis-targeting, i.e., the household should not be in the program
based on the economic status of the household but were enrolled in the program. The
second reason could be that the household belonged to the poverty category when the
household got enrolled but the household graduated from poverty to above the poverty line
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during the intervening period. Since enrollment in the program and disenrollment from the
program happens only infrequently, a certain percent of enrollees will be above the poverty
line. This group was targeted correctly but they moved up the economic ladder since
enrollment. Given the data we have, it is not possible to identify households who were
covered by the insurance for the poor even though they were not poor.
In the empirical analysis, we have used the poverty line for 2014 to identify the
individuals who were poor in 2014. Thus, our study focuses on the group who was below
the poverty line and enrolled in any government health insurance program. Since the
government health insurance scheme that covers individuals below the poverty line are the
insurance schemes for the poor, it is likely that all those who are poor and covered by
government health insurance are actually covered by the public health insurance for the
poor. The implication of these implicit assumptions is that the study cannot conduct an
assessment or evaluation of the insurance program for the poor. It is only assessing the
differences in utilization and out-of-pocket expenses between the poor households and
individuals covered by the public health insurance schemes for the poor and those not
covered by the scheme. Therefore, it is not an assessment of those who are covered by the
insurance schemes for the poor and those not covered but at similar socioeconomic
situations.
Also, the cross-sectional nature of the data creates an important limitation that it
allows us to study only the association of health insurance with the various outcomes, and
not the actual evaluation of the program. Cross-sectional data cannot infer causal
association mainly because temporality is not known and thus cannot assess the change in
outcomes over a period of time. Thus the availability of data over time is required to
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effectively evaluate the program. Data were not collected from the floating population
(people without any normal residence), but households residing in open spaces, roadside
shelters and people who reside in the same place were listed. People residing in the
protected residential areas of military, paramilitary, police areas and people in orphanages,
rescue homes, etc., were not covered. The NSSO health survey data does not collect
detailed consumption expenditure and the consumption expenditure in the NSSO survey
does not differentiate between food and non-food expenditures. It should also be noted that
all information is reported by the surveyed individuals in the households and some
information required quite long recall time. Therefore, the data is prone to strategic, recall
and other types of biases.

Ethical Approval
The dataset is available in the public domain after removing all individual level
identification variables. It is not possible to identify the residence of any of the households
as well. Therefore, ethical approval is not needed for the study. Permission has been
obtained from the Ministry of Statistics and Implementation of the Government of India
for this research and potential future publications using the data set.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations derived from the
results of the two papers discussed in earlier chapters. Since out-of-pocket expenses is an
important factor affecting fairness in financing, the results will be useful in identify
mechanism through which fairness in financing can be improved in India. Fairness in
financing will also reduce barriers to access to health care services and will help improve
health and wellbeing of the population, especially the poorer sections of the population.
There are a number of limitations of the study which may adversely affect the
generalizability of the empirical results obtained. It is important to clearly indicate the
limitations of the study first so that the conclusions and policy implications can be
discussed within the specific context of the data and the survey.

6.1 Limitations of the study
The main limitations of this study arise from the use of secondary data. Any study
that uses secondary data suffers from this limitation, i.e., the study becomes limited by the
data collected and survey methodology used. The contents and the questions asked in the
survey are not what an assessment of a program would have done to explore the specific
research questions of this study. One of the most important concern is the lack of
information on the coverage of public health insurance for the poor. The NSSO dataset
includes a variable that indicates insurance coverage by all public health insurance
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schemes, i.e., all the people covered by the government sponsored health insurance
programs. Government sponsored health insurance schemes are many in India and includes
insurance programs like Employee’s State Insurance Scheme (ESIS), Central Government
Health Scheme (CGHS), and the poor people’s health insurance programs such as RSBY
and other state health insurance programs. Clearly, government sponsored health insurance
programs cover poor as well as non-poor households. Employees of the central and state
governments are covered by government insurance and none of them likely to be below
the poverty line. It is also likely that many households covered by the insurance for the
poor are not below the poverty line at any specific point in time. Since the enrollment into
the insurance for the poor happens infrequently, economic status of households may change
from enrollment date to the date of the survey.
This research needed to identify the individuals and households who are covered
by the government sponsored insurance for the poor. Since many of those covered by
public or government health insurance schemes are not poor by design, using all
households/ individuals covered by public insurance will not provide the “target group”
the study would like to examine. To identify the group covered by public insurance for the
poor, a number of implicit assumptions were made: first, it is assumed that no insurance
schemes of the government, other than the insurance program designed for the poor, covers
the households or individuals below the poverty lines defined by the states. This conjecture
is likely to be valid because governmental salary structure is such that almost no one
covered by government employee health insurance program should be below the poverty
line, irrespective of the size of the household. Second assumption is that the people who
are below the poverty line and enrolled in a government sponsored health insurance
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program, they must be enrolled in the public health insurance programs for the poor such
as RSBY, RACHI etc.
These assumptions do not identify all the households and individuals covered under
the government insurance schemes for the poor but identifies only those who are covered
by the insurance scheme and are below the poverty line. The households that are below
poverty line and not enrolled in the government sponsored health insurance programs are
assumed to be the control group, i.e., the households that are eligible for participation in
the poor people’s health insurance program but were not enrolled. Poverty is a dynamic
event where people move in and out of poverty and it is almost impossible for any program
to be as dynamic as the underlying dynamics of social mobility and poverty dynamics. The
households who were covered by the insurance for the poor at the time of the survey but
were not below the poverty line at the time can happen for two very different reasons. The
first reason could be simple mis-targeting, i.e., the household should not be in the program
based on the economic status of the household but were enrolled in the program. The
second reason could be that the household belonged to the poverty category when the
household got enrolled but the household graduated from poverty to above the poverty line
during the intervening period. Since enrollment in the program and disenrollment from the
program happens only infrequently, a certain percent of enrollees will be above the poverty
line. This group was targeted correctly but they moved up the economic ladder since
enrollment. Given the data we have, it is not possible to identify households who were
covered by the insurance for the poor even though they were not poor.
In the empirical analysis, we have used the poverty line for 2014 to identify the
individuals who were poor in 2014. Thus, our study focuses on the group who was below
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the poverty line and enrolled in any government health insurance program. Since the
government health insurance scheme that covers individuals below the poverty line are the
insurance schemes for the poor, it is likely that all those who are poor and covered by
government health insurance are actually covered by the public health insurance for the
poor. The implication of these implicit assumptions is that the study cannot conduct an
assessment or evaluation of the insurance program for the poor. It is only assessing the
differences in utilization and out-of-pocket expenses between the poor households and
individuals covered by the public health insurance schemes for the poor and those not
covered by the scheme. Therefore, it is not an assessment of those who are covered by the
insurance schemes for the poor and those not covered but at similar socioeconomic
situations.
Also, the cross-sectional nature of the data creates an important limitation that it
allows us to study only the association of health insurance with the various outcomes, and
not the actual evaluation of the program. Cross-sectional data cannot infer causal
association mainly because temporality is not known and thus cannot assess the change in
outcomes over a period of time. Thus the availability of data over time is required to
effectively evaluate the program. Data were not collected from the floating population
(people without any normal residence), but households residing in open spaces, roadside
shelters and people who reside in the same place were listed. People residing in the
protected residential areas of military, paramilitary, police areas and people in orphanages,
rescue homes, etc., were not covered. The NSSO health survey data does not collect
detailed consumption expenditure and the consumption expenditure in the NSSO survey
does not differentiate between food and non-food expenditures. It should also be noted that
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all information is reported by the surveyed individuals in the households and some
information required quite long recall time. Therefore, the data is prone to strategic, recall
and other types of biases.

6.2 Conclusions and Policy Implications
The first set of analysis examined the differences in hospital utilization by health
insurance status of the poor individuals. There are two aspects of hospital utilization –
incidence of hospitalization and duration of hospitalization. The incidence indicates need
and/or willingness to get admitted into a hospital. Decision to become hospitalized is often
not made by the patients; in most cases, individuals follow the instructions of physicians
and other health care providers. Recommendation by health care providers is the triggering
factor for being admitted in hospitals but some individuals may decide not to seek care
from hospitals due to other barriers even though the hospitalization may be considered
medically necessary. Once the patients decide to get admitted in the hospital, the length of
stay is most likely determined by the health care providers and hospital managers.
The empirical results imply that the poor individuals enrolled in health insurance
program are more likely to get admitted in a hospital than those who are not covered by
health insurance. Incidence of hospitalization is a reflection of access to inpatient hospital
services and it is not surprising to find that having insurance increases the likelihood of
hospitalization. Even though the regression models, strictly speaking, do not show causal
relationship, in this case it probably indicates causal pathway. Enrollment in insurance
happens before utilization of hospital services and there exists no mechanism of obtaining
insurance because of need for hospitalization. Therefore, only reasonable implication of

146

the result would be that having insurance for inpatient services increases the incidence of
hospitalization among poor individuals in India.
The second aspect of hospital service use is the intensity of service utilization after
the patients are admitted. The empirical model indicates that insurance status had no
relationship on the level of utilization of hospital services, measured by the length of stay.
Again, most logical explanation would be that if insurance status has any relationship with
duration of stay, the causal relationship should be from insurance status to duration, not the
other way round. Since insurance status had no effect on duration of hospital stay, health
care providers did not discriminate between insured and uninsured once they are admitted
in the hospitals. Again, this is not surprising for a number of reasons. The coverage limits
in the health insurance programs for the poor is low and this low coverage limits did not
create any incentive for increasing the duration of hospitalizations by the physician. The
other reason may be that physicians are driven by the intrinsic motivation to provide better
care for the patients, irrespective of their health insurance coverage or their capacity to pay.
There is always the possibility that the clinicians are unaware of the insurance status of the
patient, which are usually handled by the administrative divisions of the hospitals, and thus
their clinical decisions are independent of any health insurance enrolment status.
Apart from the insurance status of individuals, a number of other factors affect
hospitalization and hospital duration. Chronic illnesses increase both the incidence and
duration of hospitalization. Early detection by preventive screenings and early treatment
initiation will help in decreasing disease progression, and thus reduce preventable
hospitalizations to a large extent. This early detection and treatment initiation could be
delivered through the PHC system in India. India has a wide network of PHCs and the
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PHCs should be upgraded adequately with diagnostic and treatment facilities to detect and
treat chronic diseases which will help in reducing hospital rates, the duration of
hospitalizations, and the associated higher OOP healthcare costs for inpatient care. Many
chronic diseases can be treated effectively in the ambulatory setting. Thus, better
approaches to manage the chronic diseases in the outpatient settings must be implemented
nationally to reduce hospitalizations for conditions that could be treated in the outpatient
setting.
Lower incidence of hospitalization is seen among the larger households. The
insurance for the poor may not cover all individuals in the household. In some states of
India, enrollment is limited to five members of household and the five members must be
selected at enrollment. Therefore, for large households, many members may not be covered
by the program even though the household is enrolled in the insurance plan. Lack of
insurance coverage of some members may prevent access and service usage by those noncovered members. Since the non-covered members cannot utilize the healthcare delivery
system for their health needs, they may end up showing lower rates of hospitalizations.
This barrier in using the hospitals may adversely affect the health status of patients and
overall health status of members in larger households may suffer. Thus, removing these
enrolment restrictions will be helpful in improving hospital utilizations especially for the
members of the larger households.
Our study shows that the Scheduled tribes in India have lower duration of
hospitalization. Scheduled tribes have been traditionally neglected in the country who have
lower capacity to pay because of their limited employment opportunities in the formal
sector, lack of access to cash, and their area of residence which is mostly located in the
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hilly and remote tribal areas of India. They also have poor access to healthcare facilities
since they live far away from the nearest health facility (Barik and Thorat 2015). In addition
to this, the enrolment of tribal people in the health insurance programs for the poor is also
quite low, both because of the presence of access barriers to reach them and enroll them
under insurance programs, and of the problem of acceptability with some of the tribal
groups who actively try to avoid participation in any governmental programs. Access
barriers should be reduced for the Scheduled tribes and their enrolment in health insurance
programs needs to be improved. Government should initiate outreach program to reach this
hard-to-reach group so that their enrollment in insurance program can be expanded.
Both men and women who are 40 years or older have higher incidence of
hospitalizations. This is expected since there is a declining stock of health capital with age
and the severity of illness may also increase with age requiring higher number of
hospitalizations. However, only women in the age groups of 19 to 40 years have higher
incidence of hospitalizations, while men in the same group do not have higher incidence
of hospitalizations. The main reason for this may be that women in the reproductive age
group of 19 to 40 years have higher hospital admissions related to childbirth in healthcare
institutions. In order to have safe deliveries, the Government of India promotes institutional
deliveries through the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) conditional cash transfer scheme,
which may explain higher hospitalizations among women in the reproductive age group.
Utilization of private hospitals have higher OOP health expenditures. Utilization of
private hospitals is not a problem if the richer households are using the private hospitals to
get access to better quality services, but when the poor households obtain care from private
hospitals, out-of-pocket expenses may become too high for the poor households to afford.
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The poor households need to be protected from the high OOP health expenditures when
they are forced to use private hospitals. If the poor households needing hospital services
do not have access to governmental facilities, they may decide to seek care from private
hospitals.
The private healthcare system in India is highly unregulated. Regulation of private
sector can be done by fixing prices for different diagnosis groups so that households would
become fully aware of the total hospital bill for the medical condition at the time of
utilization of services. Making the charges of hospitals more transparent will be another
way of protecting households from uncertainty related to hospital service expenses. The
government sector hospitals act as an important source of healthcare delivery in India,
especially for the poor people. Many poor people do not use the government healthcare
facilities because of their perceived low quality, poor infrastructure, absences of health care
providers and significant travel distances. Strengthening of government health facilities
with better infrastructure and facilities is needed. Reducing access barriers to help the poor
to reach the public health facilities should be done in order to protect the poor households
from making high OOP health expenditures at private sector hospitals.
Increased duration of hospital stay leads to experiencing higher OOP health
expenditures. Duration of hospital stay can be reduced either by reducing the severity of
illness, so that people do not have to stay longer in the hospitals or by reducing the cost of
services, so that they do not incur higher health expenditures. Increasing health insurance
coverage limits and a defined benefit package for different types of medical conditions will
also help in reducing the higher OOP health expenditures due to increased hospital stay.
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This research finds that specific diseases such as cancers, cardiovascular,
endocrine, respiratory, neurological, obstetric and childbirth, and injuries have higher OOP
inpatient health expenditures. Specific national health programs can be established to
include people affected by these diseases, and also provide them with disease-specific
healthcare services. India is currently establishing a national health program for noncommunicable diseases which is being piloted in some districts. Faster nation-wide
implementation of this program will help the poor individuals suffering from these diseases
to get specific health service package. Also, the health insurance coverage limits may be
increased for the poor individuals who are suffering from these specific diseases.
Increasing coverage limits may also encourage “up coding” of health conditions and
without a rigorous monitoring system, disease-specific limits may encourage reporting of
high revenue earning health conditions at a higher rate.
Coverage by health insurance programs reduces both the incidence and intensity of
CHE in India. People belonging to the lower socio-economic status have higher incidence
of CHE. It is expected that the poor people are more prone to experience CHE, since they
have lower level of income and any expenditure that incur for healthcare will easily make
it “catastrophic” since the proportion of the health expenditure will become relatively high
for them because of low total consumption expenditure (low value of denominator). Thus,
people with lower income levels are at a much higher risk of experiencing CHE even with
a relatively small adverse health event. Health insurance benefit packages and coverage
limits may be adjusted based on the income levels of poor households with the poorest
group receiving the highest level of protection. This type of targeting is also difficult to
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implement in practice but it is not impossible with help from community organizations
representing the poor and extreme poor households.
Households with children less than 5 years and elderly more than 60 years have
higher CHE incidence. Children and elderly are the vulnerable age groups who are prone
to higher level of health risks. They have higher healthcare utilizations and thus experience
higher healthcare expenditures which make the expenditure levels catastrophic in many
cases. This implies that policy makers should also consider age as one of the factors in
deciding the level of insurance coverage.
Utilization of private hospitals has higher incidence of CHE. As discussed earlier,
it is not a problem if the richer households are using private hospitals more. They will have
enough resources in terms of higher income, savings, and property to pay for the expenses
in most cases. Our data uses expenditures as a proxy for income. Although richer
households seem to experience CHE because of their higher healthcare spending, but this
spending may not actually represent “catastrophic” in reality. When a high proportion of
total expenditure is spent on health care, by definition, it creates catastrophic expenditure
situation. However, richer households may decide to use high-cost private hospitals, use
more expensive hospital services, etc. and for that year total expenditure may increase
significantly due to health care expenditure. A part of this health care expenditure may be
coming from savings and assets they own and therefore, the hospital expenditure will not
create long-term economic and social stress for them. But poorer households need to be
protected from CHE as their high medical care expenses are often funded by borrowing
and selling whatever small amount of assets they have. Therefore, the CHE among the poor
creates many social and economic problems for the poor. Increasing access to government
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health facilities, which are mostly free in India, and strengthening their service delivery,
and health infrastructure will enable poor people to utilize the public healthcare facilities,
thus reducing their probability of incurring CHE. As discussed before the regulation of the
private sector with fixed prices for disease-specific diagnosis groups will also help in
reducing CHE.
There is an increase in both the incidence and intensity of CHE with increased
duration of stay in the hospital. Higher duration of hospital stay increases the chance of
experiencing CHE. When the higher health expenditures are not covered adequately by
health insurance programs, OOP health expenditures may become catastrophic for many
households. The coverage limits provided by the current health insurance programs in India
are limited and are not adequate especially when the patients stay for longer duration in the
hospitals. Thus, the coverage limits for hospital insurance needs to be increased to protect
households from CHE.
Chronic illness increases both CHE incidence and intensity. As discussed before
steps should be taken for early diagnosis and treatment, to reduce the severity of illness,
reduce the cost of services, and implementation of better approaches to treat them in the
ambulatory settings. Lifestyle changes and changes in behavioral aspects, food
consumption, etc, may also help. Increasing coverage limits and better benefit package for
chronic disease treatment may also help in reducing CHE.
Households with female members have higher incidence of CHE. As seen before,
women in the reproductive age group have higher incidence of hospitalizations for
deliveries and if they experience higher delivery expenses, they may make the households
prone for CHE. Specific health programs in India like the JSY provide minimum funds for
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promoting the institutional delivery of poor women. The coverage limits under JSY needs
to be improved. In addition, specific health programs for women’s health need to be started
to provide them free and subsidized healthcare and protect the poor households from CHE.
People in the rural areas are found to have higher CHE incidence and overshoot.
There are higher rates of poverty and lower incomes in the rural areas. Thus, the people in
the rural areas must be provided with better health insurance benefit packages and higher
coverage limits to protect the households from experiencing CHE when they face a health
event. People in the rural areas must be provided better access to public sector hospitals
which are free. People in the rural areas have significant access barriers such as long travel
distances which prevent their healthcare utilization. The current health insurance programs
for the poor in India provide the same amount of money for travel expenses both for the
urban and rural people, but the rural people face significantly higher travel distances and
associated higher travel costs. Inclusion of higher transportation charges in health
insurance for people in rural areas must be done. Currently there are low rates of enrolment
in the public health insurance programs for the poor in India (Karan et al. 2017). Health
insurance coverage to the rural people must be increased.
Health insurance programs for the poor increase the incidence of hospitalization
but has no effect on the duration of hospitalizations and inpatient OOP health expenditures.
Presence of chronic illness, belonging to older age groups, women in the reproductive age
group, and belonging to a small household have higher hospitalization. People who have
higher duration of hospital stay, admitted to a private hospital, using allopathic treatment,
having chronic illnesses, having higher level of education and belonging to the middle age
group experienced higher OOP inpatient health expenditures. Presence of health insurance
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coverage reduced both the incidence and intensity of CHE. Households with members at
extremes of age, female member, utilized a private hospital, and small households have
higher incidence of CHE. Households belonging to the poor socioeconomic status, and
with members having higher duration of hospital stay, and chronic illness experienced both
higher incidence and intensity of CHE. By identifying the groups most affected, this
research aids the designers of the national insurance programs to design better benefit
packages for those population groups. This investigation will serve as a basis for assessing
India’s policy options to reduce financial burden due to OOP health expenditures.
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